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DE RUCNDT #1265/01 1742032
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O 232032Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9423
INFO RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2011 
TAGS: AORC UUNR UNGA ASIG
SUBJECT: UN REFORM: OIOS CHIEF WARNS NEW STUDY COULD LEAD 
TO WEAKENING OF OVERSIGHT 
 
REF: 06/07/06 USUN (HILLMAN)-IO/S (GLOCKNER) E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARK D. WALLACE: REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Under Secretary-General for Internal 
Oversight Inga-Britt Ahlenius met privately June 9 with 
Ambassador Wallace to present her vision of a strengthened, 
more independent OIOS, but warned the soon-to-be released 
independent external evaluation of UN oversight prepared by 
Price-Waterhouse-Coopers (PWC) will likely recommend a 
significant reduction in OIOS functions, including the 
transfer of investigations to the UN Office of Legal Affairs 
(OLA) and the shifting of responsibility for inspections and 
evaluations to the UN Department of Management.  Ahlenius 
made a strong case for OIOS' retention of its core oversight 
functions -- audit, inspection and evaluation -- while 
suggesting a lesser role for investigations.  She suggested 
that the current review of sexual exploitation and abuse were 
better suited to a "task force" approach separate from normal 
OIOS activities.  Ahlenius suggested that the UN Steering 
Committee, which was responsible only for guiding PWC in the 
preparation of its report, had actually inserted the 
proposals to transfer current OIOS responsibilities to other 
UN departments.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AHLENIUS' CALL FOR A 
NEW STRUCTURE AND 
INCREASED INDEPENDENCE 
FOR OIOS 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Requesting a private meeting with Ambassador Wallace, 
UN OIOS U/SYG Ahlenius, accompanied by OIOS Program Officer 
Mika Tapio, outlined her vision of a strengthened, more 
independent OIOS focused on its core functions as originally 
defined by the General Assembly in paragraph 5 of Resolution 
48/218B -- namely, "initiate, carry out and report on any 
action which it considers necessary to fulfill its 
responsibilities with regard to monitoring, internal audit, 
inspection and evaluation, and investigations."  Ahlenius 
said she welcomed the call in the World Summit Outcome 
Document (para 164 a) for a significant strengthening of 
OIOS' audit and investigations functions, and was pleased 
this proposal appeared to enjoy broad support among Member 
States.  Ahlenius underscored that a key to a strengthened 
OIOS would be its financial independence, particularly 
eliminating OIOS' need to solicit funds from the very UN 
programs it was responsible for auditing, through the 
provision of additional funding from the regular UN budget or 
through creation of a trust fund devoted to supporting OIOS 
activities. 
 
¶3. (C)  Ahlenius also proposed that OIOS be strengthened 
through a reorganization of its core functions, with emphasis 
on audit, evaluation and inspection.  Ahlenius said she 
favored a single audit division that carried out risk-based 
audits and assessments, with systematic additional training 
for her already professional and qualified staff.  Ahlenius 
underscored the importance of strengthening independent 
evaluations and increasing the number of evaluations 
conducted annually from 2-3 to 6-8.  She said more support 
also was needed for increased program self-evaluation.  She 
also recommended that the OIOS inspection function be 
strengthened, including by increasing the number of 
inspections conducted yearly to 8 to 10, rather than the 
current total of 1 to 3.  Ahlenius noted that all of these 
proposed changes, however, did not automatically imply the 
need for a significant increase in OIOS posts. While some 
additional resources would be required, simply reorganizing 
current OIOS staffing patterns, e.g. reducing investigations 
staff, could, in the short term, enable OIOS to increase the 
number of studies completed in such areas as evaluation and 
inspection. 
 
A TASK FORCE APPROACH 
FOR SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Ahlenius expressed concern that OIOS' current role in 
conducting two special investigations now underway, sexual 
exploitation and abuse, and procurement, were consuming 
significant resources that otherwise could be devoted to 
audits, evaluations, and inspections.  She suggested that 
technically, these types of inquiries did not fall into the 
more traditional areas for investigation such as management, 
finance, assets and contracts.  Ahlenius said she feared OIOS 
would be called upon more frequently in the future to handle 
similar inquiries, when, in fact, it would be better to 
create special task forces to handle such investigations of 
this nature.  While Ahlenius said she opposed transferring 
the investigation function from OIOS to the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs, a proposal presently in the draft version of 
the PWC study, she suggested that there was a need to 
consider who other than OIOS might be better suited to handle 
future investigations. 
 
PREVIEW OF INDEPENDENT 
EVALUATION OF UN AUDIT 
AND OVERSIGHT 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  Ahlenius said she had seen several draft versions of 
the independent external evaluation of UN audit and oversight 
prepared by Price-Waterhouse-Coopers.  (Note: USUN had an 
opportunity June 7 privately to review and summarize the PWC 
report on OIOS, which was reported ref e-mail.  End note.)  A 
number of recommendations in the draft version would 
effectively weaken, rather than strengthen, OIOS.  For 
example, Ahlenius said the PWC report recommended that OIOS' 
inspection and evaluation functions be moved to the 
Department of Management, while investigations, as previously 
noted, would be moved to OLA.  Such transfers would 
significantly reduce OIOS' mandate and restrict its future 
functions to conducting audits.  In response to a question 
posed by Ambassador Wallace as to the basis of these 
recommendations, Ahlenius noted that the original PWC draft 
did not/not contain such proposals, but rather they were 
apparently added later after the report was reviewed and 
discussed by the Steering Committee.  This Committee is 
composed of five independent experts, including former UN 
Comptroller Halbwachs, who were assigned to assist and advise 
PWC in preparing the independent external assessment of UN 
audit and oversight. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ahlenius did acknowledge that the PWC report 
recommended new funding and hiring arrangements for OIOS, 
both of which would help to strengthen OIOS.  However, moving 
the investigation, inspections, evaluations, monitoring and 
consulting functions out of OIOS and into other areas of the 
UN would weaken overall UN oversight and undermine the 
independent nature of current OIOS functions.  At one point, 
however, she suggested that there may be a case for moving 
the monitoring and consulting functions but not the 
evaluation and inspection functions.  Ahlenius said the PWC 
report likely would be released within the next few days and 
would then need to be reviewed by ACABQ and considered by the 
Fifth Committee. 
BOLTON