VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0522/01 1790637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280637Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5157
INFO RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 0041

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000522 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2021 
TAGS: AORC ETRD IAEA IR KNNP PINR
SUBJECT: PROFILE OF MALAYSIAN AMBASSADOR RAJMAH HUSSAIN 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reason 1.4 (c) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and Introduction.  Malaysian Ambassador 
Rajmah Hussain, designated next Malaysian Ambassador to 
Washington, arrived Vienna 16 months ago from her previous 
position as Ambassador to the CD in Geneva.  While in Vienna, 
Hussain served as chair of the Vienna Chapter of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, using that position to counter U.S. 
initiatives and lend support to Iranian arguments on their 
nuclear program.  Hussain traveled to New York in May 2005 
where she ended up coordinating (reportedly unhelpful) New 
York NAM positions at the NPT Review Conference.  She told us 
she takes full credit for establishing in May 2005 the first 
Vienna chapter of the Organization of Islamic Countries and 
achieving observer status for this organization at the IAEA 
General Conference.  She has noted privately that NAM and 
other organizations are important for defending the rights of 
other countries vis--vis the superpower.  End Summary and 
Introduction. 
 
¶2.  (C) Hussain has served in Washington before, as DCM.  She 
is without immediate family, though her parents are still 
alive and she has many siblings.  She told us a year ago she 
considered Vienna her last assignment before retirement.  She 
can come across as conversationally engaging, but 
periodically seeks to trap interlocutors into principled 
positions on non-proliferation or Iran.  She appears to pride 
herself on leading groups.  She has asserted her primary 
responsibility is to represent NAM positions, and not 
necessarily Malaysian positions.  Against this background, 
she has exercised almost dictatorial control of NAM meetings 
- according to some of her colleagues - and sets NAM policies 
by declaring them herself.  However, she has not won all 
battles. 
 
¶3.  (C) During Hussain's time in Vienna, the NAM has become a 
tougher adversary on political issues.  Hussain has tried to 
seize any issue at all away from G-77 purview and embrace it 
in the NAM.  She has successfully upstaged the G-77 to this 
end. 
 
¶4.  (C) Hussain has forcefully trumpeted the NAM mantra that 
defends Iran's rights to peaceful nuclear technologies, 
without criticizing Iran's noncompliance with its NPT 
obligations and its diminishing cooperation with the IAEA to 
resolve the outstanding issues and restore international 
confidence.  During the particularly difficult September and 
February IAEA Board of Governors meetings, which witnessed 
contentious votes on Iran that split the NAM, she delivered 
very emotional, almost combative statements. 
 
¶5.  (C) Some believe that Hussain has championed Iranian 
positions within the NAM to such a degree as to almost allow 
the Iranians to draft the substance of NAM statements and 
positions that are eventually adopted.  This has caused 
chagrin among some NAM delegations.  However, we have been 
told by some NAM Ambassadors that when they question aspects 
to the Iran issue in NAM meetings, Hussain either allows the 
Iranians to unleash polemical tirades against them, and/or 
rules against them.  Some indicate to us that it is just 
easier to go along with the herd than fight for what become 
incremental changes to statements.  Hussain has come across 
de facto as one of Iran's key supporters in Vienna.  Indeed, 
the South African Governor (a member of the NAM troika 
leadership) told us during a recent Board meeting that he had 
tried to get her to amend and soften the NAM statement on 
Iran in order to make it more realistic.  However he said the 
Malaysian flatly refused. 
 
¶6.  (C) In mid-2005 when UNVIE was soliciting support for the 
Committee on Safeguards and Verification, Hussain was 
reportedly working actively against the Committee.  In fact, 
other NAM delegations told us she had commissioned an 
internal working group to torpedo the Committee.  To 
circumvent her, UNVIE approached the chairs of the three 
regional sub-groups within the NAM (Asia Group, Africa Group, 
GRULAC) and offered special briefings on the Committee, and 
only afterwards offered the same briefing to Hussain and the 
full NAM.  She was angry to learn we had done this without 
working through her, though we explained we were doing it so 
we could deal with smaller groups.  When we went to brief the 
full NAM, she had us promise to not engage in direct 
discussion with the floor, but only through her.  In the end, 
our working with the chairs of and individual members of the 
sub-groups marginalized Hussain and allowed Board approval by 
consensus of the Committee. 
 
¶7.  (C) In the final run-up to the Board decision to adopt 
the Committee, the South African Governor told us he had had 
to part ways with Hussain and "bypass the NAM itself" to 
permit the broad support needed to approve the Committee and 
dodge Hussain's efforts against the initiative.  The Indian 
Ambassador advised us on the day of approval to move the 
issue to a decision before the Board floor debate to minimize 
her influence over the issue during the floor debate.  (We 
did so.)   In the end, the Board supported the Committee by 
consensus and Hussain sat in the back of the room fuming and 
apparently refusing to speak to anyone. 
 
¶8.  (C) Hussain advertised widely that she was being sent by 
her government in mid-2005 to the New York NPT Review 
Conference to help coordinate NAM positions focusing on 
disarmament.  In fact, she claims she wound up chairing most 
of the NAM meetings at the RevCon.  Hussain is proud for 
promoting her "principled" positions on disarmament and 
"rights" to peaceful nuclear uses.  She exudes a proclivity 
to uncompromising dogmatism in these areas. 
 
¶9.  (C) More recently, Hussain told us in early June that she 
took full responsibility for the Creation of a Vienna chapter 
of the Organization of Islamic Countries.  She said that it 
was important to have such an organization here, since the 
OIC was interested in disarmament (sic) and 
non-proliferation.  Most Vienna missions are unaware of her 
efforts.  In mid-June the IAEA Board of Governors approved an 
OIC request to participate as an observer in the September 
IAEA Board of Governors meeting. 
 
¶10.  (C) Two of our working-level NAM contacts told us on the 
record recently that Hussain has "generally been effective" 
in her position as NAM Chair.  She received high marks from 
them for objectivity, management style, and intellect.  They 
said she listened to the views of the disparate members and 
then was decisive once she has decided on an issue.  They 
both lauded her objectivity and ability to shape the NAM 
agenda during plenary meetings.  However, these and other 
delegates privately often tell us they chafe under her 
dictatorial methods and proclivity to press hardened 
ideological positions.  One of our contacts said Hussain was 
"not well liked" by other NAM Ambassadors, and has been 
described as "difficult" and "obstinate," though many 
acknowledge her as being "friendly."  We have heard that she 
can be a hothead prone to emotional outbursts, especially 
during times of duress such as in the debates on Iran that 
took place during the September and February Board meetings. 
 
¶11.  (C) A senior IAEA official who has known her for several 
years described her as uncompromising and dogmatic, which 
limits the IAEA's ability to work with her.  Indeed, the 
official said that IAEA senior leadership shrug her off as a 
less serious player who cannot bring added value to debates. 
 
 
¶12. (C) Despite her prickly dealings on Iran and other IAEA 
issues,  Hussain has been relatively constructive in other 
fora when dealing with issues of mutual interest.  In 
discussions on whether to share seismic data from the 
International Monitoring System (IMS) with national and 
regional tsunami alert organizations, Hussain was an 
articulate advocate for making the data readily available. 
She argued forcefully about the moral obligation of states to 
contribute to the global effort to help prevent a reprise of 
the devastation caused by the Asian tsunami of December 2004, 
and has reminded colleagues of the embarrassing public 
relations consequences of not providing tsunami alert 
organizations with data that can improve the accuracy of 
predictions on the likelihood and course of a tsunami. 
 
¶13.  (C) Hussein has not shied from challenging those among 
her Group of 77 colleagues -- including the Chinese 
delegation -- which has resorted to legalistic and procedural 
arguments to block agreement on a permanent data-sharing 
arrangement with alert organizations.  Hussein has had no 
reservations about associating herself with the U.S. position 
during multilateral discussions of this issue, when positions 
coincided. 
 
¶14. (C)  While in Vienna, Hussain was almost exclusively 
playing the role of NAM Chair. She knew her script well, but 
had the acumen and flexibility to successfully deal with a 
much broader set of issues.  However, she has indicated 
little receptivity to hearing out or trying to understand 
U.S. positions.  In this regard, she has demonstrated little 
inclination to compromise on issues.  Some believe this 
betrays a certain lack of intellectual acuity.  She can 
occasionally offer unpredictable  and ideologically-laced 
comments about U.S. nuclear history and policy (Hiroshima) 
and disarmament.  Hussain has told us that one of her top 
priorities in Washington will be to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with the U.S. 
SCHULTE