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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC XW ZF KPKO
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA LEGWAILA: 'UN CAN'T 
BABY-SIT SOVEREIGN STATES INDEFINITELY' 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001255  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a June 14 courtesy call, 
Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa 
Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (formerly Special Representative of 
the SYG for the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) shared 
his 'professional peacekeeper' views with Ambassador Bolton 
on the proliferation of conflicts on the African continent 
and the 'dependency syndrome' suffered by some of the 
countries that host them, in particular Ethiopia/Eritrea and 
Somalia, making reference as well to East Timor.  Legwaila 
was clearly looking for a way to apply his prior SRSG 
experience to his new position and was receptive to 
Ambassador Bolton's mention of the Peacebuilding Commission. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a June 14 courtesy call, U/SYG and Special 
Adviser on Africa Legwaila solicited Ambassador Bolton's 
support for the efforts of his office in dealing with the 
African Union and the New Partnership for African Development 
to address crises on the African continent but was quick to 
point out that he was 'professionally a peacekeeper,' most 
recently having spent the past several years as SRSG for 
UNMEE.  Legwaila acknowledged USG diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the stalemate and said he had been hopeful for 
progress on the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
after the first two meetings of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission (EEBC).  Now, however, Legwaila considered that 
any window of opportunity which previously existed to have 
shut, with Eritrea's refusal to lift restrictions on UNMEE 
having backfired and instead resulted in the unintended 
consequence of serving as a precondition for Ethiopia's 
participation in border talks.  The biggest tragedy in the 
situation, according to Legwaila, was not so much the $186 
million annual price tag, but rather the fact that neither 
country could afford to sustain such a stalemate. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Bolton agreed with Legwaila's assessment, 
noting that the situation illustrated what can happen when a 
peacekeeping operation becomes part of the underlying problem 
between countries.  The Security Council, Ambassador Bolton 
contended, must remain politically involved in the missions 
it sets up, rather than deciding a mandate and deferring 
subsequent responsibility to the SRSG.  Ambassador Bolton 
observed that the profusion of peacekeeping operations, 
political missions and SRSGs hindered the ability of the 
international community to resolve the underlying issues in 
African internal political conflicts, making it all the more 
difficult to determine when the situation might be 
sufficiently stable for the UN presence to withdraw and for 
the national government to assume responsibility. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In this context, Ambassador Bolton disagreed with 
SYG Annan's assessment that the withdrawal of UNMISET from 
East Timor contributed to the subsequent unrest in that 
country.  Legwaila concurred with this analysis, noting that 
the resurgence seen in East Timor could be attributed to the 
incompetence of the government, which, unlike the governments 
of Namibia and Mozambique when the time came for the UN to 
disengage, was unable to measure the 'probability of success' 
in the absence of an international presence.  Legwaila noted 
that some countries suffer from a 'dependency syndrome' on UN 
peacekeeping, hoping the UN would stay forever to prevent 
fighting.  However, Legwaila declared, 'the UN can't baby-sit 
sovereign states indefinitely,' especially when to do so 
might jeopardize development and foreign investment in such 
states. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Legwaila was not optimistic in assessing the AU's 
prospects for success in handling African conflicts.  Using 
Somalia as an example, Legwaila doubted the AU could play a 
role in the current crisis, despite the fact that the crisis 
was brewing 'in its own backyard.'  He anticipated the AU to 
deal with Somalia as it had Ethiopia/Eritrea: to go 'on 
leave' for the duration of the conflict and to re-surface 
when there were credit to be taken.  Ambassador Bolton 
suggested that the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) could 
eventually play such a role, provided that it focused its 
efforts on the ground rather than in New York.  Legwaila was 
very receptive to this idea and expressed a readiness to 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001255  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
contribute, adding that he had spoken with ONUB SRSG McAskie 
about the PBC in a meeting during the week of June 5. 
BOLTON