VZCZCXRO8460
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2441/01 2031413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221413Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4738
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002441

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01 MARCH 14 LEADER BOUTROS HARB ALSO URGES
CAUTION ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT TEETH

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
-------

¶1. (C) MP Boutros Harb, a key figure in the pro-reform
March 14 movement, believes Hizballah, as of July 21, has not
been significantly hurt -- either in its leadership or its
military capabilities. Harb said that if Hizballah can reach
a cease-fire in its present relatively strong condition, it
will have won a major political victory -- and will be very
difficult to deal with in the post-conflict phase.
Concerning immediate steps, Harb asked the Ambassador to push
for the establishment of two humanitarian corridors; one
north-south to at least the southern city of Tyre, and a
second route by sea out of the port of Beirut. Concerning
conditions in Lebanon, Harb was very concerned about
confessional tension in the areas of Beirut and Batroun (30
kms north of Beirut) where Shia IDPs from south Lebanon have
settled since the outbreak of hostilities. According to
Harb, Hizballah flags have been raised at schools and other
facilities holding the IDPs, and some IDPs have brandished
small arms. Harb implied an effective humanitarian effort is
needed as much for social stability as it is for humanitarian
relief. End summary.

¶2. (C) In a July 21 meeting with the Ambassador and poloff,
MP Boutros Harb, sometimes mentioned (and often by himself)
as a candidate for Lebanon's presidency, expressed his
conviction that Hizballah's leadership remains intact and
united, and its military capabilities relatively
undiminished. MP Harb, said that while Hassan Nasrallah was
clearly shaken in an interview five days ago, he has regained
his footing and projected renewed confidence in a Thursday
afternoon interview with Al Jezeera. Without citing sources,
Harb stated that Hizballah has had several good days and
would like to reach a cease-fire with its political strength
still intact.

¶3. (C) Like other members of the pro-reform March 14
coalition, MP Harb said that a cease-fire without significant
curtailment of Hizballah's strength would simply establish a
dominant position for Hizballah in Lebanon's politics, and
set the stage for renewed fighting sometime in the near
future.

POLITICAL ADVICE
----------------

¶4. (C) MP Harb recommended that all negotiations to set
conditions for a cease-fire, whether brokered by the UN, US,
EU, or some combination, must be conducted in a manner that
it strengthens the pro-reform Siniora government. Hizballah,
of course, must be isolated, he continued, but "we have to
use Nabih Berri" to communicate and obtain assurances from
Hassan Nasrallah.

¶5. (C) Harb admitted that Speaker Berri has much to gain
personally and is ambitious for more power, but said that
without Berri, reaching a cease-fire would be most difficult.
He advised the US/UN/EU to be "subtle" with Berri, because
even though he can serve as the conduit to Nasrallah, he can
not "deliver" Hizballah. He also advised negotiators to
de-emphasize references to UNSCR 1559, and instead use the
language of the 1989 Ta'if Agreement, which would "give us
everything we need" -- Hizballah's disarmament, GOL control
over all its territory, and provide a path to pluralistic,
rather than confessional politics. Ta'if is language that is
Arab, acceptable to all Lebanese, whereas UNSCR 1559 is seen
as belligerent by some segments of Lebanon and the Arab
world.

¶6. (C) Finally, the March 14 leader said that despite the
different interpretations of the Shebaa Farms issue, it had
to be addressed by the cease-fire. He felt it was a key
argument in stripping Hizballah of its most powerful argument
for "resistance." Harb said he understood the necessity of
preventing Hizballah from claiming a political victory on the
matter, but viewed its importance in the overall debate on
Lebanon's security as a primary cease-fire issue.

¶7. (C) Although it was far too early in the process, MP
Harb stated that he could even see GOL/GOI dialogue coming
out as one of the better results of this situation.

HUMANITARIAN EFFORT

BEIRUT 00002441 002 OF 002

-------------------

¶8. (C) Reflecting the concerns of his core constituency,
Harb insisted that the Christian community of Lebanon was
being asked to bear the greatest social and economic burden.
His primary concern was the creation of potential flashpoints
for communal fighting due to the large movement of Shia IDPs
from south Lebanon into north Beirut, Batroun, and other
Christian communities in central Lebanon.

¶9. (C) Based on anecdotal evidence that he believes is
credible, Harb stated that many of the Shia IDPs have small
arms and have not been shy about making statements that they
are the "resistance" and "are owed." Harb implied that the
humanitarian effort, which is now just forming, must focus on
communal stability as well as supplying food, water and other
necessities.

RECONSTRUCTION
--------------

¶10. (C) Despite the government's checkered record on
reconstruction -- following the 1975-1990 civil war, Beirut
was successfully rebuilt, but at enormous cost and to the
near exclusion of the country's outlying regions -- MP Harb
was convinced the Lebanese government could coordinate the
expected large number of donors and projects in a transparent
and cost-effective manner.

¶11. (C) He said the government would welcome and utilize
the expertise available in the international donor community,
but hoped that, as with political developments, the
reconstruction effort would be used as an opportunity to
strengthen the pro-reform government, as well as incorporate
badly-needed transparency and efficiency in government
institutions.

PHYSICAL SAFETY OF SINIORA
--------------------------

¶12. (C) In concluding his meeting with the Ambassador, MP
Harb voiced deep concern over the physical safety of PM
Siniora. Harb was certain the Syrian regime would like
nothing better than to eliminate democratic Lebanon's most
eloquent voice and most admired national leader. He said he
had advised the Prime Minister to remain in the relative
safety of the Grand Serail, but was wondering if more could
be done. Constitutionally, it will be difficult to
reconstitute a cabinet if Siniora is killed, since President
Lahoud would not sign a cabinet decree unless the cabinet was
more strongly tilted in Syria's favor.
FELTMAN