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DE RUEHLB #2223/01 1840722
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O 030722Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4406
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2026 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL LE SY IS KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  HARIRI, HAMADEH DESCRIBE AS BOTH GOOD AND 
BAD THE IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S GAZA OPERATION ON LEBANON'S 
NATIONAL DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 2222 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 2221 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  In separate one-on-one meetings with the 
Ambassador on 6/30, MP Sa'ad Hariri and Minister of 
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh expressed basic 
satisfaction with the previous day's national dialogue 
session.  Israel's actions in Gaza and the arrests of Hamas 
cabinet members and lawmakers cast a heavy shadow over the 
talks.  With the Lebanese convinced that Israel's response to 
the Shalit kidnapping was disproportionate, Hizballah had 
fresh material to use in arguing that Israel will be forever 
hostile.  But Israel's actions also had a positive impact on 
the dialogue, Hariri and Hamadeh argued, as the destruction 
of Gaza's civilian infrastructure demonstrated the dangers of 
Hizballah's tactics.  Hamadeh claimed to have detected Syrian 
and Iranian messages of constraint on Nasrallah, who vowed to 
work to keep the Blue Line calm.  Hariri, by contrast, 
claimed credit for Nasrallah's promises of restraint. 
Nasrallah also paid positive lip service to requests 
regarding UNIFIL renewal.  Regarding disarmament of the 
Palestinian arms outside the camps, Hamadeh claimed that 
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri proved to be an unexpected 
ally in thwarting Michel Aoun's attempt to blame the lack of 
progress solely on Fouad Siniora's cabinet.  End summary. 
 
NASRALLAH PROFITS FROM PERCEPTION 
OF ISRAELI DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C/NF)  Hariri and Hamadeh's descriptions on 6/30 of the 
previous day's national dialogue largely tracked those of 
other Embassy contacts (reftels).  They elaborated on the 
impact of the Israeli responses to the Gaza kidnapping of 
Cpl. Shalit.  The dialogue atmosphere was initially quite 
"heavy," Hamadeh said, with the Muslims in particular feeling 
a sense of solidarity with the Palestinians.  Hizballah 
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah profited from the Lebanese 
 
SIPDIS 
popular belief that Israel's destruction of Gaza 
infrastructure and arrest of lawmakers and cabinet members 
was disproportionate to the crime.  Nasrallah "had the 
perfect examples" to use, Hariri said, in arguing that Israel 
was irrationally and eternally anti-Arab and not to be 
trusted.  All dialogue participants, Hamadeh argued, had to 
demonstrate their outrage against Israeli action.  Instead of 
zeroing in on the problem of the "arms of the resistance," 
Hamadeh quipped, the dialogue focused too much on the "arms 
of the aggression," because of the news and pictures out of 
Gaza and the West Bank.  "Of course we all had to say that 
Israel was the enemy," Hariri said; "look what's going on!" 
 
HAMAS' TACTICS MIRROR HIZBALLAH'S, 
THUS LEBANON RISKS SAME ISRAELI RESPONSE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  But there was also a positive impact on the 
dialogue of the Israeli action, Hamadeh and Hariri noted. 
Citing the news from Gaza, Walid Jumblatt argued forcefully 
to Nasrallah that Lebanon must not be exposed again to 
Israeli wrath.  He and Boutros Harb took the lead in pushing 
the dialogue participants to consider a recommitment to the 
1949 armistice agreement, adjusted as necessary.  Nasrallah 
was on the defensive, Hamadeh argued, particularly when 
Jumblatt pointedly reminded the dialogue participants that 
what the Palestinians did to the Israelis -- infiltrate 
Israeli-controlled territory and successfully kidnap an 
Israeli soldier while killing others -- was exactly the m.o. 
Hizballah has tried repeatedly.  Thus Lebanon had to be 
prepared to sacrifice its bridges, water lines, and 
electricity plants, if Hizballah actually succeeded in 
kidnapping an Israeli.  Pressed by Jumblatt, Nasrallah 
admitted that Hizballah's military installations along the 
Blue Line had suffered extension damage by the 5/28 Israeli 
raids. 
 
NASRALLAH PROMISES TO TRY 
TO KEEP BLUE LINE CALM 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  Nasrallah readily agreed to the request by some 
 
BEIRUT 00002223  002 OF 003 
 
 
participants that Hizballah not take any actions along the 
Blue Line in response to the Gaza operation.  Asking the 
dialogue participants not to make any statements to this 
effect lest people try to challenge his restraint, Nasrallah 
said "leave it to me" to keep the situation in the south 
calm.  He also promised to use Hizballah's influence and 
control to prevent any Palestinians from firing upon Isarel. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  Both Hamadeh and Hariri believed that Nasrallah 
was sincere in his commitment to try to keep the Blue Line 
calm (although both worried that any Israeli "provocations" 
might change Nasrallah's mind).  But they differed on the 
reasons behind Nasrallah's vows of restraint.  Hamadeh 
detected a Syrian and Iranian message to Nasrallah.  "It 
seems obvious" that neither Syria nor Iran want to escalate 
the situation.  Hamadeh said that, while the Israeli F-16 
flights over Bashar al-Asad's summer residence did not 
produce the release of Cpl. Shalit, they may have provoked 
sufficient Syrian fears to keep Hizballah reined in.  Hariri, 
by contrast, credited the intermittent dialogue he has 
conducted with Hizballah (although not lately with Nasrallah 
himself) as the essential factor in what seems to be a 
Hizballah decision to keep the Blue Line calm for now. 
 
A "MODERATE" NASRALLAH ON UNIFIL 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  In general, both Hamadeh and Hariri agreed, 
Nasrallah came across as more moderate in this dialogue 
session than he had previously.  Asked for additional 
examples of this moderation, Hamadeh said that Nasrallah had 
responded more positively than expected regarding UNIFIL.  PM 
Siniora briefed the dialogue on UNIFIL's upcoming renewal, 
noting that he had received a letter from UNIFIL Commander 
Pellegrini regarding needed steps on the part of the GOL. 
Siniora noted that he was also under increasing pressure from 
the U.S., France, and others to show progress in asserting 
GOL authority in the south.  While admitting that Nasrallah's 
real feelings might prove to be different when time for 
implementation approaches, Hamadeh said that Nasrallah had 
been "surprisingly positive" when Siniora said that it was 
time that the Joint Security Forces (ISF and LAF combined) 
for the south was up to its full complement of 1,000 troops. 
Nasrallah said that he would help "facilitate" such 
deployment.  Nasrallah also did not reject Siniora's call for 
a joint UNFIL-LAF planning unit, per the Pellegrini (and 
UNSC) request. 
 
PREVIOUS DIALOGUE DECISIONS, 
AND PALESTINIAN ARMS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  While General Aoun was mostly silent, when the 
subject turned to the implementation of the dialogue's 
previous decisions, he reportedly went on the attack ("that 
man is 100 percent Syrian," Hariri said in exasperation): 
Fouad Siniora's cabinet was a failure, responsible for the 
lack of implementation.  Siniora reviewed the dialogue's 
decisions, noting that Syria had blocked the demarcation of 
Sheba'a Farms and the establishment of bilateral diplomatic 
relations.  On the disarmament of the Palestinian arms 
outside of the camps, Siniora said -- in a reference to 
Hizballah -- that "those who promised to help, did not." 
When Aoun protested and attacked Siniora again, Berri 
intervened, describing it as "unrealistic" that the 
government could shoulder the responsibility of Palestinian 
disarmament alone.  While Hariri and Hamadeh acknowledged 
that the dialogue session did not make tangible progress on 
Palestinian disarmament, Berri's statement made it very 
difficult for Aoun to continue to claim that the cabinet 
alone is to blame. 
 
CONSENSUS ON AL-QAIDA AS THE ENEMY 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C/NF)  Hamadeh and Hariri shared the satisfaction that 
there had been unanimity in the dialogue about the dangers 
posed to Lebanon by al-Qaida.  Al-Qaida is the "absolute 
enemy," "murderers not Muslims," Hariri said (using much 
stronger language than he had earlier in denouncing Israeli 
action).  In a swipe at recent Lebanese attempts to 
liberalize some visa policies, Nasrallah said that there was 
a danger that al-Qaida members would infiltrate Lebanon not 
only by its land borders with Syria but also via the airport. 
 This comment, Hamadeh said, elicited protests from some 
 
BEIRUT 00002223  003 OF 003 
 
 
dialogue participants, who retorted to Nasrallah that he has 
plenty of people at the airport who could prevent this. 
FELTMAN