VZCZCXRO8558
RR RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0112 1850611
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 040611Z JUL 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0399
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0418

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/4/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF SECURITY IN BASRAH 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 49 B) BASRAH 65 C) BASRAH 81 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1.  (C) On July 3, the Regional Coordinator (RC) met with Hassan 
al-Rashid, leader of Badr Organization in Basrah and a member of 
the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC).  Al-Rashid discussed the 
migration of Sunni families from the Zubair and Al Khassib areas 
because of threats and intimidation and told the RC that a group 
of Sunni and Shia leaders had met to promote unity and address 
the mass departure of the Sunni population.  (Note:  Despite 
frequent inquiries to REO contacts, this is the first that we 
have heard of a Sunni-Shia group that is trying to forestall the 
exodus of Sunni families.  End Note.)  Besides citing the 
existence of such a group, al-Rashid could not give many 
specifics on the members and their activities. 
 
¶2.  (C) Al-Rashid tied the threats against the Sunnis to the 
security situation in Basrah.  He opined that the situation has 
improved since the Prime Minister declared the State of 
Emergency in Basrah on May 1, but believes that the Iraqi Police 
Service (IPS) is the weakest link.  Al-Rashid said that he had 
heard of a new Baghdad security plan for Basrah that would 
include participation by both the Iraqi Security Forces and 
Coalition Forces, but did not know more details.  In an aside 
after discussing Governor al-Wa'eli's role in the security plan, 
the RC asked about oft-reported plans (Refs B, C, and previous) 
for the BPC to vote the governor out.  Al-Rashid said that it is 
now a dead issue and he expects the governor to remain in office 
until the provincial election.  The reason the governor was not 
ousted, he said, was because some BPC members had been directly 
threatened and were too frightened to vote al-Wa'eli out. 
 
¶3.  (C) The RC met with the governor's brother, Ismail 
al-Wa'eli, on July 2 to discuss security in Basrah (see Ref. A 
for more on Ismail al-Wa'eli).  In a disjointed and rambling 
conversation, Ismail admitted many people thought he was behind 
political assassinations in Basrah, but professed his innocence 
and blamed this "false impression" on his numerous disputes with 
people in many political parties.  He expressed frustration that 
he is always the number one suspect for assassinations and 
blamed Badr and SCIRI for many of the killings.  When asked 
about the intimidation and assassination of Sunnis and the REO's 
local staff, Ismail said that the British knew who were behind 
the killings but were not doing anything about it.  He told the 
RC that aside from the assassinations, the Governor was doing a 
good job with the security plan even without the support of the 
IPS or Chief of Police.  He described his future plans as being 
apolitical and focusing on humanitarian work. 
 
¶4.  (C) Comment:  Hassan al-Rashid, a politician who is very 
careful with his words, was even more circumspect in this 
meeting.  He spoke in broad generalities, did not provide 
specific information and, quite frankly, simply seemed to be 
meeting to keep up contact with the REO.  (Note:  in the 
previous five days he also had met with the British Consul 
General and the British military.)  Al-Rashid was resigned to 
Governor al-Wa'eli retaining the governorship. The meeting with 
Ismail al-Wa'eli was a farrago of names and events as he spewed 
out "suspects" in the murders and related his relationship to 
various people at different points in his life. 
 
GROSS