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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001000 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESC, WHA/EPSC, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN 
STATE FOR D, E, P, AND WHA 
TREASURY FOR JHOEK 
NSC FOR DAN FISK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2036 
TAGS: PREL EPET ENRG PGOV PINR VZ HO
SUBJECT: (S) UNDER ATTACK, HONDURAN VICE PRESIDENT TROUBLED 
BY INFLUENCE OF CERTAIN LEFTIST PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS 
 
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 985 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Honduran Vice President Elvin Santos 
respects President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya, but fears the 
influence that certain leftist advisors surrounding him are 
exercising over Honduran policy.  Zelaya is trying, in his 
view, to "play both sides" but will be unlikely to abandon 
his current populist trajectory unless presented with a major 
failure.  Santos has objected privately to current policies, 
which has resulted in his being cut out of the policy-making 
process and, in his view, targeted by a conspiracy of his 
rivals.  Santos very much seeks assistance from any quarter 
in convincing Zelaya to abandon what Santos sees as his 
improvised and often misguided approach before he squanders 
Honduras' best chance for economic growth.  That said, he is 
concerned that there is little that will prove effective in 
moving Zelaya.  Post does not see such a dire situation as 
does Santos, who feels he is fighting for his political life. 
 Post notes that despite his rhetoric, Zelaya has supported 
nearly all significant U.S. national interests, and is 
clearly pro-U.S. in orientation.  That said, a number of 
Zelaya's advisors have succeeded in engaging him in populist 
and leftist-inspired policies that bear close scrutiny and 
vigilance. The USG could assist Santos and other GOH 
moderates by sending a clear signal about our views on the 
GOH's flirtation with Chavez.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) In a surprisingly frank dinner discussion with 
Ambassador and EconChief on May 22, Honduran Vice President 
Elvin Santos confided his frustrations and concerns over 
President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya Rosales' continued policy 
improvisations, and his susceptibility to the "hard leftist" 
influence of his closest advisors (Liberal Party President 
Patricia Rodas, Foreign Minister Milton Jimenez, and others). 
 Referring to the historic conjunction of debt relief, the 
CAFTA free trade agreement, and solid macroeconomic 
foundations, Santos at one point castigated the Zelaya 
Administration, saying "they are throwing away the best 
chance Honduras has ever had." 
 
--------------------- 
Zelaya: "A Great Man" 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) By turns loyal to his boss and deeply critical of 
him, Santos nevertheless was clear that he has a great 
respect for Zelaya.  Zelaya is "a great man," Santos said, 
and one with whom he has a strong personal friendship and 
respect.  The problem, as he sees it, is that Zelaya has 
surrounded himself with leftist advisors, who "know where 
they want to go."  While Zelaya himself is widely seen as 
improvising his policy, Santos said, those who advise him 
have clearer goals in mind.  This leaves Zelaya -- a decisive 
decisionmaker, but one not given to deep policy analysis, in 
Post's view -- vulnerable to the attractions of short-term 
political expediency.  Citing examples, Santos called 
Zelaya's handling of the teachers' protests "a disaster" and 
lamented the poor GOH handling of energy issues as well 
(reported extensively reftels).  The one bright spot to date 
has been Zelaya's decision to protect the forests, which 
Santos considers an unqualified policy success.  (Comment: 
Interestingly, this is one of the few policy areas in which 
Zelaya has taken a leadership role, setting the course of 
that policy personally.  This suggests that his instincts are 
sound, and that he would be better served by seeking his own 
counsel than that of some of his current advisors.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶4.  (S) It has been clear for some time, Santos told 
Ambassador, that Zelaya is seeking a closer relationship with 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.  Hoping to prevent any 
precipitous agreements with Chavez on the margins of the 
Vienna Summit, Santos tried to convince Zelaya to send him 
instead.  Santos had been puzzled and frustrated by Zelaya's 
unwillingness to decide on who should go until his return 
from the inauguration of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias on 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001000  002 OF 003 
 
 
May 8.  Zelaya intended to meet with Chavez in Costa Rica, 
and, had he succeeded in doing so, would likely have sent 
Santos to represent him in Vienna.  Only when Chavez did not 
attend the Costa Rica event did Zelaya finally decide to go 
personally to Vienna on May 10.  When Santos realized this, 
he said, "All the pieces fell into place."  Santos was 
therefore unsurprised by the Zelaya/Chavez press remarks on 
oil cooperation following the summit, or by Zelaya's failure 
to focus on the biggest story to come out of that event:  the 
start of European Union - Central American trade talks. 
 
¶5. (S) Comment:  Post concurs with Santos that Zelaya has 
sought warmer relations with Chavez for some time.  In our 
view, however, this is not indicative of ideological kinship. 
 Zelaya seems drawn to the charismatic Chavez, but has shown 
none of his anti-democratic tendencies.  Though he too 
frequently resorts to the populist political quick-fix 
(reftel), Zelaya is not himself a leftist.  Zelaya strongly 
supported CAFTA entry into force, and expressed disdain for 
transitional measures included in the agreement to protect 
vested Honduran interests.  Zelaya has fully supported USG 
efforts to improve immigration and counter-drug enforcement, 
and is entertaining a USG request to expand both the Soto 
Cano airbase and the U.S. military footprint there.  Zelaya 
has personally met with nearly every senior USG visitor to 
Honduras, and on his inauguration day left Princes and 
Presidents waiting in the wings while he met first with the 
USG delegation, headed by Attorney General Gonzalez.  Zelaya 
has visited both the Embassy and the Ambassador's residence 
on numerous occasions, for both private chats and formal 
policy discussions.  Bucking his own political advisors, 
Zelaya recently made a public visit to the USS Underwood, the 
first U.S. warship to visit the Honduran mainland in two 
decades, and he has concluded settlement of a long-standing 
land border dispute with El Salvador.  Though he has not yet 
taken any tough action on the endemic corruption that plagues 
Honduras, he fully supports MCC, USAID, and Treasury efforts 
at reform and increased transparency.  He maintains close and 
friendly ties with the Catholic Church's Cardinal Oscar 
Rodriguez, and clearly seeks to maintain those same close and 
supportive ties with the USG.  End Comment. 
 
----------------------------------- 
"A Conspiracy Against Me Every Day" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Santos said that once he had made it clear to the 
inner circle surrounding Zelaya that he did not support their 
leftist political agenda, he was effectively shut out. 
Santos was forced to hire his own staff, locate his own 
office space outside the Presidency, and "even set up (his) 
own computer system."  Since then, he argues, that inner 
circle has been striving to discredit him, organizing marches 
and even paying protesters to make allegations against him. 
Having received word in early May, for example, that he would 
be denounced for "selling out Honduran interests to El 
Salvador" by supporting a hydroelectric project on the shared 
border, Santos quickly got out in front of the issue by 
calling for addressing domestic energy needs first.  He said 
his quick action stole a march on the protesters -- whom he 
claimed had been primed with an anti-Santos message by his 
political opponents within the Presidency itself -- and let 
him "score a goal."  For similar reasons Santos positioned 
himself in late May as a hawk on the issue of Honduran F-5 
fighters.  While his comments at the time were not helpful in 
reducing regional rivalries, they were successful in both 
appearing to distance him from the USG and presenting him to 
the public as "a patriot above all else." 
 
----------------------------------- 
"There's Nothing You Can Offer Him" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Asked point-blank if Zelaya could be turned from his 
current course, Santos said, "Yes, definitely."  (Comment: 
Post concurs, and suggests POTUS send such a signal during 
his June 5 meeting with Zelaya -- see reftel.  End Comment.) 
Pressed on how that could be accomplished, though, Santos 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001000  003 OF 003 
 
 
struggled for a strategy.  Zelaya, he is convinced, is 
"playing both sides," waiting to see what strategy works. 
Should Zelaya's current leftist-inspired approach fail, 
Santos is convinced he would abandon it in favor of a more 
orthodox approach.  In the meantime, Zelaya will continue to 
court Chavez, and will await the results of upcoming 
elections in Mexico and Nicaragua.  Santos predicts that, 
depending on how domestic policy evolves and how these 
international elections play out, Zelaya could shake up his 
cabinet after December. 
 
¶7.  (S) Santos shared others' concern, however, that Honduras 
cannot afford to wait until the end of the year to set its 
course, and certainly cannot afford to wait for its social 
and economic policies to fail before reforming them.  Asked 
what the USG could say to Zelaya that might encourage him to 
alter his policies sooner, Santos said, "There's nothing you 
can offer him that will make him change his mind.  You need 
to threaten him."  That said, Santos conceded, Zelaya is a 
proud man who would not react well to overt threats, but he 
is inexperienced in international affairs and could miss the 
key message in a more subtly made approach.  Asked how in 
that case to best influence Zelaya, Santos thought carefully, 
and sighed, saying, "I don't know.  I just don't know."  The 
anguish in his voice appeared both evident and genuine. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Comment:  Santos, an upper-class businessman, is not 
a politician by background, and is clearly struggling with 
the bitter internecine battles being waged inside this 
newly-elected administration.  He has never had his own 
political standing in the party or with the general public, 
and was chosen as Zelaya,s running mate as a marriage of 
convenience.  He has clashed from the beginning with close 
presidential advisor and Liberal Party president Patty Rodas. 
 He faces the dual challenge of defining the Vice Presidency 
-- a position which has not previously existed in its current 
form -- and also staking out a socio-economic position that 
is in conflict with many of those that surround him.  Santos 
fears that current policies could lead Honduras to disaster, 
yet he recognizes that he has little influence over those 
policies.  He maintains a respect for Zelaya and believes 
that he will come around, but only if forced to do so by 
events.  Unfortunately, every day that passes in which good 
policies are not put into place, and every move Zelaya makes 
towards a more populist stance, only risks further 
squandering Honduras' once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to 
succeed.  Santos continues to look for allies in his effort 
to shift Zelaya's thinking, but after only 100 days in office 
the strain is already starting to show. 
 
¶9.  (S) Santos' analysis that Zelaya is being pulled to the 
left by Patty Rodas and her allies is shared by many other 
observers.  With no clear counterweight within the 
Administration, some think that former President Carlos 
Flores is the only Liberal Party heavyweight who could point 
Zelaya in a more centrist direction.  The question is whether 
Flores' relationship with Zelaya and his close advisors is 
close enough to be truly effective in that role.  Per reftel, 
Post believes that a strong signal from the highest levels of 
the USG to Zelaya will help counter the influence of his more 
leftist advisors, and strengthen his confidence in his own, 
largely pro-U.S., convictions.   End Comment. 
 
Ford 
 
Ford