VZCZCXRO1120
PP RUEHDT
DE RUEHWL #0488/01 1780421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270421Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2952
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4464
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI PRIORITY 0017
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0142
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0044
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0058

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, EAP/MTS, AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISD LIZ PHU 
PACOM FOR JO1E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ASEC KPKO MY AS TT NZ
SUBJECT: NZ UPDATE ON E.TIMOR 
 
REF: WELLINGTON 405 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William McCormick, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On June 26, Prime Minister Clark and Police 
Minister Annette King announced that up to 25 New Zealand 
police officers would be sent to E. Timor for a three-month 
deployment.  The police will join the 167 NZ Defence Force 
personnel already in the country.  Meanwhile, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials say GNZ has no 
official position on the nature of future peacekeeping 
operations in E. Timor.  New Zealand's usual preference is to 
work through the UN, but the officials say that many 
questions remain about what such a mission would entail, 
including which countries would participate, whether a UN-led 
police mission would be effective, and how the force would be 
evacuated in case of a real crisis.  In her official 
statement regarding the police contingent even PM Clark has 
acknowledged that, "It's likely to take some time for the UN 
to work through the various issues surrounding its future 
operation in Timor Leste."  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (C) The decision to send NZ police to E.Timor was made 
following the recommendations of a police assessment team 
sent to Dili about 3 weeks ago.  Matt Paterson, Policy 
Officer in MFAT's Security Policy Division, told Pol-Econ 
Couns that the PM's decision to send the police was made 
without prejudice to any future UN mission. 
 
¶4.  (C) Jeff Langley, Deputy Director of MFAT's South and 
Southeast Asia division, says that GNZ officials continue to 
be in contact with their Australian counterparts on the UN's 
possible role in E.Timor.  GNZ has also been taking part in 
the UN discussions on this issue, and have taken note of the 
fact that Portugal, Malaysia, and E. Timor all said during UN 
discussions late in the week of June 19 that they would 
prefer to see peacekeeping/police operations move to the UN. 
As of now, said Langley, the Australians do not appear to 
favor this. 
 
¶5.  (C) In contrast, Langley said, New Zealand has no 
position on the future of Australian-led multilateral vs. UN 
operations in E. Timor.  Working level officials are still 
working through the implications of the various options and 
have not yet made any recommendations to Ministers.  Langley 
said GNZ will develop its position as the UN discussions 
proceed on the best successor to UNITIL.  He also said that 
New Zealand's tradition of supporting multilateral diplomacy, 
its relations with Australia, and the needs of E. Timor would 
all affect New Zealand's decision on how to go forward. 
Despite GNZ hesitance to join formally Australia's current 
position, GNZ has no intention of breaking away from the 
Australian-led operation.  "Although we may not always agree, 
there will be no surprises" for Australia regarding New 
Zealand's actions, Paterson said, "We  continue to work 
closely with GOA officials." 
 
¶5.  (C) Paterson said that New Zealand could work either with 
the UN or in an arrangement similar to the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 
"Multilateral can mean different things," he said, "it's not 
just the UN."  Nevertheless, MFAT working level officials 
seem a bit uncomfortable with what they see as Australia's 
more negative attitude towards a greater UN role.  Langley 
said that New Zealand has historically prefered to work more 
in the UN and other multilateral arrangements than has 
Australia.  But he hastened to add that this preference had 
not prevented New Zealand from joining the Australian 
operation in E. Timor.  (NB: While this may be true, the 
Deputy Australian High Commissioner told DCM that Canberra 
had grown a bit impatient over the relatively long time it 
took for New Zealand Defense Forces to touch down in Dili. ) 
 
¶6.  (C) If the UN does take on the mission, GNZ believes a 
lot of questions would need to be answered.  These include 
issues of command and control as well as whether the troops 
would mostly be the mulitlateral troops already there or from 
 
WELLINGTON 00000488  002 OF 002 
 
 
a more representative mix of nations.  Meanwhile, GNZ has 
also been talking bilaterally with officials from other 
countries who might participate in peacekeeping operations, 
including Singapore's Prime Minister during his recent visit 
to Wellington.  John McKinnon, MFAT's Deputy Secretary, says 
Lee said that Singapore might participate as part of a UN-led 
mission, but he resisted GNZ's suggestion that ASEAN might 
want to get involved.  McKinnon believes that    Singapore is 
wary of offending Indonesia. 
 
¶7.  (C) GNZ officials also question how foreign police will 
operate in E.Timor.  Langley said that the Timorese had asked 
for 870 foreign police, but apparently only a minor share of 
these would engage in traditional police work.  Although NZ 
has now decided to send some police, questions still remain 
about their immediate role as well as in any future UN-led 
mission. Langley said GNZ believes a large number of cops on 
the beat will be essential to maintaining order.  A heavily 
armed rapid response team is not the answer, he said, as it 
is far better to prevent crises before they happen. 
 
¶8.  (C) No matter what the international police role is, 
Langley says that over the longer term, it will be essential 
to train E. Timor police properly.  If the UN gets involved 
it will need a robust mandate and effective leadership to 
withstand the less than favorable political environment, 
which will be less than clear and could change frequently. 
Langley said UNITIL failed in adequate training of Timorese 
police, having focused on specific tasks rather than capacity 
building. The training was offered by different countries, 
all with different approaches, Paterson said. 
 
¶9.  (C) Langley and Paterson said that one New Zealander 
remains in E. Timor as part of UNITIL.  If the UN takes on a 
new role there, GNZ will maintain at least one liaison in 
Dili.  They said it would be helpful to learn more about what 
USG officials believe would be acceptable elements of a 
stabilizing operation post-UNITIL.  They confessed that their 
NZ officials based in New York and Washington are giving 
different readouts on the US position, and some clarity from 
us would be helpful. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: The Prime Minister's decision to send police 
to E.Timor showed some political courage.  The Australian 
Deputy High Commissioner told us the Kiwis were hesitant to 
send police to E.Timor because GNZ is far behind on its 
election pledge to hire more police for New Zealand's 
streets. 
McCormick