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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001275 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO, FRIED, VOLKER), D (SMITH), P (BAME), 
EUR/SCE (ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR 
WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 
TAGS: OPDC PREL BK NATO
SUBJECT: BOSNIA:  BIH OFFICIALS UNHAPPY OVER NEWS OF U.S. 
TROOP REDUCTION 
 
REF: STATE 84064 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney for Reasons 1.4 (B) and 
(D) 
 
This is an Action Request, please see para. 5. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Bosnian leaders, particularly those from 
Bosniak Muslim parties, were unhappy and apprehensive about 
the news, delivered per reftel, that the U.S. troop presence 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) would be diminished in the 
coming months and the U.S. presence at Eagle Base, Tuzla, 
ended.  They were particularly anxious about the potential 
impact of the downsizing during the current election 
campaign.  The Ambassador reassured the BiH leadership that 
the U.S. would continue its involvement in Bosnia, including 
through bilateral military engagement.  The Bosniak reaction 
is expected; we can help alleviate the apprehension through a 
careful media strategy (worked out in tandem with NATO HQ), a 
remaining visible U.S. presence at least through October 
elections, and a range of possible bilateral initiatives that 
will ease the sting of withdrawal.  End Summary 
 
Visceral Bosniak Reaction 
 
¶2.  (C) In a series of four meetings, the Ambassador 
delivered reftel news of U.S. troop reduction and withdrawal 
from Eagle Base, Tuzla, to the members of the Tri-Presidency 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Prime Minister Terzic, and 
Defense Minister Radovanovic.  Bosniak Presidency Member 
Tihic, deeply unhappy, privately told the Ambassador that he 
viewed the departure of the U.S. forces as a signal that the 
U.S. is "no longer interested" in BiH, though he fortunately 
toned down his rhetoric in the Ambassador's subsequent 
meeting with the entire Tri-Presidency.  During that 
discussion, Croat member of the Tri-Presidency Jovic 
underscored the need to properly engage the Bosnian public 
through well-publicized bilateral events, both within and 
outside the military sphere, aimed at demonstrating an 
ongoing U.S. presence in BiH.  Prime Minister Terzic, too, 
had a visceral initial reaction, proclaiming dramatically 
that the closure of Eagle Base will be "a huge issue" for the 
Bosniaks during the upcoming pre-election campaign. 
 
Defense Minister Pragmatic, Focused on Future 
 
¶2.  (C) As ever pragmatic, Defense Minister Radovanovic 
acknowledged the importance of the transition as a reflection 
of Bosnia's future.  Radovanovic told the Ambassador that he 
will a create commission composed of BiH Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), NATO HQ, and local officials to develop a long-term 
strategy for utilizing Eagle Base once the remaining U.S. 
troops depart.  The commission will discuss the possibility 
of retaining part of the complex to meet future NATO 
requirements for accessible military facilities as well as 
possible U.S. bilateral needs.  (Note:  We are highly 
skeptical that the Bosnians will have either the resources or 
the institutional ability to retain Eagle Base for any 
practical use.  More likely, it will be shut down following 
the U.S. departure and the subsequent EUFOR drawdown.) 
Radovanovic emphasized the growing political importance of 
timely BiH membership in Partnership for Peace, commenting 
that failure to gain entry by the November NATO Summit in 
Riga would adversely affect the momentum of defense reform. 
The Ambassador concurred about the importance of PfP for 
Bosnia, underscoring the need for movement on political 
criteria regarding the ICTY as the single remaining 
precondition. 
 
Questions Regarding Disposition of Tuzla Base 
 
¶3.  (C) During the Radovanovic meeting, a number of questions 
arose related to ownership of Eagle Base.  During the 
transition from SFOR to EUFOR, the U.S. retained control of 
the airfield and EUFOR assumed jurisdiction over the base. 
U.S. ownership of other facilities within Eagle Base is 
unclear, however.  Prior to the arrival of the stabilization 
forces in 1994, Eagle Base served as a Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA) site.  Under the 2004 Defense Law, the facility should 
theoretically resort to ownership by the BiH MOD.  As the 
U.S. withdraws, BiH officials will look to the U.S. to ensure 
property claims are clarified appropriately and in line with 
BiH law and U.S.-BiH historical agreements. 
 
 
SARAJEVO 00001275  002 OF 002 
 
 
Comment and Action Request 
 
¶4.  (C) Equating the troop reduction with overall U.S. 
"abandonment", as both Tihic and Terzic rather 
melodramatically put it, will be a common theme among Bosnian 
Muslims once the word spreads of the impending drawdown.  For 
Bosniaks, the troop reduction validates long standing fears 
that the U.S. will forsake BiH, leaving the Bosnian Muslims 
to the same Europeans who failed to react adequately in the 
1992-95 timeframe.  The impact of the U.S. drawdown optic 
will have even greater resonance in Bosnia's pre-election 
atmosphere, already heated by Serb references to separatist 
referenda.  To counter the accusations of abandonment, the 
Embassy is engaging NATO HQ Sarajevo to develop a 
comprehensive public affairs strategy; continued visible U.S. 
engagement will be critical to a successful transition.  We 
would also recommend that a U.S. presence at Eagle Base be 
maintained at least through October elections (also the 
timeframe for Kosovo status discussions) as reassurance. 
 
¶5.  (C) Action Request:  Other bilateral initiatives, some 
with military benefit in their own right, could also help to 
ease the sting of the U.S. withdrawal.  Among those deserving 
of strong consideration are: 
 
-- EUCOM can develop a strong Theater Security Cooperation 
(TSC) plan which emphasizes, in addition to our ongoing 
military assistance, a continual bilateral training and 
exercise relationship with the AFBiH.  The U.S. could gain 
valuable public diplomacy traction if such a plan were 
announced before the actual troop reduction occurs.  A 
visible demonstration within the next few months of our 
over-the-horizon capability via military exercise would also 
help reduce Bosniak anxiety over the U.S. restructuring. 
Another ship visit in early Fall would help in this regard, 
as well. 
 
-- Meetings with local defense attaches here in Sarajevo have 
highlighted the stalled progress of the NATO Trust Fund, 
established to help with the demobilization of soldiers made 
redundant by defense reform.  A relatively small but widely 
heralded U.S. donation to the Trust Fund could encourage 
others to contribute and again give us a much needed bump in 
our public relations effort. 
 
-- The postponed Bilateral Defense Consultations (BDC) could 
be held this summer, another venue in which our bilateral 
relationship and TSC plan are reviewed, formalized and made 
ready for an early Fall announcement. 
 
-- Finally, increased FMF and IMET funding is important to 
send a strong message of bilateral support and assistance. 
Bosnia has already contributed troops to the coalition effort 
in Iraq and would take the necessary steps to field a 
presence in Afghanistan, if the funds were available. 
Increased FMF, however, will be necessary to accomplish this 
until such time as Bosnia is eligible for PfP coalition 
funds. 
MCELHANEY