VZCZCXRO2020
PP RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHUJA #1841/01 1991232
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181232Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6501
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016 
TAGS: PBTS MOPS PREL NI CM
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAKASSI AGREEMENT 
 
REF: ABUJA 1537 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas P. Furey for Reasons 1.4 (b and 
 d) 
 
¶1.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  Summary.  From the 
Nigerian side, plans for implementation of the Greentree 
Accord on Bakassi are moving forward.  The military fully 
intends to be out of Bakassi in "not a day more" than the 
sixty days specified in the agreement, the Nigerian police 
have requested the resources they need to assume their 
interim security role on the peninsula, and the people and 
government of Cross River State are ready to resettle those 
Bakassi indigenes who wish to relocate into Nigeria.  None of 
these interlocutors gave any credence to the secessionist 
threats that have been widely reported in the Nigerian press. 
 Overall, everyone involved in the process shares a positive 
outlook and is ready for the Bakassi issue to be resolved so 
that they can focus on other issues.  The question in the 
whole process is at the top--will the Presidency provide the 
resources necessary for all of these plans to be implemented? 
 End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  PolMilOff and TDY EmbOff 
traveled to Calabar, the capital of Nigeria's Cross River 
State, the week of 10 July to assess preparations for the 
implementation of the Greentree Accord on the Bakassi 
Peninsula.  The EmbOffs met with Bakassi's political and 
traditional leadership, the Cross River State Police 
Commissioner, and the State Security Advisor (Bassey Okum, 
Cross River State's NSA-equivalent), and have had an ongoing 
conversation with Nigeria's defense establishment on the 
Bakassi issue.  The EmbOff's were warmly greeted by all 
interlocutors, and there was a sense of appreciation for the 
efforts the USG, as a witness to the agreement, was putting 
into understanding the situation.  Several interlocutors 
expressed disappointment that no representatives from any of 
the other witness states have made similar efforts so far. 
 
 
The Local Population 
-------------------- 
¶3.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  The Bakassi Local 
Government Area (LGA) Chair, Ani Eric Esin, and Bakassi's 
representative in the Cross River House of Assembly, Joe 
Etene, met with the EmbOffs to discuss the indigene view on 
the agreement.  While the agreement remained an emotional 
topic for the two, both seemingly have come to terms with the 
legitimacy of the pact and are looking for the best possible 
implementation.  Both continued to raise concerns about the 
sudden change from Obasanjo's pledge to never cede any 
Bakassi territory and continued to advocate for a referendum 
to determine the fate of the peninsula (Reftel).  Both said 
that the residents of the Bakassi view their political 
leaders as "sellouts" who were part of a "crude oil deal" in 
the peninsula.  The traditional leaders, particularly the 
paramount chief of the area (young, educated, and former LGA 
chair in Akpabuyo), are, however, still respected by the 
population. 
 
¶4. (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  Both Esen and Etene are 
pleased with the state's plan to reconstitute the Bakassi LGA 
in the current Akpabuyo LGA (near the town of Ikang), and say 
that there have historically been good relations between the 
two LGAs.  They predict some problems in the future over land 
use issues (Akpobuyo is currently a farming community), and 
access to the sea (the Bakassi communities rely on deep sea 
fishing for their livelihood, and Akpobuyo borders the Cross 
River, not the Bight of Benin). 
 
¶5.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  No interlocutors were able 
to predict how many of the current Bakassi inhabitants would 
choose to relocate.  The State Security Advisor predicted 
that there would be more movement from northern Bakassi 
(Archibong area) to southern Bakassi than movement out of 
Bakassi. As long as they were allowed to continue to fish, 
live in their traditional homes, and were free of harassment, 
most will not care (or possibly even know) if they are in 
Nigeria or Cameroon.  The political leaders voiced 
significant concerns about freedom from harassment, claiming 
historical abuses of the Bakassi population by Cameroonian 
gendarmes.  The State Security Advisor cautioned that if the 
issue of protection of the rights of the Bakassi residents 
was not handled during the transition, "Niger Delta-like 
violence" could start in the Bakassi.  He went further, 
suggesting an international presence (possibly through either 
the witness nations or the UN, or as an extension of the 
 
ABUJA 00001841  002 OF 003 
 
 
Mixed Commission's mandate) specifically to ensure the 
protection of the rights of these residents.  (Note: 
Bakassi's political leaders expressed little confidence in 
the current population estimates for the peninsula and are 
exploring performing a new headcount.  Even though the 
population was counted during the recent national census, 
those results have not been published and may be tainted by 
the administrative problems experienced during the exercise. 
End Note.) 
 
¶6.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) The paramount chief echoed 
the concerns of the two political leaders and their hopes for 
a peaceful implementation in a telephone conversation with 
PolMilOff (the chief was on his way to survey the proposed 
resettlement site).  He expressed a particular confidence in 
his ability to work with the traditional rulers of Akpobuyo 
given his past political activity in the area.  He added a 
request for USD 50 Million from each of the four witness 
states to fund resettlement and transition programs.  When 
PolMilOff told the chief this his request was not likely to 
be fulfilled, he angrily questioned the purpose of having 
witnesses to the agreement. 
 
Nigerian Military 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  Nigeria's new Chief of 
Defense Staff, General Martin Luther Agwai, has publicly and 
privately voiced his commitment to remove Nigeria's military 
forces from the Bakassi in "not a day more" than the sixty 
days specified in the agreement (Note:  Agwai told PolMilOff 
there are just under 3500 troops deployed to Bakassi).  Agwai 
made a personal tour of the deployed units shortly after the 
agreement was signed, and is convinced that the soldiers are 
ready to redeploy back to their home stations.  Of particular 
note, Agwai (in comments widely reported in the local press) 
publicly praised the Army's performance and stressed that 
Nigeria--and the military, especially--should not view the 
withdrawal as a defeat, but as an example of the peaceful 
resolution of border disputes, a view echoed by several other 
interlocutors. 
 
¶8.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU) Agwai is excited to have 
these troops available for peacekeeping and internal security 
functions, especially as security requirements in the Delta 
increase, as the mission in Darfur moves to a UN deployment 
(with a requirement for UN-standard battalions), and as the 
2007 election season begins.  He plans to return the units to 
their home stations, perform any necessary refit (resources 
permitting), and then deploy the units as required. 
Importantly, Agwai says that he wants to only deploy entire 
units, not selectively deploy individuals or components. 
 
¶9.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  The British DATT has 
shared with EmbOffs that the Presidency was noncommittal 
about providing funding for the withdrawal of troops from the 
Bakassi. He was unsure if sixty days was a reasonable 
timeline for withdraw, especially with no actual troop 
movements yet occurring, speculating that six months might be 
a more reasonable timeline. 
 
 
Nigerian Police 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  As the military 
withdraws, the Nigerian police will assume interim 
responsibility for security in the Bakassi, until Cameroon 
assumes full responsibility for the territory.  The 
Commissioner of Police for Cross River State, DanLami 
Yar'Adua, told EmbOffs that his deputy had recently toured 
Bakassi with the Inspector General of Police (the 
Commissioner was on annual leave during the IGP's visit, but 
intends to make his own tour in the near future) to determine 
the security requirements.  The Cross River police command 
has made a request to Abuja for four units of mobile police 
(63 police officers per unit) to handle this new 
responsibility.  They have requested funds to rehabilitate 
the facilities the Nigerian military is vacating for use as 
police quarters, and funding to develop a radio communication 
system to support police operations. 
 
¶11.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  When questioned about 
liaison with his Cameroonian counterparts in the event of a 
border incident (Note: Cross River State already shares a 
significant border with Cameroon), the Commissioner said that 
he had no contacts in Cameroon and that any communication 
 
ABUJA 00001841  003 OF 003 
 
 
would have to be coordinated either through the Cameroonian 
consulate in Calabar, or (more likely) through police 
headquarters in Abuja.  The State Security Advisor told 
EmbOffs that there was no formal mechanism in place to 
communicate with anyone on the Cameroonian side of the 
border, but did say that some informal networks existed for 
security issues. 
 
Secession 
--------- 
 
¶12.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  The Nigerian press has 
covered the Bakassi agreement extensively, initially 
criticizing the GON for failing to protect the Nigerians of 
the Bakassi and later reporting on positive steps toward 
implementation.  One other part of the story that gets 
significant press are calls for secession of the Southern 
Cameroons (including Bakassi) from both Nigeria and Cameroon 
and the formation of an Ambazonian Republic.  All 
interlocutors in Cross River downplayed the seriousness of 
these statements, saying that there was a very small 
population of English-speaking Cameroonians living "in exile" 
in Nigeria who were trying to latch onto the Bakassi story as 
a way to move their cause forward.  The State Security 
Advisor did caution that a true resistance movement could 
develop, however, if the rights of the Bakassi residents were 
not protected and cases of abuse by Cameroonian authorities 
were reported. 
 
¶13.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  Joe Etene, the State 
Assembly representative for Bakassi, provided PolMilOff with 
a copy of the maiden edition of the Ambaz Star--the 
secessionist news publication that was recently delivered to 
his office with a (Nigerian) cell phone number (but no name) 
for future contacts.  The publication is technically 
good--glossy paper, better editing than is typical in 
Nigerian media--but ideologically extreme.  It accuses France 
of a plot to destroy Nigeria ("Operation Crush Nigeria"), and 
calls on Ambazonians to forcefully eject the Cameroonian 
government "law breakers" (civil servants) from Ambazonian 
land.  The publication also repeatedly tries to justify both 
the legal basis for Ambazonian independence and the existence 
of the Ambazonian head of state (Fongum Gorji-Dinka). 
Interestingly, the price for the publication is denominated 
in CFA, the Cameroonian currency. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C/REL TO USA, GBR, FRA, DEU)  With the exception of the 
request from the paramount chief for USD 200 Million, 
everyone involved in the transition seems to take a very 
reasoned view on the transition process.  Everyone appears to 
want peace, to make the transition as smooth as possible, and 
has come to a realization that whether Nigeria or Cameroon 
rules the land, there will not be much of a difference on the 
ground.  The real question remains the commitment of the 
Nigerian government to the process, and how much leverage the 
witness states will have on this issue with the GON.  Any 
problems with the Greentree Accord will arise from the lack 
of attention by the Nigerian government to logistical issues 
such as funding, policing, or internal coordination. 
FUREY