VZCZCXYZ0010
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #2318/01 1841059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031059Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5472
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2016 
TAGS: PTER PREL PARM MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: JOINT WORKING GROUP TO ASSESS IRAQI ARMED FORCES 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki told the Ambassador June 24 that he is interested 
in establishing a joint working group to assess the Iraqi 
Armed Forces (IAF).  Maliki, Defense Minister Abdul Qader, 
and National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie agreed 
that the current force structure is insufficient, that the 
number and quality of troops is inadequate, and that the 
equipment procurement plan needs to be re-prioritized. 
 
¶2. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) SUMMARY CONT'D: Ambassador and 
senior Coalition leaders agreed that establishing a joint 
working group would be useful.  LTG Fry stressed the need for 
all involved to undertake the endeavor with an open mind. 
LTG Chiarelli highlighted the importance of looking at ways 
to improve capacity within the existing structure.  Both 
Chiarelli and Fry further emphasized that military might 
alone will not achieve a secure and stable Iraq. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) On June 24, Ambassador hosted 
a working dinner for Iraqi and Coalition leadership to 
discuss the concept of establishing a joint working group to 
assess the IAF.  The impetus for the session was PM Maliki's 
concern that the current force is not capable of securing 
Iraq.  Attending for the GOI were PM Maliki, MinDef Abdul 
Qader, and NSA Rubaie.  Coalition attendees included 
PolMilCouns, LTG Fry (MNF-I), LTG Chiarelli (MNC-I), MG 
Fastabend (MNF-I), MG Austin (CENTCOM), and BG Gordon 
(MNSTC-I). 
 
--------------- 
FORCE STRUCTURE 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) Maliki said that the current 
force structure is incapable of securing Iraq and therefore 
needs to be modified.  Based on discussions with Abdul Qader, 
Maliki recommended that a mechanized battalion be in each 
brigade to improve maneuverability and firepower.  Maliki 
also proposed that more divisions are needed in hot-spots 
where swaths of territory are controlled by militias or 
insurgents (such as in Basra, Kirkuk, Tikrit, and Mosul).  To 
illustrate the combat power deficiency, Maliki pointed out 
that he and Abdul Qader had wanted the Army to carry out a 
strike in Basrah against a specific target, but they decided 
against it because there were insufficient forces to deal 
with the strike's aftermath. 
 
¶5. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) LTG Fry responded that, 
although it is worth reviewing the force structure, much 
analysis went into the development of the current structure 
and any change would require careful consideration.  Fry also 
warned against any modification that would require increased 
funding since the GOI is under severe budget constraints. 
Although it may be easy to change the structure on paper, BG 
Gordon added, it would take much time to realize any results. 
 For example, Gordon explained, training a self-sufficient 
mechanized battalion would take at least eight months.  MG 
Austin reminded the group that whatever force is ultimately 
developed, the Iraqis must be able to sustain it. 
 
----------------------- 
More Qualified Soldiers 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) Maliki questioned whether the 
quantity and quality of soldiers could prevail against the 
current insurgency.  LTG Chiarelli agreed that the Army needs 
an additional 22,000 soldiers to complete the planned 
ten-division Iraqi Army; Abdul Qader should make recruitment 
a priority, Chiarelli recommended.  Chiarelli also questioned 
whether more soldiers would be needed after the additional 
22,000 are added.  The joint working group's time and effort 
should address manpower shortages that result from systemic 
issues, Chiarelli stated, such as chronic high levels of 
absenteeism.  On any given day, he pointed out, 25 percent of 
the nationally-deployed military is on leave because -- 
without a modern banking system -- soldiers must hand-deliver 
salaries to their families.  In addition, due to poor 
leadership and a lax absentee policy at the Ministry of 
Interior, only 50 percent of two divisions of National Police 
show up for work on any given day. 
 
--------- 
Equipment 
--------- 
 
¶7. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) Maliki and Abdul Qader both 
emphasized the need for more light-to-medium weaponry that 
would increase firepower and equipment that would improve 
mobility.  BG Gordon stressed that a substantial amount of 
equipment had been procured to address these needs but is yet 
to be delivered, either because it takes time for the 
manufacturer to build or because the Iraqis cannot meet their 
payment schedules.  BG Gordon listed a number of big 
procurements that are "in the pipeline," including 2,797 
armored HUMVEES and 378 wheeled, armored personnel carriers. 
Gordon also noted that the 448 armored HUMVEES that were 
procured with Iraqi national funds were on hold for several 
months because the MoD could not get its money transferred 
from the Iraqi Central Bank to the U.S. manufacturer. 
 
¶8. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) LTG Chiarelli stated that 
developing strategies to ensure utilization, sustainability, 
and accountability of equipment is important.  Forces must 
learn to use the equipment they have been issued, he said. 
For example, Coalition Forces have found that Iraqis manning 
checkpoints are not wearing their helmets or their armored 
vests.  Chiarelli also pointed out that forces frequently are 
unable to move because of their inability to refuel their 
vehicles in a timely manner.  If a unit runs out of its 
allotted monthly fuel, Chiarelli stated, the procurement 
process can become a 28-day bureaucratic nightmare.  This 
frequently happens with the border police who are at 100 
percent capacity but are left largely in static positions 
because of fuel issues.  Chiarelli further mentioned the need 
to solve the all-too-common problem of ISF equipment falling 
into unauthorized hands. 
 
------------ 
INTELLIGENCE 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) Rubaie raised the importance 
of enhancing the capacity within the intelligence community 
and increasing the number of Special Forces units to carry 
out precise strikes based on the intelligence.  PolMilCouns 
agreed that improving intelligence is critical and pointed 
out that the power of communication and the ability to 
exploit strategic information will do much toward winning 
this war. 
 
------------------- 
JOINT WORKING GROUP 
------------------- 
 
¶10. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I) The dinner closed with all agreeing 
to establish a joint working group to assess the IAF. 
Ambassador and Maliki agreed to coordinate with the relevant 
representatives to ensure that a meeting is set up within the 
next week or so.  Ambassador stressed that it would be 
important for the working group to have some initial input 
for Maliki before he leaves for Washington later in July. 
 
¶11. (C/REL MNF-I, MNC-I and IZ) COMMENT: Once again, Maliki 
has shown that he is willing to take initiative and unafraid 
of voicing his views, at least to the Coalition.  Further, it 
is not surprising that Maliki has requested a review of the 
current IAF, since the word around the MoD for weeks has been 
that, if Abdul Qader became MinDef, Maliki would begin his 
term by pushing for change in many areas, including the force 
structure and civil service.  Although drastic changes may 
not be appropriate or in our interests, we do believe that a 
joint working group could be a good forum to pursue 
improvements in logistics, management, and sustainability. 
These areas are in extreme need of attention.  Policies and 
procedures must be developed and implemented to ensure that 
when the Coalition leaves, the MoD will be able to sustain 
not only its forces in the field and in the office, but its 
wealth of equipment spread across the country.  END COMMENT. 
Khalilzad