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O 060829Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1028
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 014173 
 
PASS TO IO/UNP AND EAP/K 
PASS TO NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PARM MCCP MARR KNNP UNSC KN KS JA
 
SUBJECT: PRC WORKING ON DPRK IN PRIVATE 
 
REF: STATE 111132 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
. 
¶1. (C) Summary: China shares the same objectives with the 
United States, which should not be disappointed with China's 
actions or statements, MFA Director General Liu Jieyi said in 
response to the DCM's delivery of reftel points. As opposed 
to the 1998 UNSC "Statement to the Press," China favors a 
formal UNSC Presidential Statement at this time, according to 
Liu. He argued that the PRC's July 5 public statement in 
Beijing expressing grave concern and calling for restraint 
was directed squarely at the DPRK. Besides the public 
statements, he claimed that China is working on the DPRK in 
private, where Beijing can be more frank with Pyongyang. Liu 
CONFIDENTIAL 2 of 3 
CONFIDENTIAL 2 of 3 
said that China would use Vice Premier Hui Liangyu's 
long-planned visit to the DPRK to make the DPRK realize how 
the overwhelming negative international reaction to the 
missile launches harm North Korea's own interests. The DCM 
stressed that the PRC's July 5 statement was equivocal, 
oblique and unclear, emphasizing that Beijing must send a 
clear signal to the DPRK that its conduct is unacceptable. 
End summary. 
¶2. (C) During a July 6 morning meeting on Taiwan issues 
(septel) with MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs DG Liu 
Jieyi, the DCM used reftel points to convey to U.S. 
disappointment with China's opposition to a legally- binding 
UNSC resolution condemning the DPRK missile launches. 
Stressing that a step like the 1998 non-binding message will 
be insufficient, the DCM emphasized that it is critical for 
the UNSC to quickly send a clear, strong and unanimous 
message to Pyongyang that the DPRK actions are completely 
unacceptable. 
¶3. (C) Liu said he would pass on the U.S. points to the 
appropriate officials in the MFA Asian Affairs and 
International Organization Departments. Noting that he was 
speaking personally, Liu said that while the 1998 UNSC 
response to the DPRK launch of the Taepondong-1 was to adopt 
a "Statement to the Press," China favored a Presidential 
Statement as a more formal and stronger response to DPRK's 
July 4 missile launches. (NOTE: Liu then at the PRC UN 
Mission personally helped negotiate the 1998 statement. End 
note.) 
¶4. (C) The DCM said the United States views the PRC 
Government's July 5 evening statement in Beijing on the DPRK 
missile launches as equivocal, oblique and unclear. While 
noting that China is gravely concerned about the DPRK's 
actions, the DCM pointed out that the statement also called 
for all sides to remain calm despite the DPRK being the only 
party engaging in destabilizing action and threatening 
regional and global security by breaking its own moratorium 
on missile launches. The United States and North Korea's 
other neighbors will be closely watching PRC Vice Premier Hui 
Liangyu's upcoming visit to North Korea, noting that the 
visit will be viewed as counterproductive and damaging if Hui 
does not deliver a clear message condemning the DPRK's action 
and if North Korea does not take positive steps. 
¶5. (C) Liu responded that the July 5 PRC statement was firm 
and clear in expressing China's grave concern over the 
missile launches and that the message for the need for calm 
and restraint was for DPRK consumption. Beijing's urging 
CONFIDENTIAL 3 of 3 
CONFIDENTIAL 3 of 3 
that there be no more destabilizing action was directed at 
the possibility of further DPRK launches, Liu argued. 
Referring to Vice Premier Hui's visit, Liu said China will 
use any opportunity to make its points to the DPRK and that 
the DPRK should realize the overwhelming negative 
international reaction to the missile launches is not in 
North Korea's own interests. 
¶6. (C) Liu said the United States should not be disappointed 
with China's actions, positions or statements. Beijing 
shares the same objectives with the United States regarding 
the DRPK, but has different ideas on the best way to proceed. 
Liu said that more important than public statements, China 
is working on the DPRK in private, where it is more frank. 
RANDT 
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