VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0500/01 1670929
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160929Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5113

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL ON IRAN TO 
COOPERATE, RESTORE CONFIDENCE, AND NEGOTIATE 
 
REF: UNVIE 475 
 
 
------------------------ 
Summary and Introduction 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) At the June BOG, mission, per reftel, accomplished 
its objectives of underscoring the absence of confidence in 
the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, stressing 
Iran's need to halt enrichment-related activities, and 
re-dividing the NAM.  Iran was dealt with under agenda item 8 
(g) "Report by the Director General on the implementation of 
NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran." 
The session consisted of a DG introductory statement, 33 
country statements (28 Board members, 4 Rule 50 speakers, and 
Iran), and a Chairman's summary.  The statements began in the 
morning on June 15 and the Chair provided his summary at 1245 
hours. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The "like-minded" countries, including France (on 
behalf of the EU3) and Austria (on behalf of the EU), 
provided statements that were generally more muted in tone 
than previous ones.  EU members did not provide individual 
statements, despite our recommendation during consultations. 
Reflecting extensive prior coordination, these statements all 
noted the lack of cooperation cited in the DG's report, 
called on Iran to implement confidence building measures 
(CBMs), and to resume negotiations on the basis of the P5 
plus one package.  Japan, Australia, Canada, Norway, and the 
US (full text below) echoed these themes, as did Russia, 
China, and most of the NAM. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Malaysia (representing the NAM), read the May 30 
Ministerial  Statement verbatim and hit on all of the 
well-known themes.  Nevertheless, 12 NAM countries delivered 
tough national statements calling on Iran to cooperate with 
the Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus one offer. 
Eight NAM members explicitly called on Iran to implement 
previous Board resolutions and CBMs to restore confidence in 
the nature of its program.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
DG's Opening Remarks: Not "Much Progress" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's opening statement on June 12 flagged 
Iran's lack of cooperation with the Agency, noting "the 
report makes clear that the Agency has not made much progress 
in resolving outstanding verification issues."  (Note: these 
remarks, as well as his last two reports on Iran, seemed to 
provide cover for most of the NAM to make tougher statements 
on Iran.  End note.).  Without specifically mentioning the P5 
plus one initiative, he also lauded the recent efforts that 
aim to reach a comprehensive agreement that would 
simultaneously address the international community's need to 
establish confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's 
program, while addressing Iran's security, technology, and 
energy needs. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Chairman Amano Calls the Meeting to Order 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Board Chairman Amano, noting the April 28 and June 8 
DG reports, convened the meeting to discuss the 
implementation of safeguards in Iran on June 15 at 1015 
hours.  Country statements immediately ensued. 
 
------------------------------- 
NAM Reads Ministerial Statement 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Malaysian Ambassador, representing the NAM, 
provided a verbatim reading of the May 30 NAM Ministerial 
Statement, which regurgitated all of the well known NAM 
themes: states' rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation in 
conformity with their legal obligations; voluntary 
confidence-building measures should not be construed as legal 
obligations; the IAEA is the sole competent authority for 
safeguards verification; support for a Middle East nuclear 
weapon free zone; cited Israel's need to join the NPT; 
decried threats of attacks against nuclear facilities devoted 
to peaceful purposes; and proclaimed support for negotiations 
without preconditions.  The statement welcomed Iran's 
cooperation with the Agency, seeming to completely ignore the 
DG's reports and comments to the Board demonstrating Iran's 
lack of cooperation with the Agency.  It also did not call on 
Iran to take steps that would enable the P5 plus one 
initiative to succeed. 
 
------------------------------ 
 
Tougher NAM Country Statements 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Many NAM counties associated themselves with the NAM 
statement, 12 countries-including Venezuela-called on Iran to 
cooperate with the Agency and respond positively to the P5 
plus one offer.  India, Singapore, South Africa, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Brazil, 
Colombia, and Ecuador echoed these themes, suggesting these 
statements had been closely coordinated to distance 
themselves from the official NAM gibberish and demonstrate 
growing international concern over Iran's actions.  Eight NAM 
members explicitly called on Iran to implement previous Board 
resolutions and CBMs to restore confidence in the nature of 
its program.  Many also lauded the U.S. willingness to engage 
in direct negotiations with Iran.  (Note: Many NAM countries, 
during private consultations with various delegation members 
yesterday, had initially expressed reluctance to deliver 
individual statements, but apparently responded positively to 
our entreaties to send Iran a unified message.  End note.). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Syria and Cuba were Iran's only defenders at this 
Board meeting, with both decrying the Board's February 
decision to refer Iran to the UNSC.  Neither criticized Iran 
for the lack of cooperation cited in the DG's recent reports 
or called on Iran to implement CBMs. Cuba, noting the 
"setbacks" in the Agency's progress to resolve outstanding 
issues, blamed this turn of events the UNSC referral, 
claiming this action never should have happened.  Cuba 
mentioned "recent events" by countries that raise the 
prospects for a negotiated settlement, but did not call on 
Iran to take actions that would enable such talks.  Belarus 
was equivocal, noting the ongoing diplomatic initiative but 
not calling on Iran to respond positively or take steps to 
create the conditions for its success.  Yemen was the only 
NAM country on the Board that did not provide a statement, 
citing the absence of a sufficiently senior Yemeni 
representative in Vienna. 
 
----------------------------- 
Austria Delivers EU Statement 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Austria, representing 37 EU countries, expressed 
concern at the lack of progress in resolving the outstanding 
issues, which is required to restore the international 
community's confidence in the nature of Iran's nuclear 
program.  It called on Iran to cooperate with the Agency, 
implement CBMs (without specifically saying "suspension"), 
and respond positively to the P5 plus one package.  There was 
no reference to the UNSC or possible future sticks that the 
EU could deploy. 
 
------------------------------------ 
EU3 and "Like-minded" Echo EU Themes 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) France (speaking for the EU3) endorsed the EU 
statement, noted that Iran's cooperation with the Agency had 
"dwindled to almost nothing," and provided a short recitation 
of the P5 plus one-related developments over the previous 
several weeks.  The U.S., Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia, 
Norway, and Argentina hit on similar themes, reflecting close 
coordination over the past two weeks.  On balance, these 
statements were calibrated to highlight Iran's lack of 
cooperation and need to implement CBMs, while seeking to 
avoid an Iranian overreaction that could undermine ongoing 
diplomatic efforts.  The EU3, Australia, Canada, Norway, and 
U.S. all specifically mentioned the UNSC, while Japan, ROK, 
and Argentina did not (but called on Iran to implement BOG 
resolutions and implement CBMs). 
 
---------------------------- 
Russia and China Follow Suit 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Russia said that Iran's cooperation is necessary to 
dispel the international community's concerns about the 
nature of Iran's program, while calling on Iran to respond 
positively to this "serious" proposal.  It did not mention 
the UNSC. China, however, said Iran needs to respond to Board 
resolutions and the UNSC Presidential Statement. China lauded 
the U.S. decision to engage Iran, noting that the P5 plus one 
had reached "consensus" on a far reaching proposal to Iran. 
 
----------------------------- 
Others Chime In Under Rule 50 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Under Rule 50, which allows non-Board members to 
speak, New Zealand, Chile, Pakistan, and Panama all echoed 
the themes that Iran must increase its cooperation with the 
 
Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus 1 offer. 
Pakistan used this opportunity to trumpet Islamabad's efforts 
to shut down the A.Q. Khan network, emphasizing that people 
from about 30 countries had been involved, and imploring 
states to take steps to curtail development of other 
proliferation networks. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Iran: Ready To Negotiate On Its Terms 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh, noting the May 30 
Ministerial Statement, thanked the NAM for their support, 
which he claimed reflected the views of 116 countries.  He 
then delivered, at least for him, a rather low-keyed speech 
that played up Iran's cooperation with the Agency, citing the 
litany of over 2000 man days of inspections, implementation 
of the Additional Protocol prior to its ratification (even 
though they are no longer implementing the AP), over 20 
complementary accesses with short notice, and at least 13 
samplings conducted at military sites.  He also noted that 
the DG had found no evidence of diversion of declared 
materials.  He claimed that referral of the Iran file-not 
done because of verification issues but because Iran halted 
CBMs-was a "historical mistake" and noted the file should be 
returned to the IAEA. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Regarding the P5 plus one offer, it was notable 
that Soltanieh specifically mentioned the other five partners 
but omitted the U.S.  Repeating the official Iranian line, he 
proclaimed Iran's willingness to negotiate, but without 
preconditions and said the package has some positive elements 
but there are many (unspecified) ambiguities.  Iran will 
respond to the offer in "due course."  He then requested that 
the Board remove Iran from the agenda of subsequent Board 
meetings, something that many delegations, including UNVIE, 
will not support. 
 
----------------------------- 
Chairman's Summary Inadequate 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Chairman Amano, at 1245 hours, promptly delivered a 
 summary that did not accurately capture the debate in the 
Board room.  He noted that some countries expressed concern 
about Iran's diminishing cooperation with the Agency, cited 
Iran's need to implement CBMs and the Additional Protocol as 
called for by the Board, and encouraged Iran to react 
positively to the P5 plus one diplomatic initiative. 
 
16 (SBU) However, he then noted "other country" concerns, and 
then regurgitated themes from the official NAM statement-with 
out reflecting the widespread calls in the individual country 
statements for Iran to increase its cooperation with the 
Agency, implement CBMs, and respond positively to the P5 plus 
one initiative. (Note: Ambassador Schulte will issue a strong 
demarche over the Chairman's misleading portrayal of the 
debate.  End note.). 
 
------------------------------------ 
U.S. Statement, As Delivered June 15 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (U) Mr. Chairman, 
 
Last September, the IAEA made two important findings: 
first, that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations 
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and second, that 
Iran had lost international confidence that its nuclear 
program is exclusively peaceful. 
 
The IAEA and the UN Security Council have called on Iran to 
cooperate, fully and proactively, in resolving troubling 
questions about its nuclear program. 
 
The IAEA and the UN Security Council have also called on Iran 
to refrain from activities to enrich uranium and produce 
plutonium.  Iran failed to heed these calls.  Instead of 
suspending uranium enrichment-related activity, Iran is 
conducting small-scale operations and has announced ambitious 
plans to proceed with larger-scale operations.  Instead of 
halting work on a heavy water reactor that will produce 
plutonium, Iran is forging ahead with construction.  Instead 
of granting IAEA requests for greater access, Iran has 
limited the number and location of visits by inspectors and 
refused Agency requests to upgrade monitoring capabilities. 
Instead of answering IAEA questions, Iran has: declined to 
satisfy IAEA concerns about ties to the A.Q. Khan network, an 
illicit market for nuclear weapons technology and assistance; 
declined to meet the IAEA' s request to turn over a document 
from the A.Q. Khan network on fabricating components for 
nuclear weapons; declined to answer IAEA questions about 
 
advanced and potentially undeclared centrifuge programs; 
declined to explain apparent connections between an 
undeclared uranium conversion program and the design of a 
missile warhead. 
 
Last week's report by the Director General is sparing in 
words but clear in content: Iran continues to withhold 
cooperation with the IAEA on almost every outstanding issue. 
Iran is not implementing any of the confidence-building 
measures requested by the Board and backed by the Security 
Council. 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
No one disputes the right of Iran to a peaceful nuclear 
program in conformity with its NPT obligations.  But Iran's 
program makes no sense from a civil perspective.  Iran's 
leaders say they need the heavy water research reactor at 
Arak to produce medical isotopes.  But why this large 
investment when an existing research reactor in Tehran 
remains underutilized?  Iran's leaders claim they need 
enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. But Iran has no 
nuclear power plants.  The one under construction at Bushehr 
will receive fuel from Russia.  Iran's leaders claim they 
need the capability to enrich uranium to be self-sufficient. 
But Iran's known reserves of natural uranium are only 
sufficient to power a single reactor for under seven years. 
Even adding speculative reserves, Iran would run out of 
uranium soon after completing construction of just seven 
reactors. Compare Iran to the examples of South Korea and 
Sweden.  South Korea has twenty nuclear power plants. Sweden 
gets 40 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Both 
are advanced countries.  Neither enriches uranium. 
 
The programs and actions of Iran's leaders are not consistent 
with a peaceful program. 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
Our goal is to secure a diplomatic solution, one in which the 
leaders in Tehran provide tangible assurances that they do 
not seek to acquire atomic weapons.  With that goal in mind, 
we have worked with Europe, Russia, China, and other 
like-minded countries to present Iran's leaders with a clear 
choice.  The negative choice is for Iran's leaders to 
maintain their present course, ignoring international 
concerns and international obligations.  If Iran's leadership 
makes this choice, the Islamic Republic will only incur great 
costs and lost opportunities.  The positive choice, the 
constructive choice, the choice that would most benefit the 
Iranian people, is for Iran's leaders to alter their present 
course and to cooperate in resolving the nuclear issue. 
 
This must start by Iran meeting IAEA and Security Council 
requests to suspend all activities related to uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, including research and 
development.  These activities, once pursued covertly, and 
now pursued in contradiction of IAEA resolutions, are not 
necessary for Iran to enjoy the benefits of civil nuclear 
power.  But they are a necessary step in mastering the 
technology and acquiring the material and know-how to produce 
weapons-grade material.  Hence our concern. And hence the 
requirement by the Security Council, the Board, and the six 
Ministers to suspend these activities. 
 
Suspending these activities will allow the Security Council 
to suspend its action.  And suspending these activities will 
allow the EU3 countries, joined by the United States and 
others, to open negotiations for a long-term agreement.  Such 
an agreement would both reaffirm and advance Iran's right to 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including access to 
nuclear fuel and civil nuclear technology.  Such an agreement 
would also open the prospect for increasing political 
dialogue and economic cooperation with the rest of the world. 
 This choice will lead to the real benefit and long-term 
security of the Iranian people. 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
When the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States met here in 
Vienna two weeks ago, the substance of the message could not 
have been more clear -- a choice of two paths for the Iranian 
government: one offering considerable benefits, including 
peaceful nuclear technology and civil nuclear power; the 
second bringing to bear the weight of the Security Council. 
 
And the delivery of the message could not be more clear: Six 
Ministers representing Europe, Russia, China, and the United 
States standing side-by-side, in complete solidarity.  We 
hope that Iran's leaders will think carefully about the 
proposal from the six Foreign Ministers. 
 
 
We hope that Iran's leaders will think about what is best for 
the economic prosperity and long-term security of the Iranian 
people.  And we hope that other countries, including all 
represented here today, will encourage Iran's leaders to make 
the right choice: a choice for cooperation and negotiation; 
and a choice to grasp the diplomatic opportunities now being 
offered. 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
 
SCHULTE