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FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
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INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1373
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001278 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MARR ML AG LY SU
SUBJECT: ALGERIA REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING 
MALI AGREEMENT 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 1243 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 748 
 
ALGIERS 00001278  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C) MFA Director General for African Affairs Chergui 
briefed Ambassador July 9 on the recent agreement Algeria 
brokered between Malian authorities and Tuareg rebels in 
northern Mali (reftels) and asked for a U.S. pledge of 
financial assistance for the "Forum on Development" created 
by the agreement.  The GOA also requested that Embassy Bamako 
help explain the benefits of the agreement to the people of 
Mali and provide moral support for its implementation. 
Ambassador, while making no promises of assistance, noted the 
U.S. interest in keeping the Sahel region stable and free of 
terrorism and undertook to inform Washington of the GOA 
requests.  Chergui also told Ambassador of GOA concerns that 
Libya could hamper the implementation of the agreement, 
leaving the clear impression that U.S. assistance in bringing 
the Libyans on board would also be appreciated.  Separately, 
Chergui told Ambassador Algeria was continuing its efforts to 
convince Sudan to accept conversion of the AMIS to a UN force 
by the end of the year and expressed optimism that in the end 
Sudanese President Bachir would accept UN forces for Darfur. 
Post requests guidance from the Department on responding to 
the GOA requests for assistance in implementing the Mali 
agreement.  (End Summary and Action Request.) 
 
¶2.  (C) MFA Director General for African Affairs Smail 
Chergui convoked Ambassador July 9 for a briefing on the 
recently signed peace agreement between the government of 
Mali and the Tuareg rebels (see reftels).  Chergui told 
Ambassador, who was accompanied by PolEc Chief, that he had 
been part of the Algerian team negotiating the agreement. 
Chergui said the President of Mali had asked the GOA to 
intervene, and the Tuareg rebels agreed to the GOA's 
assistance by a referendum vote among the tribes.  The GOA 
told both parties it insisted on working through "the full 
integrity of Mali institutions," a condition that both the 
rebels and government accepted prior to Algeria's 
involvement. 
 
AGREEMENT CALLS FOR NEW TUAREG SECURITY UNIT IN NORTH MALI 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) After Ambassador congratulated the GOA on its success 
in brokering the agreement, Chergui said he wanted to draw 
U.S. attention to the provisions for creating a special 
Tuareg security unit because of its relevance to 
counterterrorism efforts in the region.  This new security 
unit in the north of Mali would be composed mainly of the 
Tuareg and would be similar to the arrangement Algeria had 
negotiated in Niger some years ago.  The security unit would 
be subordinate to the Malian military, could be used to fight 
terrorism as needed, and would have responsibilities for 
patrolling, visitor protection, guarding public buildings, 
and assisting the police.  Chergui noted it was better to 
employ the Tuareg in fighting terrorism than have them sit 
around with no source of income and getting into trouble. 
Ambassador observed that Niger seemed to have a more 
disciplined fighting force against terrorism than Mali. 
Chergui agreed, stressing that much work remained in order to 
strengthen Mali's forces. 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked what arms the Tuareg would carry, Chergui said 
"light arms, like police" and referred Ambassador to a copy 
of the French-language agreement, which he handed Ambassador, 
for more details.  (Note:  Embassy provided a copy of the 
agreement to NEA/MAG.)  Chergui said the central government 
could use the new security forces as it wished.  Chergui 
suggested to Ambassador that the U.S. and Algeria, through 
intelligence channels, should work cooperatively over time on 
defining and enhancing Mali's cooperation against terrorism. 
 
U.S. FINANCIAL AND MORAL ASSISTANCE VITAL 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In addition to the creation of the new security unit, 
Chergui drew Ambassador's attention to the economic and 
social areas of the agreement, which in part called for the 
establishment of a fund to make payments to fighters leaving 
the mountains, returning to their families, and turning in 
 
ALGIERS 00001278  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
weapons.  As part of the emphasis on social and economic 
development, Mali agreed to issue invitations within three 
months to a "Forum on Development".  Observing that there was 
no running water, roads or sanitary structures to speak of in 
Kidal, the focus of the conference would be on developing 
this region, home to the Tuareg  In the interest of "not 
provoking jealousies" in other regions of Mali, Chergui 
emphasized that the Forum would not be billed as assistance 
to Kidal.  Chergui concluded by telling Ambassador the GOA 
"counted a lot" on the United States to help fund the 
necessary development.  Ambassador responded that the U.S. 
already provided assistance to Mali and that any assistance 
would need to be addressed through the budgetary process. 
Chergui stressed that a U.S. pledge of assistance would help 
make the Forum a success. 
 
¶6.  (C) Noting that press coverage in Mali of the new 
agreement had not been good, Chergui also asked that the U.S. 
Embassy in Bamako help explain the agreement to the people of 
Mali.  "Anything you could do would help."  Chergui hoped the 
U.S. Ambassador to Mali would "diffuse the same message as 
the President (of Mali) and help calm the waters."  Chergui 
explained that the social pact of 1992 in Mali contained many 
elements that the central government had failed to implement 
due to lack of financial means.  It was because of this lack 
of attention that some Tuareg went to the mountains. 
Thankfully, the number of casualties was limited, and the 
movement to the mountains merely brought attention to the 
situation and facilitated intervention.  Ambassador said he 
could make no promises but would convey the GOA request to 
Washington.  It was in our mutual interest to maintain calm 
in the Sahel, deny sanctuary to terrorists, and work together 
to strengthen the abilities of Sahelian governments and 
militaries to exercise more effective control over their 
territories. 
 
GOA CONCERNED THAT LIBYA COULD BE UNHELPFUL 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Chergui, stressing the sensitivity of his next point, 
expressed concern that Libya could complicate the 
implementation of the agreement in Mali.  Libya had closed 
its consulate, and the Tuareg tribes did not have a favorable 
opinion of Qadhafi's "Greater Sahara Initiative."  The tribes 
themselves told Qadhafi in person of their opposition to it. 
Qadhafi's behavior in Timbuktu a couple of months ago -- 
keeping people waiting for him and then starting a planned 
ceremony before the President of Mali had arrived -- had also 
left bad feelings, which continued even today.  Ambassador 
asked if the unrest among northern Mali Tuaregs had spilled 
over into Tuaregs in Algeria.  Chergui claimed it had not but 
added that Algeria was closing its eyes and allowing the 
transportation of most goods to the tribal areas across its 
border with Mali.  This gesture of goodwill was aimed at 
bringing peace to the area and reflected Algeria's good 
neighbor policy toward Mali and its inhabitants.  Chergui 
stressed that Algeria's cooperation in these areas, at the 
request of the government in Bamako, was being kept quiet. 
 
AGREEMENT MUST SUCCEED 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Chergui said the agreement between the Tuareg rebels 
and Government of Mali was signed in Algiers in order to 
avoid the perception of a national pact that would lead to 
animosity between other regions of Mali and the central 
government.  The Tuareg also did not want to travel to 
Bamako.  Holding the signing ceremony in Algiers, where 
fanfare was kept to a minimum, was a compromise acceptable to 
both parties.  It went without saying that Algeria needed to 
make the agreement succeed, and Chergui welcomed U.S. 
assistance to this end. 
 
ALGERIA WORKING TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON SUDAN ON DARFUR 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Ambassador took advantage of his meeting with Chergui 
to request the GOA's assessment of the transition to UN 
peacekeepers in Darfur.  Chergui noted that the Peace and 
Security Council of Africa would meet in the coming days and 
that a conference of donors was scheduled for later this 
month in Brussels.  Chergui said the Sudanese President 
wanted to make the AMIS stronger, but this was not 
sustainable over the longer term because the resources "were 
just not there."  If support for AMIS was secured into 
December, the rehatting of the AMIS to a UN force would be 
 
ALGIERS 00001278  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
considerably easier.  Asked if the upcoming meetings aimed to 
provide Khartoum a face-saving way to agree to the rehatting, 
Chergui responded in the affirmative.  Chergui observed that 
the AMIS could not continue to operate without money.  By the 
end of the year, it would be clear to everyone, including 
Bachir, that the African Union could no longer handle the 
operation on its own, and the pressure on Sudan to accept the 
UN force would be substantial.  Algeria would continue to 
work toward this end. 
 
 
ERDMAN