VZCZCXRO5748
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #3045/01 1530852
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020852Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2790
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9770
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0031
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 6038
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2031 
TAGS: PREL ETRD APECO CH RS JA
SUBJECT: ASIAN REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE: EXPLORING DIFFERENCES 
ON APEC, THE EAS AND ASEAN PLUS 3 
 
REF: STATE 060291 
 
TOKYO 00003045  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reasons:1.4(b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Reflecting Japan's preoccupation with the 
PRC when dealing with the question of Asia regional 
architecture, and sensitivity to being regarded as a 
less-than-equal partner, MOFA Asian Affairs Bureau Regional 
Policy Director Kazutoshi Aikawa, in an exceptionally frank 
personal opinion that reflects the views of many in the 
Japanese government, opined that the United States was 
concerned about the East Asia Summit (EAS) "talk shop" 
because of its potential overlap with APEC, but wondered why 
the U.S. was not similarly concerned about ASEAN Plus 3, 
where the PRC role is much more significant.  In the course 
of briefing a Tokyo Embassy officer on the May 20 Ad Hoc 
Consultations on the EAS in Malaysia -- which he said had 
produced no particular results since the EAS is intended to 
be a dialogue among leaders and none had been present in 
Malaysia -- Aikawa asked what, if any, were the specific U.S. 
proposals for strengthening APEC and suggested that U.S. 
insistence on dealing with Asian regional issues in a large 
umbrella organization like APEC that includes Latin American 
countries gave the unintended impression that Asians were 
incapable of handling their own affairs.  He related that 
China and ASEAN, supported by the ASEAN secretariat, are 
pressing for greater progress in ASEAN Plus 3, rather than 
the EAS.  While acknowledging that the Koizumi government is 
more comfortable dealing with China in the presence of India, 
and thus favored the EAS, Aikawa asserted that Japan is 
equally interested in making progress on regional cooperation 
in ASEAN Plus 3.  End Summary. 
 
EAS SOM 
------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On May 31, newly appointed MOFA Asian Affairs Bureau 
Regional Policy Director Kazutoshi Aikawa briefed Political 
Officer on the May 20 Ad Hoc Consultations among the EAS 
Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Sabah, Malaysia.  Held on 
the margins of the ARF SOM, most countries were represented 
at the vice-minister level, but Japan was only able to send 
Asian Affairs Bureau DDG Toshihisa Takata due to the press of 
other business.  Stating that the meeting produced no 
particular results, Aikawa observed that the EAS was intended 
as a dialogue among leaders and that no decisions would be 
made in the absence of the leaders themselves.  In that 
regard, he noted that the other countries would not support 
Japan's proposal for an EAS science and technology 
ministerial on the margins of an ASEAN s&t ministerial in 
August.  As a compromise, the ministerial will proceed, but 
without the EAS logo.  Similarly, the members insisted on 
making Malaysia's proposal for an "informal" international 
trade ministerial in August even more informal by calling it 
a "luncheon" meeting with no decision on whether it will be 
under EAS auspices. 
 
ASEAN Secretariat Promotes ASEAN Plus 3 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Taking up more general issues,  Aikawa observed that 
ASEAN and China were more eager to make progress in ASEAN 
Plus 3 than in the EAS.  The ASEAN Plus 1 format (e.g., ASEAN 
Plus Japan) has made the most progress, he asserted, and now 
ASEAN wants to focus attention on making ASEAN Plus 3 equally 
productive.  ASEAN Plus 3's financial sector has established 
cooperative efforts -- for instance, the work on swap 
agreements at the May 3 ASEAN Plus 3 Finance and Central Bank 
Deputies Meeting in Hyderabad -- but there has been little 
progress in other fields, he noted. 
 
¶4.  (C)  ASEAN's secretariat has the most at stake in ASEAN 
Plus 3's success, Aikawa explained, adding it has been the 
most vocal proponent of ASEAN Plus 3 cooperation.  He stated 
that ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong has pressed Japan 
to be more active in ASEAN Plus 3 to balance China's 
domination of the group.  While Tokyo had held the first 
ASEAN Plus 1 summit outside of an ASEAN country in 2003, the 
PRC has worked assiduously at promoting ties to ASEAN 
countries and was now preparing to host the China-ASEAN 
summit in October.  Although he did not know the details, 
Aikawa said that Ong had noted China's pressure on ASEAN to 
undertake projects without providing the financial resources 
to carry them out.  Ong is hoping Japan will become more 
 
TOKYO 00003045  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
active in ASEAN Plus 3 and fund cooperative projects, Aikawa 
stated. 
 
Dealing with China 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Noting that the ASEAN secretariat had gained the 
impression that Japan favored the EAS over ASEAN Plus 3, 
Aikawa asserted that this was not true.  Japan, he insisted, 
sought to develop regional cooperation through both 
organizations.  Blaming this misimpression on Japan's 
contention with China over membership and modality issues in 
the lead up to the December 2005 EAS Kuala Lumpur summit, 
Aikawa averred that Japan believes both organizations can 
co-exist and recognizes there will be significant overlap 
between the two groupings.  Which group will be the most 
productive may only become clear in five years or more, he 
suggested. 
 
¶6.  (C)  While claiming that Japan was indifferent as to 
whether ASEAN Plus 3 or EAS should be the engine of community 
building in Asia, Aikawa acknowledged that the Koizumi 
government was more disposed towards the EAS than ASEAN Plus 
3 because of the presence of India and Australia in the 
former organization.  Japan is more comfortable dealing with 
China when India is present, he stated.  In addition, Aikawa 
observed, the EAS is "forward looking," while ASEAN Plus 3 
has the potential to become bogged down in history issues. 
 
APEC, the EAS and ASEAN Plus 3 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  In discussing reftel talking points on U.S. views of 
Asian regional architecture, Aikawa said Japan is pleased 
that the United States wants to remain engaged in Asia. 
However, he noted his personal view that the United States 
frequently expresses concerns about the EAS, but rarely 
mentions ASEAN Plus 3.  Aikawa observed that the United 
States tended to view the EAS in the context of APEC, but 
Japan tends to view the EAS in the context of ASEAN Plus 3. 
While U.S. interests in APEC are understandable, he said, 
Japan finds U.S. "indifference" to participation in the EAS 
puzzling, particularly in light of Russia's efforts to gain 
membership.  Although the ASEAN secretariat has told Japan 
that ASEAN wants to impose a moratorium on EAS membership, 
Japan is concerned that Russia might yet get an invitation to 
join.  He pointed to Indonesia President Yodhoyono's visit to 
Moscow in June and rumors that Philippine President Arroyo 
might invite President Putin to attend the upcoming EAS 
Summit in December. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Continuing with his personal thoughts on U.S. 
involvement in Asian regional groupings, Aikawa, who has no 
responsibility for APEC, said that while the United States 
wished to promote APEC as the premier organization for 
addressing economic issues in the Asia-Pacific region, it was 
unclear, at least to him, what were the specific U.S. 
proposals for strengthening the organization.  Asserting that 
APEC's weakness stemmed from its failure to address the Asian 
financial crisis, Aikawa wondered in what particular area the 
United States wanted to make progress in APEC.  He 
acknowledged that Japan would have no answer to the same 
question about the EAS, but insisted that Japan wanted to 
work towards regional cooperation in whatever organization 
could deal with the issues most effectively. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Another problem with using APEC to handle Asian 
regional issues, Aikawa stated, was the involvement of Latin 
American countries.  Although undoubtedly unintended, the 
U.S. focus on APEC created the impression that Washington 
believes Asian countries are not capable of handling their 
own regional affairs.  For instance, it was difficult to 
explain to the Japanese public why the Prime Minister was 
going to Santiago to discuss Asian issues, he said, 
particularly when a major Asian country like India is not a 
member of APEC. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  We emphasize that Aikawa, who is new, had no 
intention of providing Japan's official position on issues of 
regional architecture, particularly with regard to APEC, 
which is handled by another bureau entirely.  However, while 
 
TOKYO 00003045  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
he is not familiar with U.S. positions on APEC, Aikawa's 
frank discussion of the issues is reflective of the thinking 
of at least some parts of MOFA, and his comments regarding 
U.S. views of the EAS are enlightening.  Aikawa believes that 
the United States is opposed to the EAS because of the 
potential for overlap with APEC.  Japan, on the other hand, 
is more concerned about ASEAN Plus 3 because the organization 
is dominated by China.  Aikawa's comments reflect Japanese 
puzzlement as to why the United States is more concerned 
about a "talk shop" like the EAS that includes a number of 
democratic countries, than it is with ASEAN Plus 3, which has 
an elaborate structure of sub-groups and an action agenda 
that is dominated by China.  As in much of its Asia policy, 
Japan's view of regional architecture reflects its 
preoccupation with the PRC. 
SCHIEFFER