VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAE #0618/01 2090906
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280906Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8326
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0520
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0209
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1720
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4602
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0581

UNCLAS ASMARA 000618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC SIPDIS 
 
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, WGARVELILNK, LROGERS 
DCHA/OFDA FOR GGOTTLIEB, AFERRARA, ACONVERY, CGOTTSCHALK, KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP FOR JDWORKEN, SBRADLEY 
USAID/AFR/EA FOR JBORNS, SMCLURE 
USUN FOR EMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
ROME FOR FODAG 
NAIROBI FOR OFDA JMYER, GPLATT; REDSO/FFP NESTES 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID UN ER
 
SUBJECT:  ERITREA - HUMANITARIAN UPDATE 
 
REF:  Asmara 00398 
 
------------------------ 
Introduction and Summary 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. USAID/OFDA Regional Advisor (RA) Georgianna Platt traveled to 
Eritrea June 17-29, 2006 to meet with U.N. agencies, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), OFDA implementing partners 
and staff of the US Embassy Humanitarian Affairs Unit (HAU) to 
assess the overall humanitarian situation and impact of the ongoing 
drought in the Horn of Africa region.  The RA also visited a 
USAID/OFDA funded water project implemented by UNICEF Eritrea in 
Northern Red Sea Region and its planned Community-based Therapeutic 
Feeding Center (CTC) for severely malnourished children in Massawa. 
 
 
¶2.  The operating environment for UN agencies and NGOs in Eritrea 
remains challenging.  While about half of the 32 local and 
international NGOs passed the rigorous process of registration 
imposed by the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare (MLHW) in May 
2005, they still encounter operational, administrative and financial 
obstacles and travel restrictions imposed by the GSE.  Three 
international NGOs that were initially registered in 2005 had their 
registrations rescinded in March, and were asked to cease activities 
and close their offices immediately.  Reasons for this action were 
not provided to the NGOs. 
 
¶3.  The drought that has affected other Horn of Africa countries has 
had a detrimental impact on household food security throughout 
Eritrea.  Contrary to government claims of a bumper harvest in late 
2005, UN and NGOs say the 2005 harvest was at best average, and 
provided only a three-to-four month supply of cereals.  The much 
needed December coastal rains completely failed causing considerable 
livestock loss there due to lack of pasture and water reserves while 
the long rains of June and July are off to a slow start.  All 
general food distributions by the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) and 
NGOs were stopped by the GSE in September 2005 and targeted food 
distributions were stopped by April 2006. 
 
¶4.  Nutrition surveys conducted in February 2006 by the U.N. 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) show worsening malnutrition rates, a proxy 
indicator of the general food security situation.  (The GSE will not 
allow multi-sector household food security assessments by the U.N. 
and NGOs).  A much anticipated food-for-work (FFW) scheme to be 
organized by the MLHW to replace general food distributions never 
materialized, instead, the government is selling the 94,000 MT of 
commodities provided by donors to WFP and NGOs to finance a 
cash-for-work (CFW) scheme.  U.N. agencies and NGOs met with 
describe high food prices, limited food availability, poor terms of 
trade, low livestock prices and an overall worsening food security 
situation. 
 
¶5.  The USAID/DCHA Humanitarian Affairs Unit (HAU) staff at the US 
Embassy are working to facilitate USAID/FFP's portfolio closeout, 
monitor OFDA funded partner activities, and monitor and assess 
general humanitarian conditions in the country by liaising with 
government ministries, the U.N. and NGOs.  New travel restrictions 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on embassy staff travel 
outside Asmara is making it difficult for HAU, embassy and temporary 
duty (TDY) staff to effectively determine the humanitarian situation 
in the country. 
 
¶6.  OFDA recommends continued engagement with UN agencies, NGOs and 
the GSE; and funding for water, food security, nutrition, health and 
coordination if disaster funding is available.  End Introduction and 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Humanitarian Affairs Unit - US Embassy, Asmara 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  HAU staff at the US Embassy in Asmara are facilitating the 
closeout of Food for Peace's program portfolio (with NGOs Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), WFP and Mercy Corps).  The unit also provides 
oversight to USAID/OFDA funded programs implemented by UNICEF and 
CRS, and assesses the humanitarian situation by liaising with the 
U.N. agencies, NGOs, government authorities, and other international 
organizations. 
 
¶8.  HAU national staff face a challenging task but are doing a good 
job, having been told by some NGOs that their presence in NGO 
vehicles is unwelcome, and some NGOs feel that an embassy vehicle in 
convoy with theirs may cause undue attention.  HAU attempts to 
gather information on food security and the general humanitarian 
situation from local authorities have been stymied by the reluctance 
of officials to be frank and forthcoming with information. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Food Security:  Everyone's Concern 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  The GSE declared the 2005 harvest to be the best since 1998, 
claiming a harvest of 400,000 MT.  The government stopped all 
general food distributions in September, 2005, and stopped targeted 
food distributions between November 2005 and April 2006.  These 
distributions were implemented by WFP, Mercy Corps and CRS.  The 
three agencies had been feeding approximately 1.3 million 
beneficiaries, about a third of the Eritrean population.  Instead, a 
FFW scheme was to replace general food distributions.  By May 2005, 
the FFW program had not materialized, and the GSE announced a CFW 
program that would utilize the 94,000 MT currently in 
government-controlled warehouses for its own projects, part of a 
goal to achieve "self-reliance" and reduce dependency on donor aid. 
(Reftel). 
 
¶10.  The GSE is selling the donor-provided food aid to subsidize its 
CFW program.  Donor food commodities are being sold at government 
outlets and to businessmen for resale on local markets.  WFP reports 
that donated cereals are being milled in Asmara, repackaged in the 
same bags, and are being transported to rural markets and urban 
government shops.  NGOs interviewed made similar reports. 
 
¶11.  According to WFP, Eritrea needs about 650,000 MT per year to 
feed its citizens while only 200,000 to 220,000 are produced locally 
in the best of times, with the balance provided through commercial 
imports and donations.  With no general food distributions since 
September of 2005, and an average harvest in 2005, many zobas hit by 
the region-wide drought earlier this year saw extensive livestock 
deaths.  The failure of the short rains in March, needed for 
long-cycle crop germination, the delay in the start of the long 
rains and seed and fertilizer shortages, are contributing to 
critical household food shortages.  In fact, all UN agencies and 
NGOs interviewed confirm high food prices, limited food availability 
at markets, poor terms of trade, poor milk and milk product 
production, and say they have heard that some families limit food 
intake to one meal a day.  Unfortunately, the lean period will 
continue through November, with the food security situation only 
getting worse over the dry summer months ahead. 
 
¶12.  Extensive labor shortages due to military and national service 
requirements have severely affected subsistence farming capacity and 
family income generating opportunities.  In some regions of the 
country, women headed households are as high as 50 percent due to 
conscription. 
 
¶13.  UNICEF reports increasing malnutrition rates, especially in 
Gash Barka where a nutrition survey showed global acute malnutrition 
rates increasing from 17.2 percent in July 2005 to 21 percent in 
February 2006.  Severe acute malnutrition in this region also 
increased, from 1.3 percent to 2.3 percent.  According to UNICEF, 
the main causes for these high malnutrition rates are inadequate 
food, low variety in diet, and water shortages.  UNICEF anticipates 
these malnutrition rates will increase in the coming months.  Since 
the government is not conducting post-harvest assessments and 
household food security surveys, these figures are good proxy 
indicators of the general food security situation. 
 
----------------------------- 
Difficult Working Environment 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14.  U.N. agencies and NGOs continue to grapple with operational 
challenges posed by GSE ministries.  Since the MLHW replaced the 
Eritrean Relief and Refugee Commission (ERREC) in May 2005 as the 
main government institution responsible for coordinating 
humanitarian operations, it has not established itself as a 
responsive counterpart to the humanitarian community.  MLHW issued 
travel passes are required for all NGO expatriates wishing to travel 
to project locations outside Asmara and work permits are now limited 
to one expatriate per NGO.  U.N. agencies fare slightly better in 
getting travel and work permits.  International employees at all 
embassies now require MFA permission to travel outside the Asmara 
city limits.  The OFDA RA was granted permission to visit a UNICEF 
implemented water project in Foro, Northern Red Sea, but was denied 
travel permission to visit a CRS project site in Debub. 
 
¶15.  NGOs cite shortages of qualified workers (due to required 
national service obligations), travel restrictions, shortages of 
supplies, equipment and materials, delays in processing imports, 
delays in processing memoranda of understanding with local 
authorities and line ministries as major challenges that result in 
delays in project implementation. 
 
¶16.  The GSE's May 2005 NGO Proclamation resulted in about half of 
the 32 international NGOs being registered and allowed to operate in 
Eritrea, the balance of NGOs were closed down by the end of 2005. 
In March 2006, three NGOs that were registered in 2005 were 
deregistered and asked to cease operations by the MLHW; no reasons 
were provided.  Concern Worldwide and Accord will be closed out by 
the end of July and Mercy Corps ended all activities and forfeited 
all assets to the government in June.  This has made the tenure of 
all NGOs uncertain, especially since the NGO Proclamation cites an 
annual NGO registration process; the remaining local and 
international NGOs fear being culled in the next round of 
registration. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Interagency Coordination and the CHAP 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) has implemented the cluster approach to coordination, with 
designated U.N. agencies chairing each of six cluster groups that 
are responsible for identifying humanitarian issues and response 
plans.  Cluster heads are to report to an interagency steering 
committee (IASC).  While the process resulted in the drafting of the 
common humanitarian action plan (CHAP) which outlines the current 
humanitarian situation and projected humanitarian response resource 
requirements, the IASC has been dormant for the past several months, 
due in part to the absence of an office chief at OCHA and lack of 
engagement by the UNDP Humanitarian Coordinator.  OCHA has recently 
appointed a new head of office in Eritrea who will be reactivating 
the IASC.  The CHAP can easily be converted into a consolidated 
emergency appeal (CAP) if the government allows the U.N. to start 
the process.  Eritrea was included in the regional Horn of Africa 
CAP, however, donor response for U.N. agency support in Eritrea has 
been minimal. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Internally Displaced Persons:  uncertain future 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶18.  Approximately 40,000 people remain internally displaced in 
Eritrea, living in camps in Gash Barka, Debub and Northern Red Sea 
provinces; unable to return to their homes in the temporary security 
zone (TSZ) along the disputed border with Ethiopia.  In early 2005, 
the U.N. assisted the government to resettle over 14,000 IDPs in 22 
villages in Gash Barka.  In recent months, the government has 
resettled an additional 5,000 IDPs in their home villages in Debub, 
however, OCHA reports that many are returning to camps due to lack 
of infrastructure and support services in resettlement areas.  A 
recent U.N. assessment mission (UNICEF, OCHA and UNDP) was deployed 
to the region and will soon report its findings. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Water:  Continues to be a priority 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  As the long rains are delayed, water availability is becoming 
increasingly scarce.  According to UNICEF and the Water Resource 
Department of the Ministry of Land, Water and Environment, only 
about a third of the rural population has access to protected water 
systems.  Water levels in wells and boreholes in lowlands are at an 
all time low.  Women and children are impacted the most, as they are 
generally tasked with fetching water and are compelled to travel 
great distances to find it.  Most agencies interviewed are 
implementing water programs, as this is the priority need voiced by 
all rural communities. 
 
¶20.  Sanitation coverage is extremely low, with less than four 
percent of the rural population having access to sanitation 
facilities.  Subsequently, with each water delivery system that 
UNICEF rehabilitates or constructs, accompanying sanitation 
facilities are introduced and sanitation/health education programs 
are undertaken in local schools. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Progress of OFDA Funded Projects - UNICEF and CRS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶21.  The RA visited a USAID/OFDA-funded UNICEF-implemented water 
program site in Northern Red Sea Zoba.  The Foro water project 
phase-one was completed in February 2005, phase-two is to be 
completed by the end of the year.  It provides water to six villages 
in addition to Foro town, a total of about 10,000 persons.  Water is 
gravity fed from a spring 15 KM from Foro.  Water committees were 
formed and they have been trained to manage the water resources in 
their villages.  Distribution points are managed locally and 
residents are charged a nominal fee to cover maintenance costs. 
UNICEF has an excellent working relationship with both the central 
and regional water board officers.  The project is within national 
development priorities and has had an immediate impact on both 
health and livelihoods of the beneficiaries. 
 
¶22.  UNICEF plans to expand therapeutic feeding programs in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Health.  It currently supports 42 
programs for severely malnourished children throughout the country 
and plans to open an additional ten feeding centers.  It is also 
planning to pilot community-based therapeutic care (CTC), a feeding 
strategy that will provide ready-to-use therapeutic food to children 
on an out-patient basis. 
 
¶23.  CRS' USAID/OFDA funded Agriculture and Livelihood Program 
commenced after the start of the long rainy season in 2005, thus was 
unable to provide farmers with seeds for the main cropping season. 
CRS was given a no-cost extension until the end of June 2006 
providing 10,000 farm families with seeds and plowing services in 
Debub and Maekel Zobas.  CRS was awarded a cost extension by OFDA in 
June 2006, targeting an additional 4,000 farm families with seeds 
and plowing services for the main cropping season.  The OFDA RA was 
unable to observe a CRS supported seed fair in Debub due to GSE 
travel restrictions. 
 
------------------------------- 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
------------------------------- 
 
¶24.  Many of the overall problems in Eritrea stem from chronic 
poverty and vulnerability and are exacerbated by questionable 
government relief policies and responses to food insecurity.  About 
half of the population is unable to produce or obtain sufficient 
food while less than a third of the rural population has access to 
potable water.  Food insecurity is exacerbated by chronic drought 
conditions in the Sahel, resulting in crop failures, exorbitant 
grain prices, livestock losses and asset depletion furthering the 
downward spiral of vulnerable people into abject poverty and 
destitution. 
 
¶25.  While the GSE has downplayed the need for development 
assistance programs, it has created an extremely difficult and 
antagonistic working environment for many U.N. agencies and NGOs 
which could respond to the looming humanitarian crisis. 
 
¶26.  The failure of the December coastal rains, needed to replenish 
pasture and water tables, resulted in large numbers of livestock 
deaths and reverse migration of pastoralists and livestock to 
highlands which further stressed the population in those regions. 
The absence of the short rains in March resulted in poor long cycle 
crop germination.  The delayed onset of the long rains for the main 
cropping season, shortages of seed and fertilizer, and the lack of 
food relief during these lean months prior to the next harvest are 
contributing factors to extensive food insecurity.  Malnutrition 
rates are increasing, food prices are skyrocketing while many 
households are already limiting food intake to one meal a day, 
indicators show that the food security situation is deteriorating. 
Responses by the government, such as stopping all food aid 
distributions, initiating a hastily implemented CFW scheme and the 
monetization of food aid are inadequate and inappropriate 
interventions. 
 
¶27.  Depending on the availability of funds, the OFDA RA recommends 
priority consideration to the following sectors:  (1) water source 
rehabilitation focusing on drought stricken areas as well as water 
related livelihood interventions (irrigation schemes); (2) 
short-term agriculture support activities, including the provision 
of seeds and other farm inputs and interventions addressing 
livelihood support; and (3) support for emergency health and 
nutrition interventions.  In addition, the OFDA RA recommends 
support to OCHA to enable greater coordination between humanitarian 
actors and the government. 
 
¶28.  OFDA also recommends a follow-up review of the humanitarian 
situation in mid-2006 by OFDA agriculture and health/nutrition 
specialists to determine agriculture, livelihood, health and 
nutrition sector needs, and to reassess the operating climate and 
humanitarian and food security situation. 
 
DeLisi