Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2223, MGLE01: HARIRI, HAMADEH DESCRIBE AS BOTH GOOD AND

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2223.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT2223 2006-07-03 07:22 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXRO7353
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2223/01 1840722
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030722Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4406
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2026 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL LE SY IS KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  HARIRI, HAMADEH DESCRIBE AS BOTH GOOD AND 
BAD THE IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S GAZA OPERATION ON LEBANON'S 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 2222 
     B. BEIRUT 2221 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C/NF)  In separate one-on-one meetings with the 
Ambassador on 6/30, MP Sa'ad Hariri and Minister of 
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh expressed basic 
satisfaction with the previous day's national dialogue 
session.  Israel's actions in Gaza and the arrests of Hamas 
cabinet members and lawmakers cast a heavy shadow over the 
talks.  With the Lebanese convinced that Israel's response to 
the Shalit kidnapping was disproportionate, Hizballah had 
fresh material to use in arguing that Israel will be forever 
hostile.  But Israel's actions also had a positive impact on 
the dialogue, Hariri and Hamadeh argued, as the destruction 
of Gaza's civilian infrastructure demonstrated the dangers of 
Hizballah's tactics.  Hamadeh claimed to have detected Syrian 
and Iranian messages of constraint on Nasrallah, who vowed to 
work to keep the Blue Line calm.  Hariri, by contrast, 
claimed credit for Nasrallah's promises of restraint. 
Nasrallah also paid positive lip service to requests 
regarding UNIFIL renewal.  Regarding disarmament of the 
Palestinian arms outside the camps, Hamadeh claimed that 
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri proved to be an unexpected 
ally in thwarting Michel Aoun's attempt to blame the lack of 
progress solely on Fouad Siniora's cabinet.  End summary. 
 
NASRALLAH PROFITS FROM PERCEPTION 
OF ISRAELI DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSE 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C/NF)  Hariri and Hamadeh's descriptions on 6/30 of the 
previous day's national dialogue largely tracked those of 
other Embassy contacts (reftels).  They elaborated on the 
impact of the Israeli responses to the Gaza kidnapping of 
Cpl. Shalit.  The dialogue atmosphere was initially quite 
"heavy," Hamadeh said, with the Muslims in particular feeling 
a sense of solidarity with the Palestinians.  Hizballah 
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah profited from the Lebanese 
 
SIPDIS 
popular belief that Israel's destruction of Gaza 
infrastructure and arrest of lawmakers and cabinet members 
was disproportionate to the crime.  Nasrallah "had the 
perfect examples" to use, Hariri said, in arguing that Israel 
was irrationally and eternally anti-Arab and not to be 
trusted.  All dialogue participants, Hamadeh argued, had to 
demonstrate their outrage against Israeli action.  Instead of 
zeroing in on the problem of the "arms of the resistance," 
Hamadeh quipped, the dialogue focused too much on the "arms 
of the aggression," because of the news and pictures out of 
Gaza and the West Bank.  "Of course we all had to say that 
Israel was the enemy," Hariri said; "look what's going on!" 
 
HAMAS' TACTICS MIRROR HIZBALLAH'S, 
THUS LEBANON RISKS SAME ISRAELI RESPONSE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C/NF)  But there was also a positive impact on the 
dialogue of the Israeli action, Hamadeh and Hariri noted. 
Citing the news from Gaza, Walid Jumblatt argued forcefully 
to Nasrallah that Lebanon must not be exposed again to 
Israeli wrath.  He and Boutros Harb took the lead in pushing 
the dialogue participants to consider a recommitment to the 
1949 armistice agreement, adjusted as necessary.  Nasrallah 
was on the defensive, Hamadeh argued, particularly when 
Jumblatt pointedly reminded the dialogue participants that 
what the Palestinians did to the Israelis -- infiltrate 
Israeli-controlled territory and successfully kidnap an 
Israeli soldier while killing others -- was exactly the m.o. 
Hizballah has tried repeatedly.  Thus Lebanon had to be 
prepared to sacrifice its bridges, water lines, and 
electricity plants, if Hizballah actually succeeded in 
kidnapping an Israeli.  Pressed by Jumblatt, Nasrallah 
admitted that Hizballah's military installations along the 
Blue Line had suffered extension damage by the 5/28 Israeli 
raids. 
 
NASRALLAH PROMISES TO TRY 
TO KEEP BLUE LINE CALM 
------------------------- 
 
4.  (C/NF)  Nasrallah readily agreed to the request by some 
 
BEIRUT 00002223  002 OF 003 
 
 
participants that Hizballah not take any actions along the 
Blue Line in response to the Gaza operation.  Asking the 
dialogue participants not to make any statements to this 
effect lest people try to challenge his restraint, Nasrallah 
said "leave it to me" to keep the situation in the south 
calm.  He also promised to use Hizballah's influence and 
control to prevent any Palestinians from firing upon Isarel. 
 
5.  (C/NF)  Both Hamadeh and Hariri believed that Nasrallah 
was sincere in his commitment to try to keep the Blue Line 
calm (although both worried that any Israeli "provocations" 
might change Nasrallah's mind).  But they differed on the 
reasons behind Nasrallah's vows of restraint.  Hamadeh 
detected a Syrian and Iranian message to Nasrallah.  "It 
seems obvious" that neither Syria nor Iran want to escalate 
the situation.  Hamadeh said that, while the Israeli F-16 
flights over Bashar al-Asad's summer residence did not 
produce the release of Cpl. Shalit, they may have provoked 
sufficient Syrian fears to keep Hizballah reined in.  Hariri, 
by contrast, credited the intermittent dialogue he has 
conducted with Hizballah (although not lately with Nasrallah 
himself) as the essential factor in what seems to be a 
Hizballah decision to keep the Blue Line calm for now. 
 
A "MODERATE" NASRALLAH ON UNIFIL 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C/NF)  In general, both Hamadeh and Hariri agreed, 
Nasrallah came across as more moderate in this dialogue 
session than he had previously.  Asked for additional 
examples of this moderation, Hamadeh said that Nasrallah had 
responded more positively than expected regarding UNIFIL.  PM 
Siniora briefed the dialogue on UNIFIL's upcoming renewal, 
noting that he had received a letter from UNIFIL Commander 
Pellegrini regarding needed steps on the part of the GOL. 
Siniora noted that he was also under increasing pressure from 
the U.S., France, and others to show progress in asserting 
GOL authority in the south.  While admitting that Nasrallah's 
real feelings might prove to be different when time for 
implementation approaches, Hamadeh said that Nasrallah had 
been "surprisingly positive" when Siniora said that it was 
time that the Joint Security Forces (ISF and LAF combined) 
for the south was up to its full complement of 1,000 troops. 
Nasrallah said that he would help "facilitate" such 
deployment.  Nasrallah also did not reject Siniora's call for 
a joint UNFIL-LAF planning unit, per the Pellegrini (and 
UNSC) request. 
 
PREVIOUS DIALOGUE DECISIONS, 
AND PALESTINIAN ARMS 
---------------------------- 
 
7.  (C/NF)  While General Aoun was mostly silent, when the 
subject turned to the implementation of the dialogue's 
previous decisions, he reportedly went on the attack ("that 
man is 100 percent Syrian," Hariri said in exasperation): 
Fouad Siniora's cabinet was a failure, responsible for the 
lack of implementation.  Siniora reviewed the dialogue's 
decisions, noting that Syria had blocked the demarcation of 
Sheba'a Farms and the establishment of bilateral diplomatic 
relations.  On the disarmament of the Palestinian arms 
outside of the camps, Siniora said -- in a reference to 
Hizballah -- that "those who promised to help, did not." 
When Aoun protested and attacked Siniora again, Berri 
intervened, describing it as "unrealistic" that the 
government could shoulder the responsibility of Palestinian 
disarmament alone.  While Hariri and Hamadeh acknowledged 
that the dialogue session did not make tangible progress on 
Palestinian disarmament, Berri's statement made it very 
difficult for Aoun to continue to claim that the cabinet 
alone is to blame. 
 
CONSENSUS ON AL-QAIDA AS THE ENEMY 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C/NF)  Hamadeh and Hariri shared the satisfaction that 
there had been unanimity in the dialogue about the dangers 
posed to Lebanon by al-Qaida.  Al-Qaida is the "absolute 
enemy," "murderers not Muslims," Hariri said (using much 
stronger language than he had earlier in denouncing Israeli 
action).  In a swipe at recent Lebanese attempts to 
liberalize some visa policies, Nasrallah said that there was 
a danger that al-Qaida members would infiltrate Lebanon not 
only by its land borders with Syria but also via the airport. 
 This comment, Hamadeh said, elicited protests from some 
 
BEIRUT 00002223  003 OF 003 
 
 
dialogue participants, who retorted to Nasrallah that he has 
plenty of people at the airport who could prevent this. 
FELTMAN