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RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001832 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS SO YE
SUBJECT: SALEH ADVISES GEN ABIZAID ON SOMALIA'S "NEW 
TALIBAN" 
 
REF: SANAA 1773 
 
SANAA 00001832  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( 
D). 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  President Saleh told visiting CENTCOM 
Commander GEN John Abizaid on June 18 that Yemen had invited 
members of the Somali Islamic Courts (IC) and the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Sanaa for talks. 
The IC leadership answered that they would come "within a 
week."  Saleh said if they do not come to Sanaa, it would be 
a clear indicator that they intend on becoming the "New 
Taliban."  He disclaimed rumors that Yemen was sending 
weapons to the TFG and said he believed Egypt and Libya were 
supporting the Courts in order to destabilize Ethiopia. 
Saleh pleaded for more help from coalition naval assets 
patrolling the Gulf of Aden in stopping boats filled with 
Somali refugees destined for the Yemeni coast.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C)  Saleh opened a cordial meeting with GEN Abizaid with 
a discussion of the current situation in Iraq, but quickly 
turned to Somalia.  Saleh opined that fears of an Ethiopian 
invasion were exaggerated.  Addis Ababa is aware that the 
Islamic Courts would use any incursion as a pretext to rally 
the people against foreign intervention, which would only 
strengthen the hands of the Islamists.  Responding to a 
question from GEN Abizaid, Saleh said even an Ethiopian raid, 
rather than a full invasion, might not weaken the Courts 
because the "Somali people are stubborn."  The religious 
extremists within the Islamic Courts have a great deal of 
sympathy among Somalis, and even in Yemen, although it is 
more "hidden" here than in Somalia. 
 
¶3. (C)  The Islamic Courts represent a "New Taliban," Saleh 
advised, but if they learned the lessons of the Afghan 
regime, they will not be as confrontational with their 
neighbors and the west.  In that regard, Saleh said his 
invitation to the Courts and the TFG to come to Sanaa for 
talks would be an important test of the Courts' intentions. 
"They said they would come within a week," he explained, "but 
if they were sincere, they would have accepted much earlier." 
 Saleh said the Courts were likely just stalling for time in 
order to achieve more victories on the ground and then come 
to talks from a "position of strength" or even reject talks 
with the TFG altogether. 
 
¶4. (C)  Indirectly referencing recent media reports that 
Yemen had sent several planeloads of weapons to Baidoa 
destined for the TFG, Saleh said such rumors were not true, 
and were only drummed up by the Courts in order to whip up 
nationalist support from Somalis.  Saleh noted that Yemen had 
provided food and clothing to the TFG President and 
Parliament Speaker after their successful negotiations in 
Aden earlier in the year, but "we are not sending anything 
now," he claimed. 
 
¶5. (C)  In Saleh's opinion, it is the Courts, not the TFG, 
who are receiving outside assistance.  Egpyt's intelligence 
services, he asserted, were supporting the Courts on the 
ground "not as terrorists, but because they want war between 
Somalia and Ethiopia" in order to gain greater influence over 
the Ethiopia's use of the Nile.  Likewise Libya's Qadafi was 
sending support to the Courts' Chairman through former Somali 
President Abdul Qasam Salad because Qadafi is "not on good 
terms" with Ethiopia and because he wants to "create trouble 
for U.S. forces in the Horn of Africa" (NFI). 
 
¶6. (C)  Seizing upon the presence in the meeting of RDML 
Richard Hunt, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force - 
Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA), Saleh said Yemen was "suffering 
from Somalia's problems," particularly because of the daily 
flow refugees into Yemen.  "We have more than 150,000 Somalis 
here," he claimed, "and we are concerned about them not only 
for humanitarian reasons but also because we have caught 
 
SANAA 00001832  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
smugglers bringing weapons here, possibly for terrorist 
attacks."  Saleh pleaded with Hunt to "stop the refugees from 
getting closer to our shores."  GEN Abizaid and RDML Hunt 
said that through better coordination between the Yemeni 
Coast Guard, CTF-150, and NAVCENT, more could be done to 
combat smuggling of people and weapons between Somalia and 
Yemen. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT:  Saleh is clearly concerned about the Islamic 
Courts' military successes in Somalia (reftel).  As one of 
the few regional actors with access to all of Somalia's 
regional and factional leaders, Saleh is keen to use his 
influence to moderate the Islamic Courts.  That said, Saleh's 
tone in this meeting indicated that he believes it may be too 
late to exert meaningful influence over the Courts as they 
gain military and political strength on the ground.  As for 
Saleh's refutation of arms shipments to the TFG, post has 
nothing thus far to confirm or discredit these reports, but 
we note that Saleh has in the past defied the UN arms embargo 
to send arms to the TFG. 
 
¶8. (U)  GEN Abizaid has cleared this message. 
Krajeski