This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ALMATY 002370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, INL/HSTC PASS TO KCC 
POST FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS KCRM CPAS CMGT ASEC KZ
SUBJECT: Q1 AND Q2 FRAUD SUMMARY - ALMATY 
 
REF: A. STATE 205073, B. ALMATY 355, C. ALMATY 1476 
 
¶1. A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Since independence in 1991, the 
economic situation in most of Kazakhstan has improved.  In 
the larger cities, such as Almaty, Astana, and Atyrau, the 
oil and gas industry has provided an economic boom. 
However, the improvement in living conditions is uneven and 
in many rural areas there are still pockets of extreme 
poverty and economic hardship.  The economic situation is 
aggravated by corruption, which motivates much of the visa 
fraud encountered by post.  Many visa applicants have 
unofficial jobs as produce sellers or goods traders.  It is 
difficult to verify income from these jobs, let alone 
establish strong ties to entice applicants to return. 
 
Most visa applicants desire to travel to Brooklyn and Rego 
Park, NY, where there are very large Russian-speaking 
populations.  There also appears to be a growing group of 
Kazakhstani religious refugees in the Seattle, WA area. 
Students from the region often seek to study English in 
Houston, TX or Omaha, NE.  A significant number of ethnic 
Russians have sought to leave Kazakhstan since independence. 
The government and other organizations here are actively 
promoting study and use of the Kazakh language, and also 
focusing on indigenous culture.  However, in both areas the 
process here has been slower than in neighboring Central 
Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan. 
 
While the number of Kazakhstani immigrants to the United 
States is increasing, it is still fairly low. 
 
Fraudulent documents, especially invitation letters, 
employment letters and other bona fides are available and 
easy to come by.  However, it is unusual to see fraudulent, 
official Kazakhstani documents such as passports and birth 
certificates.  On the other hand, it is common to see 
fraudulent official documents from neighboring countries. 
The most common occurrence of official document fraud is the 
switching of nationalities from neighboring countries in 
Central Asia.  Due to historic, ethnic and cultural ties 
among Central Asian populations, it is easy to switch 
nationalities. 
 
¶B. NIV FRAUD: Embassy Almaty processes NIV visas for 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.  The most widespread incidence of 
consular fraud in Kazakhstan is related to NIV applications, 
featuring false job and invitation letters.  Recently, post 
has seen more sophisticated attempts to fraudulently obtain 
visas, including P and O petitions and H2B petitions.  The 
current NIV refusal rate is 18% and more than twice that for 
Tajiks. 
 
For a number of months, Post received applications from 
groups of Tajik athletes intending to compete in the United 
States in various competitions. The sports ranged from Tae 
Kwon Do to Arm Wrestling. Nearly all of the applicants were 
unqualified -- their only travel outside of Tajikistan was 
their trip to Almaty for their visa interview. 
 
Post has recently uncovered P petition fraud perpetrated by 
Tuscan Art, Inc. (reftel C). Of 15 applicants claiming to be 
part of two nationally-known performing groups from 
Tajikistan, only 6 were actual performers. The remaining 
were "hangers-on". An in-depth investigation by Post 
determined that the petition has submitted many similar 
petitions in CIS countries. 
 
Additionally, Post has seen an increase in the number of H2B 
applicants over the past quarter. It would appear that as 
petitioners are unsuccessful in obtaining workers from 
Europe and the Caucasus, they are moving further east to 
Central Asia. 
 
As the Summer Work and Travel season has started, Post has 
begun to see job offers from particular parties of concern. 
When discussing with applicants about how they obtained 
their job offers, the number one answer is "on the 
Internet." It also appears that a small group of students 
have paid for their job offers. Post is flagging particular 
applications for follow-up in the fall, based on comments 
received from our 2005 Summer Work and Travel season 
validation study (septel to follow). 
 
Student visa fraud (F visas) still remains rare in 
Kazakhstan.  The majority of Kazakhstani students are 
qualified for their visa.  Those who are not usually do not 
provide fraudulent documents.  However, post also 
adjudicates visas from Tajikistan, where many students 
remain unqualified to study in the United States because of 
their inability to provide proof of sufficient financial 
means to pay for their first year of study. 
 
Post is seeing an increasing number of Third Country 
Nationals applying from the region and beyond, including 
Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Israel, who often 
have difficulty proving ties to either Kazakhstan or their 
home country.  Many times, these applicants have previous 
refusals from their home countries or neighboring posts. 
 
Post does not see significant or noticeable fraud in other 
visa categories, including R, A, G, or H1B. 
 
¶C. IV FRAUD: Post processes immigrant visas for Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  Approximately 60% of 
post's IV cases are from Uzbekistan.  Beginning in Summer 
2006, Embassy Tashkent will process Uzbek IV applications. 
 
Recently Post has seen multiple K-1 petitions filed for 
the same person by different petitions. In one such 
case, the beneficiary met both male petitioners through 
an Internet dating site. She maintained correspondence 
with both at the same time and even met both of them in 
Istanbul, Turkey, albeit at different times. The I-129F 
fiance petitions were filed within two weeks of one 
another, although neither petition knew about the 
other. The email correspondence and description of the 
"meeting" for both petitioners reads like a script. 
After a long fraud interview, the applicant admitted 
that she was engaged to both American men. The 
petitions were sent for revocation, but interestingly 
enough, even though the petitioners were advised of the 
situation, one still professed his intention to marry 
the beneficiary. In an odd turn of events, the 
beneficiary stated that she would not marry this 
petitioner after all. 
 
¶D. DV FRAUD: Post processes immigrant visas for Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  Post works closely 
with neighboring consular sections to verify the validity of 
documentation.  Approximately 80% of post's DV cases are 
from Uzbekistan.  Beginning in Summer 2006, Embassy Tashkent 
will process Uzbek DV applications. 
 
Post has encountered a number of suspicious Affidavits of 
Support and notarials provided by ethnic Russian Americans 
located in Chicago, Illinois and Brooklyn, New York. It 
appears that a translation Agency OMEGA LLC, located in 
Samarqand, Uzbekistan at Ziyokor St. Apt. 31, Samarqand, 
Uzbekistan 703033; along with its translators Nina 
Vyacheslavovna Pogosyan and M. Abduhamedova assist in the 
completion of Diversity Visa package paperwork and the 
search for potential "financial sponsors" for Uzbekistani 
nationals. They advise DV winners what documents they should 
acquire to improve their chances of getting a visa, usually 
a new passport, a military service book, or a new birth 
certificate. For these services, they charge 400,000 UZB 
SUMs, about $400 (8 month's salary.) 
 
Many applicants serviced by Agency OMEGA have provided 
Affidavits of Support notarized by Leonard Schwartz of 
Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Schwartz himself has been a sponsor 
for a number of DV cases processed in Almaty over the past 
year. The Americans sponsoring these DV winners were based 
in Chicago, but the applicants provided a Brooklyn address 
for their permanent address. It remains unclear what the 
connection is or the relationship to fraud, but it certainly 
raises questions as to the validity of the information. 
 
¶E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: ACS fraud is extremely low in 
Kazakhstan.  To date, post has not had major problems with 
mala fide applicants trying to obtain genuine U.S. passports 
or Consular Reports of Birth Abroad from the consular 
section. 
 
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD: Post processes over 500 adoptions a year, 
the fifth largest provider of adopted children for Americans 
adopting abroad.  To date, post has not registered problems 
with fraudulent documentation or fraudulent cases. 
 
¶G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: Post assists DHS 
Moscow, the Department and the BCIS District offices in the 
United States with verifying documents for refugee and 
asylum cases.  In most instances, these documents turn out 
to be fraudulent. 
 
¶H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: Cooperation 
with the Kazakhstani government authorities is mixed.  MFA 
is in the capital of Astana and normally requires a 
diplomatic note before responding to official requests. 
However, post has good relations with the MFA representative 
in Almaty.  There is a noted lack of cooperation or 
organization among Kazakhstan's ministries and regional 
departments.  Despite this, post is usually able to receive 
immediate assistance with verification of documents and 
border crossings, most notably during the so-called "Tulip 
Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan last spring. 
 
Post has developed strong relationships with adoption 
processing authorities.  We also have good ties with the 
Ministry of Education--the government agency that oversees 
the processing of dossiers. 
 
¶I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: Kazakhstan's geographic 
location makes it a transit point for alien and drug 
smuggling, particularly from South Asia to Western Europe. 
 
In Summer 2006 Uzbek IV/DV processing will be transferred to 
Embassy Tashkent. 
 
In Summer/Autumn 2006 Tajik NIV processing is scheduled to 
be transferred to Embassy Dushanbe. 
 
In September 2006, the Embassy will move from Almaty to 
Astana.  Almaty will maintain a consular section with two 
American officers and eight FSNs.  All IV processing, 
including regional processing except for Uzbeks will remain 
in Almaty.  Embassy Astana will open a consular section in 
September 2006 with one officer, a Consular Associate and at 
least two FSNs.  Astana will process only NIVs and share the 
ACS workload with Almaty.  The Chief of the two Consular 
Sections will remain in Almaty. 
 
¶J. STAFFING AND TRAINING: Almaty Consular Section Chief Jeff 
Lodinsky and Vice Consul Anne Baker share the workload of 
Fraud Prevention Manager.  Post has one full-time DV Fraud 
Investigator, Ilya Pyuro.  NIV fraud prevention is the 
responsibility of FSN Zhanna Lim. 
 
Jeff Lodinsky attended the Small Post Consular Leadership 
Development Course (PC-108) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopa in May 
¶2006. 
 
Anne Baker attended the Fraud Prevention for Consular 
Manager's course (PC-541) at FSI in May 2005, the Small Post 
Consular Leadership Development Course (PC-108) in Mainz, 
Germany in November 2005, and the EurAsia Regional Fraud 
Prevention Conference in Istanbul in April 2006. 
 
Ilya Pyuro attended the Fraud Prevention Workshop for FSNs 
(PC-542) at FSI in November 2005.  Mr. Pyuro also spent 
three days at Embassy Tashkent at their Fraud Prevention 
Unit in April 2005. 
 
Zhanna Lim attended the NIV FSN Workshop (PC-121) at FSI in 
January 2004 and the EurAsia Regional Fraud Prevention 
Conference in Istanbul in April 2006. 
 
 
ORDWAY