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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL KN LA
SUBJECT: ROK EMBASSY ASKED TO APPROACH GOL ON 10 DPRK 
ASYLUM SEEKERS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The ROK Foreign Ministry has asked its 
Embassy in Vientiane to approach the GoL to seek a 
"humanitarian" solution for 10 DPRK citizens currently 
imprisoned in Luang Prabang province. The ROK Embassy intends 
to raise the case of these 10 with the Deputy Foreign 
Minister, but -- like us -- worries that bringing the issue 
of the 10 to the government's attention may lead the Lao to 
deport the group to China. We share the ROK Embassy's view 
that the "underground railroad" for DPRK asylum seekers 
through northern Laos works best when it is out of sight and 
mind of the central government. The GoL does not want to be 
seen as facilitating North Korean refugee flight, concerned 
as it is about the impact on both the DPRK and the Thai 
bilateral relationships. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The arrest of 10 DPRK asylum seekers by authorities in 
northern Laos last week has brought to international 
attention the flow of North Koreans through Laos to Thailand. 
 When we first learned of the detention of this group last 
week, we spoke with the South Korean Embassy First Secretary, 
who told us that a South Korean broker had handled the 
group's travel through Laos, that the 10 North Koreans had 
been detained in Luang Namtha province, and that officials 
there were demanding hefty "fines" for their release.  At the 
time the ROK Embassy was not inclined to get involved in the 
arrest, believing their intervention would wreck ongoing 
negotiations between the South Korean broker and the Luang 
Namtha authorities.  In the end, the broker (with money paid 
by NGOs) paid "fines" of $500 for each of the 10, and the 
Namtha authorities released them. The group's weekend release 
supported the ROK Embassy's view that non-involvement was the 
best policy, the First Secretary told us. 
 
¶3. (C) The re-arrest of the group in Luang Prabang province 
over the weekend has, however, brought renewed calls for the 
South Koreans to intervene on a more official level. The 
First Secretary told us today the group was probably 
rearrested because, by the terms of their release, they were 
to return to China (this is at odds with an NGO report that 
the group was given a seven-day "pass" for travel in Laos.) 
She speculated that when the South Korean broker took the 10 
south to Luang Prabang instead of north to China, the Luang 
Namtha authorities alerted the police in Luang Prabang to 
detain the group. 
 
¶4. (C) The First Secretary said that the re-arrest of the 
group had attracted a renewed call from the South Korean and 
U.S. NGOs involved for intervention from the ROK government. 
As a result, her ministry was under considerable pressure to 
"do something" to get the 10 released from jail in Luang 
Prabang. The Ministry had ordered the Embassy to approach the 
GoL to "negotiate" their release. The ROK Ambassador was 
seeking an appointment with Deputy FM Bounkeut (the same 
Deputy FM who was helpful to us with our DPRK asylum seeker 
in early 2005) to discuss the case. The First Secretary was 
also seeking a meeting with Director-General-level officials 
to propose in a low-key way the possibility of negotiating 
their release. The South Koreans assumed that any negotiation 
would involve more payments; the First Secretary said her 
ministry was "prepared to pay." 
 
¶5. (C) We shared our view with the ROK Embassy that raising 
the arrest of the 10 with the Foreign Ministry could have 
negative ramifications for their security.  The First 
Secretary agreed that the Lao would first and foremost not 
 
SIPDIS 
want to be seen facilitating the transit of DPRK asylum 
seekers though Laos.  The Lao were very conscious of the 
impact of DPRK asylum seekers on bilateral relations with 
both the Thai and the North Koreans.  The South Koreans 
pointed out that the Lao had agreed to inform the North 
Korean Embassy in Vientiane any time DPRK citizens were 
arrested in Laos, presumably to give the DPRK Embassy an 
opportunity to vet the asylum seekers and request the return 
of those of interest.  For our part, we noted that last year 
the Thai pressed the Lao to crack down on the transit of 
North Korean through Laos. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: The use of Laos as a stop on the North Korean 
underground railroad works only as long as it stays informal 
 
VIENTIANE 00000509  002 OF 002 
 
 
and below the radar screen.  The Lao government has a poor 
track record on protection of refugees, and in fact has 
refused UNHCR permission to reopen an office in Vientiane. 
The GoL is not in any way sympathetic to the North Koreans, 
who may remind them all too much of their own refugee exodus 
from the ethnic Hmong population. The DPRK asylum seekers 
currently passing through Laos depend on the greed, not the 
sympathy, of local officials to grease their passage on to 
Thailand.  End comment. 
 
 
HASLACH