VZCZCXRO6213
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHYN #1814 1721132
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211132Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4408
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SANAA 001814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO S/CRS FOR BRENDA HAZZARD, CHIEF OF EARLY 
WARNING. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016 
TAGS: PINS PGOV PTER EAID PREL KDEM KCRS YM
SUBJECT: EMBASSY SANAA COMMENTS ON NIC WATCHLIST 
 
REF: SECSTATE 94560 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) Post recommends the following changes to the suggested 
test for Yemen in the NIC watchlist of internal instability: 
 
¶2. (S) "Yemen's risk of significant internal instability over 
the past six months has slightly decreased due to a 
successful ceasefire with insurgents in the north, President 
Saleh's improved health, and a public commitment by the ROYG 
to combat corruption and implement reforms.  Other 
destabilizing factors, including a relatively weak central 
government, a struggling economy, and strongly decentralizing 
tribal influence on the populace, remain constant.  Sanaa's 
counterterrorism initiatives and alliance with the United 
States counter destabilizing activity by unruly tribes and 
Islamic extremists.  Despite the arrests of several important 
terrorism supporters, counterterrorism cooperation with 
Washington has been inconsistent in some areas.  The escape 
of 23 al-Qa'ida operatives from a government prison in 
February highlights corruption and gross negligence in 
Yemen's intelligence security services.  Saleh historically 
has responded to internal pressure by releasing rehabilitated 
extremists from custody and reportedly seeking truces with 
extremist leaders. 
 
¶3. (S) "Any number of shocks could trigger wide-scale unrest, 
including further reductions in fuel subsidies, devaluation 
of the local currency, or serious insurgent attacks in urban 
centers.  If Saleh dies suddenly or is incapacitated, there 
is a good chance Yemen could fall into disarray, as any 
successor will be severely challenged in holding together 
political, military, regional, and tribal factions while 
maintaining Yemen's fragile economy.  There is significant 
potential for violence in the 2006 elections if the 
opposition chooses to oppose Saleh's candidacy, or if there 
is widespread fraud at the local level.  Any significant 
challenge to Saleh's rule, whether from death, popular 
revolt, or political opposition, would trigger a succession 
crisis." 
Krajeski