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Viewing cable 06ASHGABAT716, A Street Wisdom Primer on Corruption in

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ASHGABAT716 2006-07-07 05:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO1413
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #0716/01 1880550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070550Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7537
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/REA/NMJIC-J2//
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5-E//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/RUE//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1655
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 000716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET ECON EFIN ENRG TX PGOV INV SOCI ZK
SUBJECT: A Street Wisdom Primer on Corruption in 
Turkmenistan 
 
Ref A: Ashgabat 564 
Ref B: 05 Ashgabat 1266 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Rampant corruption in Turkmenistan pervades all 
levels of society.  Its root causes include high 
unemployment, a general lack of civic pride, an unresponsive 
and incompetent bureaucracy and long-standing societal 
acceptance of bribery as a way to get better service or 
advance personally.  The system is used by President Niyazov 
as a means of personal control over government officials at 
all levels.  The way corruption operates in the oil and gas, 
health and education, construction and law enforcement 
spheres differs, but all of these major economic sectors are 
heavily affected.  Official statistics on corruption are 
unavailable, and most of this primer is taken from the 
direct experiences of embassy employees and contacts, as 
well as the conventional wisdom on the street.  End Summary. 
 
State-Sponsored Corruption:  Pervasive by Design 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  (SBU) The pervasiveness of corruption in Turkmenistan is 
an indication that rule of law does not effectively 
function.  The Government of Turkmenistan routinely engages 
in corruption, largely as a measure of control.  Although 
Niyazov regularly fires officials for corrupt practices, 
given the enormous quantities of loot he accuses his 
officials of stealing, we must assume that he is aware of 
the widespread practice, and he turns a blind eye in order 
to extract loyalty from his subordinates.  The widespread 
corruption also gives him a ready-made hook to purge anyone 
in his way.  Since August of 2005, of the thirteen high- 
level (ministerial and welayat hakim) positions purged, the 
majority were fired for corruption, based on official press 
reports.  Though these high-level government officials were 
officially sacked and prosecuted for taking bribes, the real 
reasons were political, and should not be seen as a sign of 
the regime's seriousness about fighting corruption. 
 
Corruption's Roots 
------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Although corruption originally became widespread in 
Central Asia during the Soviet period, particularly under 
Brezhnev where the communist party famously transmogrified 
into a mafia-style tribute system, it became more diffused 
under Gorbachev's "perestroika" era -- less hierarchical and 
arguably more pervasive.  Continued in the current culture 
of fear and repression in Turkmenistan under Niyazov's rule, 
rampant corruption has helped to destroy any sense of civic 
responsibility forcing citizens to survive by any means 
necessary.  There is no social inhibition against "greasing 
palms" with bribes in order to get ahead of a neighbor or 
colleague -- whether this means getting a child into 
university, obtaining a good position or getting certain 
business permits ahead of competitors. 
 
To Bribe, or Not to Bribe? 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) While corruption is pervasive, not all government 
services in Turkmenistan require a bribe.  Often, a citizen 
who wants a routine government service has a connection who 
will intervene to ensure that everything is done in the 
proper timeframe, obviating the need for a bribe.  If a 
public official judges an applicant unable to make the 
requisite payment, rather than press for the bribe, he/she 
simply lets that person's application fall to the bottom of 
the pile, to be acted upon after those who are paying for 
the "premium service." 
 
5.  (SBU) Turkmenistan's high unemployment rate caused by a 
diminished public sector, including massive layoffs in the 
public health and education sectors (Note: In 2001 the 
government laid off 11,000 health and 10,000 education 
workers, and in 2004 an additional 15,000 healthcare 
workers. End Note.), and chronic non-payment of wages, also 
contribute to corruption.  As the main employer in the 
 
ASHGABAT 00000716  002 OF 006 
 
 
country, the government's lack of transparency in the public 
sector hiring process leads to further corruption. 
Government officials who have access to decision-making in 
personnel issues enrich themselves by receiving bribes for 
providing these jobs.  In order to obtain the lucrative 
government positions where it is possible to collect such 
bribes requires an initial bribe, as well as yearly -- or 
sometimes monthly -- cash maintenance fees.  This creates a 
never-ending cycle of corruption:  Corrupt officials "hire" 
others for a cash payment or other consideration and these 
employees then use their positions to make this money back 
through the taking of bribes-for-services. 
 
6.  (SBU) The amount of a bribe depends on the position 
offered.  A PolEcon Asst's son was asked to pay $300 for a 
communication technician position in the public telephone 
company.  An Ashgabat resident told a PolEcon Asst that for 
$1,000 he could get a traffic police officer position. 
Another Ashgabat resident said that a lawyer's position at 
the Ministry of Justice can be bought for $10,000.  During a 
September 27 cabinet meeting, President Niyazov dismissed 
several regional governors for embezzlement and corruption, 
and accused the Governor of Ahal Welayat Myrat Atagarryev of 
receiving bribes ranging in amount from $10,000 to $100,000 
for hiring regional managers. 
 
7.  (SBU) Almost all services require bribes, for example: 
-- Education Ministry:  accepting students to universities; 
 
-- Hospitals:  providing "better" medical services; 
 
-- City government: access to the new marble high-rise 
"Elitka" housing. 
 
-- Motor Vehicles:  a driver's license can be obtained 
through the normal procedure by taking the test and paying 
the standard $3, or to avoid the test, one can pay anywhere 
from $70 to $150, depending upon the type of license. 
 
7.  (SBU) In an office or ministry where corruption is 
rampant, honest employees or those who do not generally 
insist on taking bribes, are mistrusted by those above them 
who do, and are often quickly replaced or supplanted by 
those who "play the game." 
 
High Turnover Creates "Shopping Spree" Mentality 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The infamous "revolving door" of top-level 
officials in Turkmenistan fuels the fires for corruption in 
Turkmenistan and accelerates its timetable.  In what amounts 
to an accelerated kleptocratic model of governance, when a 
minister, deputy minister or office head is replaced, the 
new official then replaces many of the officials below them, 
and this is a prime opportunity for graft, corruption and 
nepotism.  Currently employed officials -- many of whom paid 
for the position in the first place -- must again pay to 
stay in place or face replacement by the new minister's 
friends, relatives, fellow tribesmen, or more likely, job- 
seekers who are willing to pay top dollar for the chance to 
profit from a new high position.  Additionally, the short 
tenure of the top-level officials -- all are appointed for a 
six-month probationary period -- motivates them to take full 
advantage of their position, grabbing as much financial 
benefit as possible before they are inevitably demoted, 
banished or imprisoned. 
 
The Myth of Cheap Living in Turkmenistan 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) As long as officials at every level benefit from 
the practice, the Government of Turkmenistan is unlikely to 
fight corruption in any meaningful way.  While Niyazov makes 
a public show for both domestic and international audiences 
about providing free education, medical care, new modern 
housing, inexpensive gasoline, one dollar airline tickets 
and many other benefits, the true cost of living in 
Turkmenistan requires making additional, off-the-books 
payments in order to get the allegedly "free" or "low-cost" 
items or services.  For example, even though a citizen of 
Turkmenistan can book a domestic flight on Turkmenistan 
 
ASHGABAT 00000716  003 OF 006 
 
 
Airways for just $2.40, in reality, these flights are often 
"sold out" but for the additional fee of $20 to the right 
official you can book a place, depending upon the 
destination, according to a PolEcon Asst, who regularly pays 
this extra fee for airline  tickets.  In rural areas in 
Turkmenistan, if someone from a well-to-do family is getting 
married, the family usually pays a pre-emptive bribe of a 
few bottles of vodka or other liquor to the municipal power 
authority in order to avoid having the electricity cut 
during the wedding reception.  A further example is paying 
$2,000 - $3,000 to one or more prison officials to ensure 
that your relative is included in the annual amnesty list of 
prisoners. 
 
Oil & Gas 
--------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Corruption in the petroleum sector is 
characterized by two main factors: Lack of transparency, and 
lack of market mechanisms.  The entire industry is 
structured in order to mask a huge portion of government 
revenue by accumulating it in off-shore, off-budgetary 
funds.  This then provides ample opportunities to hide the 
real amount and flow of the budget funds.  For instance, on 
May 20, 2005, former Deputy Chairman for Oil and Gas Yolly 
Gurbanmuradov was accused of using Petroleum Fund resources 
without authorization.  He allegedly misappropriated $48 
million earmarked for the State Petroleum Fund, "re- 
allocating" this money without following the appropriate 
procedures.  Furthermore, Turkmenistan practices unfair 
procurement processes, especially in the oil and gas 
sectors.  Through pre-arranged tenders with foreign 
companies of questionable pedigree, government officials 
regularly overprice various services and supply contracts 
and then split the illegal mark-ups with tender "winners." 
 
11.  (SBU) Another example of the lack of market mechanisms 
causing corrupt practices in the oil and gas sector is the 
long-standing barter deal with Ukraine for natural gas 
supplies.  Government of Turkmenistan officials reportedly 
receive bribes from Ukrainian companies for overpricing the 
cost of goods supplied to Turkmenistan as payment for gas 
deliveries.  In a recent meeting with PolOff, a Ukrainian 
diplomat admitted that the barter arrangement between the 
two countries provided "many opportunities for corrupt 
practices."  In June 2005, Ilyas Chariyev, the former 
Turkmennebitgaz Trade Corporation Chairman was accused of 
applying the so-called "coefficients" of goods supplied from 
Ukraine, using the false numbers to skim profits from the 
monetary difference in the actual price of the barter 
goods.  The investigation revealed that Chariyev almost 
tripled the prices of the barter merchandise received. 
Additionally, state-subsidized consumer oil products -- such 
as gasoline and kerosene -- are smuggled to Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan where their price is considerably higher, 
providing high profits for smugglers.  Border officials who 
permit this illicit trade also benefit from the arrangement 
via bribes and payoffs. 
 
12. (SBU) The state controls the salaries of all employees, 
paying them considerably less than foreign companies pay 
their local staff doing similar jobs in Turkmenistan.  This 
leads to a sense of entitlement to "make up the difference" 
through bribery and other corrupt activities.  A common 
practice among local officials in the industry is to boost 
their income -- and thus, that of foreign firms with 
production sharing agreements (PSAs) -- by increasing the 
amount of oil extracted, over the agreed-upon quota, in 
return for a bribe.  The foreign firms can then sell the 
extra oil on the open market for increased profits. 
 
Health and Education 
-------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU) There is widely-recognized corruption in the 
public sector health, education and employment industries, 
due in large part to low salaries.  Bribes are both expected 
and required to provide an adequate standard of living for 
people in these professions and their families.  For 
example, most doctors require that patients pay "off-the- 
record" fees in addition to the actual fee for their 
 
ASHGABAT 00000716  004 OF 006 
 
 
services.  There are informal rates for every type of 
service.  For example, an embassy employee recently paid her 
doctor an additional $10 off-the record fee for a 
tonsillectomy (surgery), while the actual fee was $16. 
Expecting mothers are a reliable target for this kind of 
extortion.  A local embassy employee recently paid a bribe 
of $100 to have her baby delivered, even though the normal 
fee is just $40.  Another local employee, whose daughter 
needed hernia surgery, paid roughly $200 to doctors and 
caregivers in order to ensure better care. (Note: the 
average monthly salary in Turkmenistan is $62. End Note.). 
 
14.  (SBU) In the education sector, a steep decline in the 
quality of secondary school education and the reduction of 
admission slots in Turkmenistan's universities has increased 
corruption dramatically.  Reportedly, headmasters of 
Ashgabat's elite schools require a $200 - $500 bribe to 
place a child.  Admission to a Turkmen university can be 
secured for anywhere between $5,000 and $7,000 which is 
equal to the official tuition in the country's only private 
university. 
 
Construction 
------------ 
 
15.  (SBU) Construction is one of the few fields where 
foreign companies are allowed to widely operate in 
Turkmenistan.  However, in order to acquire one of these 
lucrative construction contracts from the government it 
takes more than just good personal relations with 
Turkmenistan's government agencies.  The Trade Counselor at 
the Turkish Embassy told PolOff that the Turkish 
construction companies win their projects through open 
tenders, but rumors about Turkish firms bribing the 
Government of Turkmenistan officials abound.  Former Deputy 
Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Yolly Gurbanmuradov was 
charged with accepting over $1 million in bribes from Ilham 
Ipekci, the head of the Turkish construction company ERKU, 
for example.  According to his conviction, in return for the 
money, Gurbanmuradov allowed ERKU projects to pass unimpeded 
through Construction Ministry inspections.  In another 
example, the former Head of the Presidential Apparatus Rejep 
Saparov was charged with bribery that included accepting 
almost $1.4 million from the "Mensel" construction company, 
another Turkish firm (Reftel A). 
 
Law Enforcement 
--------------- 
 
16.  (SBU) Although the Government of Turkmenistan rarely 
acknowledges corruption in law enforcement ministries, the 
recent fall from grace of former Prosecutor-General 
Gurbanbibi Atajanova provided ample evidence of corrupt 
practices.  In addition to her dismissal for various crimes, 
not least of which was corruption, 14 other procurators were 
also relived of their responsibilities for similar 
misdeeds.  There are several other examples of high-ranking 
law enforcement officials involved in corruption.  For 
example, in June 2002 the Supreme Court of Turkmenistan 
sentenced Committee of National Security Chief Muhammed 
Nazarov, Deputy Khayit Kakayev and Department Chief 
Allamurad Allakuliyev to 20 years of imprisonment for 
accepting bribes, exceeding their authority, involvement in 
illegal drug trade and other crimes.  Also on November 18, 
2005 the president issued a decree firing the Head of the 
Serkhetabat border detachment Major Kakajan Kakyshovich 
Tajibayev due to the involvement of border guards in narco- 
trafficking.  Reftel B also outlines how police involved in 
criminal investigations often exploit the system for their 
personal gain, with little to no regard for putting 
criminals behind bars. 
 
17.  (SBU) When criminal charges are put forward, law 
enforcement officials will take bribes at every step of the 
case's passage through the justice system.  EmbOff's 
domestic employee's spouse was apprehended on a criminal 
charge and the investigator immediately started asking for 
money to help "fix" the case.  A small sum was requested and 
paid, but the case did not disappear.  Prior to the trial, 
prison officials extorted sums of money in order to allow 
visitation rights as well as deliveries of food and medicine 
 
ASHGABAT 00000716  005 OF 006 
 
 
(much of which was never actually delivered).  A forensic 
psychologist requested a payoff through the police 
investigator in order to render a favorable characterization 
of the suspect's state of mind. 
 
18.  (SBU) Turkmenistan's traffic police are notoriously 
corrupt.  Their modus operandi is to stop drivers for 
alleged traffic infractions and then shake down the drivers 
for a dollar or two as an alternative for getting a ticket 
or larger fine.  Most of the time the fine is paid as a 
convenient alternative to going through the bureaucratic 
hassle of paying the fine for the violation in person, and 
the amount of the bribe is always less than the fine itself. 
 For example, failure to yield is a 25,000 manat ($0.90) 
ticket, but a bribe of just 20,000 manat saves a trip to the 
traffic police.  In August 2002, Niyazov tried to fight 
corruption in law enforcement by transferring the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs' (MIA) Traffic Police departments to the 
newly created Ministry of Defense State Traffic Control 
Service.  The idea was that the new agency would employ 
young conscripts with "clean minds" who were not yet 
involved in the previous agency's corrupt practices. 
However, the practice of accepting bribes continues, and 
these young people readily accept bribes, due to two 
factors:  their wages are so meager and they are often 
forced to do so by their supervisors -- many of whom were 
simply old MIA officers who obtained positions similar to 
their old ones in the new agency. 
 
Small Businesses 
 
19.  (SBU) A large number of small enterprises exist in 
Ashgabat, from family-owned stores selling basic food 
products, to wholesale beverage suppliers, to bars and 
restaurants.  According to anecdotal evidence, no small 
enterprise can succeed without a "krisha," or roof -- 
someone in a "power" ministry (Ministries of National 
Security and Internal Affairs, or the General Prosecutor's 
office) who can intercede when government officials are 
causing problems.  Some restaurants and bars, for example, 
pay bribes in order to avoid having to close down right at 
11:00 p.m., as mandated by local law.  The expat manager of 
a new bar/disco, when asked how much he had to pay to stay 
open until 04:00 a.m., simply answered "a lot."  Another 
common source of harassment for small business owners are 
the myriad local authorities adept at finding "infractions" 
within their purview.  Unless the business owner has a high- 
ranking "krisha," he is forced to settle with every minor 
passing official who is looking for a handout.  The friend 
of one embassy staff member was shopping for a new "krisha," 
but finally decided that the cost of doing business 
outweighed the benefits and closed his small food stall. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
20.  (SBU) While Turkmenistan's corruption problem has 
existed since Soviet times and before, it has shown no sign 
of diminishing over the last fifteen years and in many 
instances has become much worse.  Furthermore, President 
Niyazov benefits directly from the established system, both 
personally and politically -- either making token efforts to 
"clean up" government in order to increase his cult of 
personality, or by using it as a weapon when he needs to 
clean house and fire ministers whom he has deemed too 
powerful or a threat to his rule, so as to consolidate his 
power. 
 
21.  (SBU) It should be noted that, unlike many states in 
the post-Soviet sphere (and elsewhere), Turkmenistan has 
little or no organized crime independent of the government. 
Elsewhere, organized crime bosses have key government 
officials in their pockets; here, the capos and dons are the 
officials themselves and their subordinates are the foot 
soldiers. 
 
21.  (SBU) In addition to its political utility to Niyazov, 
corruption also in a way solves the gross inefficiencies of 
Turkmenistan's economy.  With prices kept artificially low 
to perpetuate the myth of Turkmenistan's "Golden Century," 
the black market price of goods and services ends up being a 
 
ASHGABAT 00000716  006 OF 006 
 
 
truer reflection of economic reality.  END COMMENT 
 
JACOBSON