VZCZCXYZ0035
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1266/01 1742121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 232121Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9425
INFO RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KUNR ASIG UNGA
SUBJECT: UN OVERSIGHT: JIU LACUNAE REPORT (A/60/860) 
 
¶1. This is an action request.  USUN seeks Department guidance 
on the JIU Report on "Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations 
System" summarized below in time for imminent discussions in 
the Fifth Committee on UN oversight and accountability. 
 
¶2.  SUMMARY: The UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has released 
a report assessing UN oversight mechanisms intended to 
identify gaps, shortcomings and inconsistencies in UN 
oversight capabilities (A/60/860).  The JIU report originally 
was proposed to the General Assembly in October 2005 
(A/60/34) as part of JIU's intended work program for 2005. 
In light of the Outcome Document's request for an external 
review of UN oversight and the JIU's own role in UN system 
oversight, the U.S. and some other delegations were against 
the proposal, but JIU conducted the assessment anyway.  The 
JIU defined its primary objective in preparing the report as 
establishing whether internal mechanisms were in place to 
review allegations of wrongdoing against senior UN officials, 
assessing the adequacy of existing mechanisms, and 
determining where final responsibility for the outcome of 
such cases should lie.  The report underscored that Members 
States have primary responsibility for oversight of the UN 
system.  States delegate some oversight authority to the 
secretariats of various organizations within the UN, and some 
 
SIPDIS 
to external oversight bodies.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶3.  The JIU report notes there are two sets of oversight 
mechanisms: external and internal. Both can be subdivided 
into different offices or agencies that focus on various 
aspects of monitoring.  Externally, two system-wide oversight 
mechanisms exist: operational and policy/review. The 
operational mechanisms include the UN Board of Auditors 
(BOA), a panel of external auditors of specialized agencies 
and IAEA, and the JIU.  The policy and review mechanisms are 
the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC), and the 
International Civil Service Commission (ICSC).  The UN's 
internal oversight responsibilities are largely fulfilled by 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which 
provides internal auditing, investigation, program 
monitoring, and consulting. 
 
¶4. The success of UN oversight mechanisms is contingent on 
how well these external and internal mechanisms coordinate. 
The JIU report maintains duplication among the oversight 
bodies can be avoided while still ensuring effective 
oversight, provided there is healthy coordination and 
cooperation among them.  There are numerous formal and 
informal forums in which such coordination occurs (JIU Report 
- Paragraph 17). 
 
¶5. The JIU report concludes that, "there is nothing 
intrinsically deficient with either the design or the 
mandates of the overall system of oversight in the United 
Nations System" (JIU Report - Paragraph 18).  However, JIU 
inspectors recommended that Member States take stock of the 
UN oversight system as a whole and work collectively to 
address problems across the system that may arise.  JIU 
recommends the establishment of Oversight Boards to help 
structure coordination between external and internal 
mechanisms on a system-wide basis.  Ideally, this will help 
reduce conflicts of interest, duplication, and lack of 
representation. 
DEFICIENCIES 
------------ 
 
¶6. The JIU report identified external oversight deficiencies 
in the following areas: 
 
a.  no individual or collective accountability - External 
oversight bodies should be subject to peer-review; 
b.  lack of financial independence - The external oversight 
bodies should not be subject to scrutiny by the entities 
which are the object of their oversight; 
c.  lack of investigative capacity in respect to executive 
heads and internal oversight heads; and, 
d.  potential overlap in the scope of the external and 
internal audits. 
 
¶7. Among internal oversight deficiencies, the JIU identified: 
 
a.  fragmentation of internal oversight functions; 
b.  lack of provision for investigation functions; 
c.  lack of mechanisms to encourage reporting of wrongdoing; 
d.  insufficient independence of oversight bodies; 
e.  unsatisfactory procedures for appointing the head of 
internal oversight; 
f.  inadequate reporting modalities; 
g.  inadequate follow-up to internal oversight 
recommendations; 
h.  lack of review of the performance of most internal 
oversight functions; and, 
i.  insufficient resources. 
 
JIU RECOMMENDATIONS 
------------------- 
 
¶8. The JIU report offers a number of specific recommendations 
(17 Total) to correct oversight deficiencies, including: 
 
-- the Legislative bodies of the UN system should establish 
an independent external oversight board composed of five to 
seven members, elected by Member States; 
 
-- the General Assembly should decide that ACABQ, ICSC and 
JIU should be subject to peer review at least every five 
years; 
 
-- the General Assembly should decide that ICSC and JIU 
create their own budgets and that ACABQ should create its own 
budget; 
 
-- members of ACABQ, ICSC and JIU and other similar bodies 
within the UN should not be allowed to serve in any 
organization which they have had oversight responsibilities 
during their tenure and for three years following the 
cessation of their oversight responsibility; 
 
-- Term limits should be established for external auditors of 
the UN and staff; 
 
-- executive heads should review the structure of their 
respective oversight organizations; 
 
-- audit, inspection, investigation and evaluation should be 
consolidated into one position that reports directly to the 
executive head of each department/program; 
 
-- anything beyond these 4 areas should be positioned 
elsewhere in the secretariat and not in the internal 
oversight unit; 
 
-- the executive heads should: 
      a.    Review capacity of organization; 
      b.    Ensure minimal investigative capacity is 
sufficient; 
      c.    Ensure investigation are not interfered with by 
senior management; 
      d.    Ensure independent reporting is established; 
 
-- safeguards from retaliation should be established to 
protect those who report wrongdoing and misconduct; 
 
-- the legislative bodies of each organization should decide 
all budgets to be drawn up by the internal oversight entity. 
 
-- concerning the appointment to heads of internal oversight: 
      a.    Announcements should be widely publicized; 
      b.    Appointment should be subject to consultation; 
      c.    Termination should be for just cause - subject to 
review; 
      d.    Non-renewable 5-7 year tenure should be 
established; 
 
-- executive heads should place minimum standards on: 
      a.    Internal oversight reports; 
      b.    Annual internal oversight summary; 
      c.    Individual internal audit, inspection and 
evaluation reports; 
      d.    Individual investigation reports. 
 
-- with respect to follow-up oversight, the legislative 
bodies in each organization should direct their respective 
heads to ensure: 
      a.    A database is created to monitor follow-ups. 
      b.    The annual internal oversight summary report 
contains a summary of oversight recommendations not fully 
implemented; 
 
-- the legislative bodies in each organization should direct 
their respective executive heads to ensure independent 
quality assessment (e.g. peer review) at least once every 
five years; 
 
-- the legislative bodies in each organization should adopt 
the following standards: 
      a.    If biennial resources are greater than USD 250 
million, internal oversight unit is justified. 
      b.    If biennial resources are less than USD 250 
million, Internal oversight should be in-sourced to any other 
organization in UN. 
 
-- the legislative bodies in each organization should direct 
their respective executive heads to put forward proposals for 
the: 
      a.    Establishment of ethics function with clear terms 
of reference. 
 
 
      b.    Establishment of post of ethics officer at 
D-1/P-5 level. 
            c.    Mandatory integrity and ethics training for 
all staff 
-- the legislative bodies in each organization should direct 
their respective executive heads to put forward proposals for 
the: 
      a.    Establishment of confidential financial 
disclosure requirements for all elected officials and all 
staff at D-1 level and above; 
      b.    Annual filing of the financial disclosure 
statements to the ethics officer for review; and, 
 
-- the legislative bodies in each UN system organization 
should direct their respective executive heads to establish 
an effective mechanism for coordination among external and 
internal oversight bodies on a system-wide basis. 
 
¶9.  In short, the JIU report underscores the important role 
played by individual Member States in exercising oversight 
responsibilities.  The JIU report suggested that annual 
meetings of the chairpersons of the external oversight boards 
would serve to enhance the coordination and cooperation while 
helping to determine best practices for achieving efficiency 
and effectiveness in the oversight functions. 
BOLTON