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DE RUEHVJ #1231/01 1521400
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P 011400Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3643
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO), D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR/SCE 
(ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, 
GREGORIAN, OSD FOR FLORY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA:  AFTER MONTENEGRO, BIH SERBS TAKE UP 
REFERENDUM THEME 
 
REF: A. SARAJEVO 1095 
     ¶B. SARAJEVO 1194 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney, for reasons 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In the wake of the Montenegro referendum, 
Bosnian Serbs have raised the possibility of a vote here that 
would determine whether the Republika Srpska (RS) remains 
part of the Bosnian state.  Statements May 27 by RS Premier 
Milorad Dodik speculating on the possibility of a referendum 
on RS independence have radicalized Bosnian political 
rhetoric and risk further alienating him from the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR) and other International 
Community (IC) representatives in Bosnia.  Reactions from all 
sides to Dodik's statements have been predictable, if 
problematic in their own right, ranging from Bosniak Muslim 
pundits impugning the U.S.-brokered constitutional reform 
efforts as separatist, to increased attention to the Serb 
radical fringe, to talk within the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) of use of the Bonn Powers.  Following 
Dodik's statements, the Ambassador warned him of the 
corrosive effect of referendum comments, reiterating a 
previous message that Kosovo's status (as well as the 
Montenegrin issue) should be kept out of the Bosnian 
electoral campaign.  The Embassy continues to liaise with 
local politicians and internationals to mitigate the results 
of Dodik's remarks and to prevent, as much as possible, a 
recurrence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DODIK'S REFERENDUM MUSINGS... 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a wide-ranging interview in Sarajevo's 
"Oslobodjenje" May 27, RS Premier Milorad Dodik criticized 
the international community and its positions on a number of 
issues, including police reform, and broached the 
hypersensitive issue of independence referenda in the 
Balkans.  Dodik greeted the results of Montenegro's recent 
referendum and asked "If one party has the right to a 
referendum, why shouldn't others?"  Dodik opined that the 
referendum "could be a good model to solve the fate of 
Kosovo" and added that Montenegro's referendum could "show 
the way how the democratic process of splitting should be 
promoted," something he described as "instructive for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina." 
 
... LEAD TO SHARP REACTIONS FROM LOCALS, IC 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Predictably in this pre-election period, local 
reactions to Dodik's message were swift and fierce.  Bosniak 
politicians and pundits assailed Dodik's remarks, saying they 
revealed his true separatist intentions.  Haris Silajdzic's 
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) called for a 
referendum on the level of the whole of BiH to dissolve the 
RS, while representatives of the Bosniak Party for Democratic 
Action in the RS National Assembly (RSNA) said that Serbs 
were free to leave BiH, but not to take the land.  One 
journalist in Sarajevo's "Oslobodjenje" used Dodik's remarks 
to attack the USG-brokered constitutional reform project, 
saying that Dodik's interest in pushing for constitutional 
changes was to prepare the ground for his referendum plans. 
In the RS, meanwhile, radical and nationalist fringe 
politicians like the pro-independence "Serbian National 
Movement - The Choice is Yours" supported Dodik's statements 
and capitalized on them through increased attention and press 
coverage. 
 
¶4. (C) International reaction was immediate, as well. 
Principal Deputy High Representative Lawrence Butler publicly 
asked Dodik to explain his remarks, while High Representative 
Christian Schwarz-Schilling, in a visit to Belgrade, 
reasserted that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
BiH were not up for a vote.  Ambassadors accredited to 
Sarajevo were particularly upset with Dodik's pointed remarks 
questioning the motives for their interventions in BiH.  Some 
OHR and IC representatives even spoke openly of the 
possibility of using the High Representative's Bonn Powers 
either to avoid a referendum or to punish Dodik. 
 
AMBASSADOR PRIVATELY REBUKES DODIK 
 
¶5. (C) In a private conversation May 29, the Ambassador 
rebuked Dodik for his irresponsible remarks, noting with 
particular dismay how they came just days after his request 
 
SARAJEVO 00001231  002 OF 002 
 
 
not to raise the issue of Kosovo in the BiH press.  The 
Ambassador warned of the corrosive effects of such statements 
both within BiH and for Dodik's relations with the IC, noting 
that the chief beneficiaries of the furor caused by such 
statements were radical Bosniak politicians like SBiH's Haris 
Silajdzic.  Dodik offered no defense for the referendum 
remarks, though he said that he hadn't intended to group the 
Ambassador with other chiefs of mission he referred to 
negatively in the article. 
 
¶6. (C) Subsequent to the release of the "Oslobodjenje" piece, 
Dodik attempted to walk back from the referendum statements 
somewhat in an article published in the May 28 "Nezavisne 
Novine."  In this piece Dodik said that the question of "BiH: 
 Yes or No?" had been answered long ago, but that the 
question of what form BiH would take remained.  RS President 
Dragan Cavic largely steered clear of the debate, while 
offering an oblique public criticism of Dodik for promoting a 
policy (the referendum) that he could not deliver.  Dodik 
surrogates, meanwhile, have continued to walk his statements 
back.  The leader of Dodik's Association of Independent 
Social Democrats in the RSNA, Krstan Simic, said in the May 
31 "Glas Srpske" that Dodik, as a legalist, would not 
organize any referendum, and only mentioned it as a 
possibility. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT:  In this pre-election period (national 
elections will take place in October), we expect this will 
not be the last we hear of Serb politicians trying to take 
advantage of separatist sentiment.  As Kosovo negotiations 
proceed this year, the political temperature will likely 
rise, with Serbs in BiH calling for "the same right" to leave 
Bosnia as Kosovars are demanding from Serbia.  Despite our 
early warnings to Serb politicians not to use Kosovo, or 
Montenegro for that matter, to advance their election 
fortunes, there will be a continuing low-level drumbeat on 
"self-determination" as long as the Kosovo status process 
goes on.  As we have already been doing publicly and 
privately, we will need to tamp this down.  High 
Representative Schwarz-Schilling has jumped the gun a bit 
(see septel reporting) by implying the use of extraordinary 
Bonn powers against the Serbs if they pursue the referendum 
course; his reaction demonstrates the jitters of the 
international community about spillover into Bosnia of events 
elsewhere in the Western Balkans.  END COMMENT. 
MCELHANEY