This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 004218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, INR, EUR, EAP, EUR/WE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2026 
TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC AS FR CBW
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP:  2006 INFORMATION EXCHANGE (IE) 
 
Classified By: ESTH/NP COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D) 
, (E) AND (H). 
 
 
----------- 
(U) SUMMARY 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The following describes highlights of the Information 
Exchange (IE) portion of the annual meeting of the Australia 
Group (AG), which met in Paris, June 12-15, 2006 (Report on 
AG Plenary provided septel).  The IE included 48 
presentations by 13 AG member states, and 2 presentations 
were provided in the Joint Session by 2 member states.  The 
US provided 20 of the 50 presentations.  These presentations 
focused on chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs of 
concern, trends and developments in CBW proliferation, 
prospective new members, looking ahead, summary of IE 
outcomes, and recommendations for the IE report to the 
Plenary.  All papers referred to below were provided by the 
chair (Australia) separately and are available to concerned 
agencies upon request.  All IE documents received will be 
available online at the WINPAC Threat Reduction Monitoring 
Group,s Australia Group site on Intelink.  The IE held a 
joint session with the enforcement experts meeting to enhance 
the transparency of information between the two communities 
over two days of meetings.  The enforcement experts meeting 
focused on intangible transfers of technology.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
(U) INTRODUCTION 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The Chairman opened the Information Exchange Session 
with a review of past IE efforts and thanked the membership 
for their continued support and commented on the value of the 
information exchange for all our efforts to stem the 
proliferation of CBW programs worldwide. 
 
------------------------- 
(U) EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The US presented on microreactor technology. 
 
¶4.  (S) The UK presented the paper 'Developments in Chemical 
Microreactor Technology.'  This paper updated the UK paper 
from the AG meeting in 2005 on the emergence of this new 
technology.  Since that time the scientific discipline and 
related industrial applications have progressed.  This paper 
informed the membership on those advances, advised of the 
possibilities for misuse and made suggestions for countering 
the threat presented by this technology.  The paper discussed 
the technological advantages, limiting factors, potential 
factors that could contribute to CW proliferation, 
difficulties for use in CW applications, and considerations 
for control.  The UK suggested that the AG monitor 
developments of microreactors and consider steps to develop 
appropriate safeguards to address potential proliferation. 
This paper is available online. 
 
¶5.  (S) The US presented on disposable bioreactors. 
 
¶6.  (S) New Zealand commented that the AG needed to be aware 
of this technology and be prepared to act on potential 
proliferation concerns. 
 
¶7.  (S) The UK presented the paper 'Fentanyls - A Cause for 
Concern?"  The paper described fentanyls as a highly potent 
narcotic analgesic belonging to the opiate family that is 
used extensively for analgesia and anaesthesia.  It discussed 
the Russian Special Forces use of fentanyls in the October 
2002 Dubrovka Theatre hostage rescue operation intending to 
subdue a group of 50 Chechen rebels but resulting in the 
deaths of the rebels and 129 civilians.  The use of fentanyls 
and their analogues are not included in the schedules of the 
CWC, and according to the UK,s assessment was not contrary 
to Russia,s obligations under the Convention.  The use of 
fentanyls has increased the awareness of these chemicals and 
may lead to small scale use on the battlefield, which the UK 
judges would be prohibited under the CWC.  Fentanyls and 
their derivatives are controlled nationally and coordinated 
internationally by the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB).  Information on the INCB is provided in an annex to 
this paper.  Both papers are available online. 
 
¶8.  (S) The UK provided a paper entitled, 'Non-Lethal 
Warfare: Chemical Incapacitants.'  The UK paper notes 
non-lethal warfare capabilities are being pursued by a number 
of countries and have the potential to be used by the 
military and law enforcement agencies in numerous scenarios, 
including urban environments and peacekeeping operations. 
Non-lethal weapons cover a broad spectrum to include kinetic 
devices, barriers, electrical devices such a TASER guns, 
directed energy weapons such as lasers, and various 
chemicals.  Chemical incapacitants can cause sensory 
irritation-such as sneezing, coughing, or 
lachrymation-disabling physical effects-such as vomiting or 
cramps-or sensory nervous efforts-such as sedation, 
anesthesia, and sleep.  There is considerable interest and 
research being done to find incapacitating agents that are 
potent and fast acting without the side effects that threaten 
human life.  The UK judges that the acquisition of non-lethal 
warfare capabilities will continue to increase in the next 
ten years.  This paper is available online. 
 
-------------------------- 
(U) REGIONAL CBW OVERVIEWS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Portugal presented a paper entitled, 'The Threat 
Represented by the WMD Proliferating Countries.'  Portugal 
judges that proliferating countries, despite enforcement by 
international counterproliferation mechanisms, have adopted 
new methods that allow them to be successful in acquiring 
goods that can be applied to WMD programs.  Portugal suggests 
monitoring diplomats suspected of coordinating illicit 
procurement as well as front companies and organizations; 
reinforcing information sharing at the AG to include as much 
actionable information as possible; and monitoring shipping 
companies, busy ports, and banking institutions.  This paper 
is available online. 
 
¶10.  (S) Italy presented on the current status of Libya,s CW 
destruction, which was generally consistent with US 
information.  Italy described Libya,s views for conducting 
its CW destruction, focusing on Libya,s desire to install 
incinerators at Jufra, the CW storage area, and then 
dismantle and relocate them to Tripoli for civilian hazardous 
waste disposal.  Italy also discussed the status of the 
conversion of Libya,s former CWPF at Pharma 150, which 
should be finished by August 2006.  This conversion is 
intended for the packaging of imported drugs for HIV, 
tuberculosis, and malaria and will be commissioned in 
September 2006.  No paper was distributed. 
 
¶11.  (S) The US presented on Libyan CBW. 
 
¶12.  (S) Slovakia presented a paper on two suspicious cases 
of dual-use materials proliferation in 2005.  During 2005, 
the Slovak Information Service received information about 
Libya,s interest in procurement of dual-use materials. 
Libyan military attach to Slovakia Abdulla Ali BEN OUN 
contacted a Slovak citizen engaged in arms trade asking him 
to procure boron and polybutadienes ending in hydroxyl 
groups.  The Slovak mediator immediately considered using a 
forged end-user certificate.  The second case presented was 
on Abbas SADEK, a Slovak citizen of Lebanese origin, who was 
officially engaged in procurement of various commodities, 
including unidentified chemicals.  SADEK was said to be in 
contact with OPCW inspectors and experts from Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia in December 2005 but no further information was 
revealed to determine if any controlled materials were 
procured.  This paper is available online. 
 
¶13.  (S) The US presented on Iran BW. 
 
¶14.  (S) Germany presented a PowerPoint presentation entitled 
'Iran,s Level of Self-sufficiency: Does Iran Still Need 
Foreign Assistance for Running a BW Program?'  Germany 
concluded that Iran is in possession of BW relevant agents 
and that it has the scientific knowledge to work on a BW 
program.  They also concluded that Iran has developed a 
dual-use production industry and is en route to becoming 
self-sufficient, though it may still need to import freeze 
dryers and centrifuges.  Iran has acquired dual-use knowledge 
that is relevant for BW production and has built dual-use 
production facilities.  Germany asserted that it is no longer 
a question whether Iran is capable of producing BW agents, 
but whether it is willing to do so.  This PowerPoint 
presentation is available online. 
 
¶15.  (S) France presented a paper entitled 'Activities of the 
Nature Bio Technology Company.'  In the paper, France 
suggests that the Nature Bio Technology Company could 
produce, within six-months, an industrial production 
capability of 1,000 tons of Bacillus thuringiensis (BT) 
because of its fermenter capacity.  France estimates that the 
Iranian Health Ministry needs up to 200 tons of BT for 
indigenous malaria control and that 800 tons will be exported 
to Sudan and South Africa.  The BT was experimentally 
produced by the Biological Research Center (BRC) belonging to 
the Iranian Research Organization of Science and Technology 
(IROST).  The production line previously underwent 
small-scale tests within IROST.  This pilot production was 
reportedly conducted on the Shahriyar Research Center of 
IROST.  This production program of BT allows Iranians to 
improve their skills in fermentation and lyophilization 
technologies, useful in offensive BW programs.  This paper is 
available online. 
¶16.  (S) New Zealand presented on Iran BW.  New Zealand 
commented that although there was little evidence of Iran,s 
offensive program, there is plenty of information on its 
defensive work.  Cuba, Russia, India, and China aid Iran,s 
defensive work.  New Zealand is concerned with Iran,s 
biodefense connections to IROST, the Iranian Republican Guard 
Corp (IRGC), and the Defense Industry Organization (DIO). 
New Zealand noted the possibility that Iran,s defensive work 
could be a parallel project to offensive development. 
Wellington is most worried about Imam Hussein University and 
its development of toxins from shiga, cholera, anthrax, and 
clostridium bacteria. 
 
¶17.  (S) The US presented on Iran CW. 
 
¶18.  (S) The Netherlands presented a paper entitled 'Iran: 
Involvement of the Special Industries Group in Sulfuric Acid 
Projects.'  According to the Netherlands, the Iranian Special 
Industries Group (SIG) falls under DIO, which is subordinate 
to the Ministry of Defense.  SIG was responsible for 
controlling several entities involved in the CW program. 
After Iran acceded to the CWC, SIG entities have been 
involved in other projects where they actively seek new 
customers.  The Netherlands assesses that there is no 
evidence that SIG is currently involved in offensive CW work. 
 The paper discusses two cases involving SIG,s procurement 
of sulfuric acid plants, neither of which the Netherlands 
assesses have any applicability to CW.  Sulfuric acid is 
common in the mining and petrochemical industry and is 
already available domestically.  The Netherlands assesses 
that SIG,s involvement with these sulfuric acid plants is 
the first time that SIG has been procuring for non-military 
related projects and may indicate further commercialization 
of SIG.   This paper is available online. 
 
¶19.  (S) Germany presented a PowerPoint presentation entitled 
'Cooperation Iran-Syria:  Traces for a CW Program or 
Development of Civil Chemical Infrastructure?'  Germany 
presented on a Jane,s Defense Weekly article from October 
26, 2005 that alleged that Iran was assisting Syria to pursue 
an 'innovative chemical warfare program' by establishing 4-5 
CW precursor production facilities.  Iran would provide the 
construction design and equipment to annually produce tens to 
hundreds of tons of precursors for VX, sarin, and mustard. 
Engineers from Iran,s DIO were to visit Syria and survey 
locations for the plants, and construction was scheduled from 
the end of 2005-2006.  Past Iranian deals with Syria involved 
ethylene glycol, sodium sulfide, and hydrochloric acid, which 
Germany proposed could produce sulfur mustard.  Previous 
contacts between Iran and the Syrian defensive organizations 
include a June 2005 antifreeze production line, the transfer 
in September 2005 of 1500 graphite anodes, the transfer in 
January 2003 of 100kg of Obidoxime Chloride, filter, gloves, 
etc., and the transfer in 2003-4 of ND-CAM detectors. 
Germany,s general assessment of these activities is that 
there is no indication of an independent CW-precursor 
production in Syria, and Iran has strongly limited know-how 
in chemical plant engineering. Germany also has no recent 
information on Syrian attempts to procure nerve agent 
precursors.  Germany assesses that Syria is building an 
infrastructure for basic chemicals, the Syrian Army or 
Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) is procuring 
dual-use chemicals for sulfur mustard (including sodium 
sulfide), there is cooperation between the Iranian and Syrian 
defensive organizations, and there is long-standing 
cooperation between Iran and Syria on NBC-related matters. 
This PowerPoint presentation is available online. 
 
¶20.  (S) The Netherlands presented a paper entitled 
'Proliferation-Relevant Applications of Monoethylene Glycol.' 
 The Netherlands began the paper by listing common 
monoethylene glycol (MEG) applications and noted that it is 
not on any control lists domestically or internationally. 
The Netherlands recently commissioned an independent 
scientific study on the possible application of MEG in the 
production of CW because an unidentified Dutch company 
recently supplied shipments of MEG to the Syrian Ministry of 
Industry.  The Syrian Ministry of Industry certified the 
chemicals were to be used in the production of urethane and 
antifreeze.  The Netherlands noted that the Syrian Ministry 
of Industry allegedly serves as a front organization for 
procurement efforts of the SSRC under the Syrian Ministry of 
Defense.  The Netherlands said that the MEG can be converted 
to 2-chloroethanol, which can be used for the production of 
VX and sulfur mustard.  In the past, SSRC had a need for MEG 
given the supply of ten tons of MEG by the Iranian DIO in 
¶2002.  The Netherlands discussed how to make 2-chloroethanol 
using MEG.  The Netherlands commented that they are not at 
this time recommending the inclusion of MEG on any AG control 
lists, but welcome comments from other AG members on MEG 
trade to countries of concern.  This paper is available 
online. 
 
¶21.  (S) The US presented on Syria CW. 
¶22.  (S) France presented a PowerPoint presentation on Syrian 
cooperation with Russia.  France presented on an unspecified 
joint project between the Syrian Environmental Studies 
Research Centre (ESRC) and the Oriental Petrochemical 
Industry (VNKHK) of Russia.  The ESRC would own 49 percent 
and the Russian company would own 51 percent.  The people 
involved in the joint project were Mahmod Saleh Soliman and 
Mustafa Tiaess from the ESRC, and Arkadiy Vinogradov from 
VNKHK.  France also talked about a publication from 1998 
describing a project between Mustafa Tiaess and Anatoliy 
Kuntsevich, the former Soviet chemical warfare expert, on 
activated carbon.  France noted that Kuntsevich was suspected 
to have provided Syria with precursors prior to his death. 
This PowerPoint presentation was not given out at the meeting. 
 
¶23.  (S) The US presented on Syria BW. 
 
¶24.  (S) Argentina noted the distribution of a paper entitled 
'Biological Weapons Programs - An Overview.'  The papers 
contain an annex with a table that highlights Argentina,s 
assessments on BW proliferation concerns.  The countries 
include: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, 
Pakistan, India, and China.  The paper and annex is available 
online. 
 
¶25.  (S) Argentina noted the distribution of a paper entitled 
'Chemical Weapons Programs - An Overview.'  The papers 
contain an annex with a table that highlights Argentina,s 
assessments on CW proliferation concerns.  The countries 
include: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, North Korea, 
Pakistan, India, and China.  The paper and annex is available 
online. 
 
¶26.  (S) New Zealand commented on possible Iranian-Syrian 
cooperation.  New Zealand assesses that the cooperation is 
mainly driven by Iran,s desire for increased strategic 
importance in the region.  New Zealand also assesses that 
Iran,s biotechnology sector is far more advanced than 
Syria,s, and Iran does not mind sharing its knowledge with 
Syria. 
 
¶27.  (S) The US presented on Albania CW and Russia CBW. 
 
¶28.  (S) Canada interjected a comment regarding Russian 
transparency related to the CWC and BTWC.   Canada noted that 
since former President Yeltsin,s announcement in 1992 of the 
existence and termination of the Russian BW program.  Russia 
in 1992 submitted Confidence Building Measures (CBM) 
documentation to the BTWC, which detail numerous institutes 
involved in offensive BW programs.  Since that time, Russia 
has repeatedly denied ever having an offensive BW program. 
Canada encouraged Russia to open MOD institutes to AG member 
states in an effort to answer questions regarding Russia,s 
current activities and past Soviet activities.  Canada noted 
that Russian transparency would be increased if it submitted 
an updated CBM.  Russia has failed to acknowledge public 
statements made by former Russian CW researchers on 
 Novichok, CW agents.  Canada mentioned that current 
Russian CW experts are still restricted from traveling 
abroad.  Canada continues to have concerns regarding Russian 
compliance in the CWC. 
 
¶29.  (S) The US presented on Pakistan CBW. 
 
¶30.  (S) France presented a paper entitled 'Pakistan 
Cooperation with China.'  France stated that since the 
beginning of 2004, Pakistan has been dealing with the Chinese 
company, Polytechnologies Inc. to acquire a production plant 
of military grade activated carbon with a capacity of 500 
tons per year.  This project also would supply analysis 
equipment to certify the activated carbon, protection means 
to handle toxic chemicals during the certification tests, and 
some chemicals used for these tests- cyanogen chloride, 
hydrocyanic acid, phosgene, and dimethyl methyl phosphonate 
(DMMP).  France noted that when Pakistan receives these 
elements, Pakistan will be able to indigenously produce 
efficient filters for individual and collective protection 
against chemical warfare agents.  Moreover, they will have a 
certification laboratory for military grade activated carbon. 
 France mentioned that via this cooperation, Pakistan is also 
trying to acquire knowledge of toxic chemical production and 
a 200Kg quantity of DMMP, a major precursor for sarin, soman 
and VX.  This paper is available online. 
 
¶31.  (S) US presented on India CBW. 
 
¶32.  (S) Australia gave a presentation on South East Asia CBW 
Proliferation.  Australia does not believe that any country 
in South East Asia appears to be developing an offensive CBW 
capability.  Australia has concerns with the area because of 
the possibility of proliferation and potential terrorist 
access.  Australia noted that South East Asia lacks export 
control legislation, the motivation to enact legislation, and 
a capability to enforce export controls. Australia noted that 
the busiest ports are Singapore and in Malaysia, and they 
have uneven enforcement of export controls.  Australia noted 
that ports in Cambodia and Brunei may be next.  Regional 
terrorist groups are interested in CBRN capabilities, but 
they are assessed to have low technological sophistication. 
For these terrorist groups, the initial acquisition of 
virulent pathogens and chemicals pose the greatest challenge. 
 Australia commented that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) prefers 
methods that induce mass casualty outcomes, rather than 
disruption, but Australia assesses that JI,s interest in BW 
related attacks may have been reduced by recent safehouse 
raids. Australia has concerns with the security of CBW 
materials in the area because security is less stringent than 
the West.  The Philippines and Indonesia are upgrading 
biocontainment facilities to BL3 at the Research Institute 
for Tropical Medicine and the Research Institute for 
Veterinary Science, respectively.   New Zealand raised its 
concerns over the proliferation of high biosecurity 
containment facilities to these countries, except for 
Singapore.  New Zealand,s general concerns stem from an 
assessment that these facilities are poorly maintained, 
poorly funded and are lacking in procedures and processes to 
guarantee the security of highly pathogenic organisms. 
 
¶33.  (S)  The UK presented a paper entitled 'Production of AG 
listed Dual-Use Chemical Manufacturing Equipment in Non-AG 
Countries in Asia.'  The UK judges that producers of AG 
listed dual-use chemical manufacturing equipment have been 
identified in China, India and Taiwan and that these 
countries have sufficiently large and developed chemical 
industries to justify a market for indigenous manufacturers 
of this type of equipment.  Additionally, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam have a limited number of civil 
requirements for dual-use chemical manufacturing equipment. 
No manufacturers of this type of equipment have been 
identified in these countries.  Myanmar and the DPRK (N. 
Korea) may have legitimate civil requirements for some 
dual-use chemical equipment, though the UK cannot accurately 
assess their requirements for this type of equipment.  This 
paper and its supporting tables are available online. 
 
¶34.  (S)  The US presented on DPRK CBW and China CBW. 
 
¶35.  (S)  The UK presented a paper on China,s Research 
Institute of Chemical Defense (RICD) that they assess is an 
institute of concern.  Canada commented on China,s joint 
project with France to build a BL-4 facility in Wuhan but 
asked if any member had specific information regarding the 
location of this facility.  The US commented that it would 
investigate this issue and raise it with Canada 
intersessionally.  This paper was not distributed at the 
meeting. 
 
----------------- 
(U) TOXIC EVENTS 
----------------- 
 
¶36.  (S)  Australia presented information concerning toxic 
events in Australia in 2005.  On 21 February 2005, 57 people 
were affected by an unknown toxic exposure at the Melbourne 
airport.  Forty seven of the 57 were hospitalized with 
symptoms of nausea, vomiting, throat tightness, and shortness 
of breath.  There were no indications of toxic release, and 
subsequent testing (at 3 hrs and at 5 hrs after the first 
symptoms appeared), including after the HVAC system returned 
to normal operation, showed no evidence of contaminants. 
Australia commented that only ten to fifteen were credible 
casualties because they reported symptoms at a time 
consistent with the chain of events.  Australia assessed that 
the event was most likely chemically, rather than 
biologically, caused, because the victims recovered quickly, 
there were no abnormalities in their blood (NFI), and there 
were no long term effects; however, Australia has not 
identified a chemical that would cause the symptoms, and 
there was no specific information that Melbourne,s airport 
was a potential target.  A full investigation of possible 
causes for the event did not reveal suspect toxic substances 
and the event was declared unexplainable.  There were several 
white powder events during June at the Indonesian embassy in 
Canberra as well as one event at Parliament House also in 
June 2005.  No toxic material was detected in the white 
powder.  The Australians assessed that these events were 
related to the trial of an Australian citizen convicted in 
Indonesia on drug trafficking charges.  The last confirmed 
powder incident that tested positive for at least Bacillus 
thuringiensis occurred in 2004 at the Sydney airport.  The 
presentation highlighted the disruptive effect that even a 
low-grade CBW-related incident could cause. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
(U) TERRORISM AND OTHER NONSTATE ISSUES 
--------------------------------------- 
¶37.  (S)  The US presented on CBW terrorism. 
 
¶38.  (S)  Canada presented on terrorist CBW capabilities. 
Canada assesses that anthrax, ricin, and botulinum toxin (bot 
tox) are the most sought after agents, but there has been no 
success in their production due to a lack of resources and 
expertise.  Most jihadist internet recipes are crude and 
incomplete or technically inaccurate as to affect the quality 
and quantity of product.  In contrast to most recipes, a 
comprehensive terrorist botulinum toxin manual in mainly 
English with some Arabic was found on the web.  The SITE 
Institute recovered the approximately 25-paged manual and 
posted it on the web at www.siteinstitute.org.  Canadian 
defense experts found the manual is too technically detailed 
for most terrorists, but it is the most accurate found to 
date.  It compiles information from various sources including 
the Journal of Medical Science, the US FDA, Protein 
Purification Protocols, and other open sources.  The manual 
contains six chapters: 1) Finding Clostridium 
botulinum/isolation and purification, 2) Conditions for toxin 
production, 3) isolation and purification, 4) Mouse toxin 
assay, 5) Storage and stability and, 6) Weaponization.  The 
instructions on finding Clostridium botulinum are sparse, and 
there are omissions or vague guidelines on liquefaction and 
selecting pure isolates and anaerobic growth conditions.  The 
instructions on protein purification using ammonium sulfate 
precipitation are inefficient but could work because they are 
technically accurate.  There are some errors in math and 
figures quoted, especially with regard to toxicity and growth 
times, but experienced microbiologists could decipher the 
instructions and could potentially produce 664 lethal human 
oral doses, if optimally disseminated.  The author suggested 
novel mechanisms for dissemination, including dissolving the 
toxin in detergent and water and using a nebulizer to 
disperse the suspension.  The author notes that 0.5-5 microns 
is the optimal particle size for dissemination, and he also 
suggests a method for producing a dusty form of bot tox and 
for poisoning food and water.  The Canadians assess the 
author has a reasonable understanding of microbiology and 
probably has some formal education.  The author understands 
English well, but he probably retyped the information from 
other English-language sources.  In conclusion, the Canadians 
noted that the manual is the most comprehensive jihadist 
toxin production manual produced to date, and a skilled 
person could produce some bot tox, but the individual would 
need to produce multiple batches for anything beyond a 
small-scale attack.  The Canadians assess that the improvised 
spray solution would not be efficient at producing 
casualties, and the isolation of Clostridium botulinum from 
soil would pose the most daunting challenge. 
 
¶39.  (S)  Italy presented a PowerPoint presentation on 
'Emerging Zoonoses Could Influence AG Lists?'  The focus of 
the presentation is the hazard posed by zoonotic disease as 
they jump from animals to human-to-human disease.  Many 
zoonotic diseases, such as rabies, are appropriate for 
terrorist purposes because of their high morbidity and 
mortality.  Insect vectors make disease monitoring and 
surveillance difficult.  Zoonoses have an expanding host 
range, and Italy cited SARS, vCJD, HIV, Ebola, and influenza 
as recent examples of agents that have crossed into the human 
population.  The presentation notes animal diseases 
notifiable to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
and those noted by the WHO.  Italy presented the EU,s 
monitoring data for several zoonotic diseases, and noted that 
very few of the agents that cause these diseases are on the 
AG control lists.  Italy specifically discussed avian 
influenza, West Nile Virus, and rabies incidents and 
outbreaks.  Italy,s considerations when weighing the threat 
posed by zoonotic diseases are that 75 percent of emerging 
diseases have zoonotic origin, foodstuffs should be the 
preferred method of dissemination by nonstate actors, acts of 
terrorism would most likely be small-scale, and new hazardous 
microorganisms could be used as BW.  Italy concluded that the 
AG should continuously monitor and update its control lists 
or design new criteria for the addition of new agents.  This 
paper and its supporting tables are available online. 
 
------------------------------ 
(U) DENIALS AND TREND ANALYSIS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶40.  (S)  Australia presented on CBW denial and catch-all 
trends.  Iran is consistently the country with the highest 
number of CW/BW denials.  Iran is also responsible for most 
catch-all denials, which are mostly BW-applicable.  Since 
1991 overall denials have risen from less than five in 1991 
to a peak of 35 in 1995, to a low again in 1999 of ten to a 
peak of almost 55 in 2003, with a decline to 44 in 2004. 
While specific denials are down, the continued rise of 
catch-all denials since 1996 is of interest, perhaps 
indicating new proliferation risks, changes in proliferant 
behavior, and/or the need to evaluate the control lists. 
Iran, Pakistan, Syria, India, and the DPRK continue to 
represent the greatest share of CW denials and Iran, India, 
Pakistan, and Syria dominate the catch-all denials.  In 2005, 
Iran represented the majority of all BW denials.  Precursors 
constitute the bulk of CW denials, particularly potassium and 
sodium cyanide (tabun precursors), sodium sulfide, thionyl 
chloride (mustard precursors) and sodium fluoride (sarin). 
BW denials are for equipment specifically fermenters, freeze 
dryers, and incubators.  Overall denial processing time has 
increased recently, and despite our efforts, proliferators 
continue to seek controlled technology.  The increase in 
catch-alls may mean that the AG control list should be 
updated. 
 
-------------------------------- 
(U) TRADE IN AG-CONTROLLED ITEMS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶41.  (S)  France presented a paper entitled, 'Problems 
Relating to the Export of Used Dual-Use Chemical 
Manufacturing Equipment.'  France assesses that trade in used 
chemical manufacturing equipment can circumvent export 
controls of dual-use items.  Some trade and export companies 
are not always familiar with European legislation on the 
export of dual-use items and do not apply for export 
licenses.  France suggested affixing  proof marks, or 
markers, which state the equipment is subject to export 
controls, to the equipment at the end of the manufacturing 
process.  Such markers could aid in immediate recognition of 
the sensitivity of certain products and enhance traceability. 
 France concluded that the issue of export controls of used 
chemical manufacturing equipment calls for in-depth 
examination and global action.  Although at first glance this 
market appears to be a marginal one, it nonetheless presents 
vulnerability that should definitely be taken into account. 
During the joint Information Exchange-Enforcement Session the 
following morning, Canada supported France,s proposal on 
marking dual-use equipment and recommended that this proposal 
be explored by AG members in the future.  France will 
follow-up intersessionally on their proposal to affix marks 
to AG controlled equipment. 
 
--------------------------- 
(U) PROSPECTIVE NEW MEMBERS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶42.  (S)  The Chair invited members to comment on Russia,s 
interest in becoming a member of the Australia Group.  The UK 
commented on their concerns regarding Russian transparency 
about its CBW programs.  The UK doubts the accuracy of the 
Russian CWC declaration, and efforts to clarify concerns have 
been unsuccessful.  The UK assesses that Russia maintains a 
CW program and makes agents that can defeat defensive 
measures that are not declared to the OPCW.  The UK was 
concerned about the possibility that incapacitants, like 
those used in the Dubrovka Theater, may be a part the 
offensive CW program.  The UK thinks that Russia may have a 
CW mobilization capability and stores precursor chemicals. 
The UK believes that Russia,s export control enforcement is 
feckless.  Russia,s CW infrastructure was the largest ever 
assembled, and that although work with the ISTC has mitigated 
many risks, the UK nonetheless harbors several concerns about 
past and current activities.  The UK also is concerned that 
Russia,s offensive BW program may continue, and several 
questions remain because of a lack of access to Russian 
military facilities.  The UK mentioned that there were a 
number of occasions where Russia demonstrated poor export 
control (NFI).  Russia,s BW program was the largest in 
history, involving thousands of scientists, so the potential 
for proliferation is enormous.  ISTC initiatives have helped 
mitigate some of the threat, but there are a number of 
outstanding issues.  In conclusion, the UK stated that they 
remain concerned about the transparency of past CW and BW 
programs, whether the programs have continued, Russia,s 
behavior and compliance with arms control regimes, and the 
effectiveness of Russian export controls. 
 
¶43.  (S)  The Chair asked the plenary to note the arguments 
in favor of continued caution over Russia,s prospective 
membership.  See septel for Australia Group statement on 
Russian and Croatian membership. 
 
------------------- 
(U) OTHER MATERIALS 
------------------- 
 
¶44.  (S)  Spain distributed a paper that was not presented 
entitled 'Iran Strategies for the Procurement of Dual-use 
Materials, Equipment, and Technologies.'  The paper concluded 
that proliferating countries such as Iran have changed their 
procurement strategies because of the difficulties in 
procuring material for WMD programs.  The trends are directed 
toward the use of front companies and intermediaries abroad, 
but this will result in a rise in the real cost of the goods 
and a decrease in the reliability of equipment.  As an 
alternative to these procurement methods, proliferating 
countries will seek to set up networks that are not connected 
to the governments.  One may see front companies and 
intermediaries involved in the same commercial transactions. 
This paper is available online. 
 
----------------- 
(U) LOOKING AHEAD 
----------------- 
 
¶45.  (S)  Romania commented that an updated version of the 
CD-ROM describing AG members, export controls was not 
available because Romania was still waiting on input from AG 
members.  The Chair reported to the plenary to encourage 
members to provide updated information on their export 
controls as soon as practicable. 
 
¶46.  (S)  The Chair of the IE sought ideas for the 2007 IE. 
Biosecurity, specifically in South East Asia, and emerging 
technologies, such as chemical microreactors and disposable 
bioreactors, were again flagged for discussion during the 
meeting.  The Chair recommended to the plenary that 
biosecurity, specifically in South East Asia, and emerging 
technologies, such as chemical microreactors and disposable 
bioreactors, be considered for next year,s agenda. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
(U) JOINT INFORMATION-ENFORCEMENT EXCHANGE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶47.  (S)  The US presented on CW internet message boards. 
 
¶48.  (S)  Japan gave a PowerPoint presentation on several 
case studies involving suspicious cargo transfers from China 
to Pakistan through Japan.  The four cases presented occurred 
in 2005, and the three ships involved were the Bolan, the 
Islamabad, and the Khairpur.  All were Pakistani owned 
vessels.  The first Bolan transfer was of 600 tons of 
ferrosilicon and an unknown quantity of anhydrous sodium 
sulfate from NORINCO to a Pakistan ordinance factory.  The 
Islamabad had 196 boxes of detonators and 175 boxes of 
ammunition, also from NORINCO.  The second Bolan transfer 
involved a rubber vulcanization machine, 1,215 tons of sodium 
sulfide, and 110 tons of ferrosilicon from Tianjin Foreign 
Trade Chemical and Medical Products Company to an unknown 
consigner in Pakistan.  The Khairpur had a cargo of sodium 
sulfide, caustic soda, aluminum chloride, zinc chloride, and 
aluminum hydroxide.  The Japanese Coast Guard inspected all 
of these ships, and notified the authorities of the results, 
but no enforcement action was taken because cargoes could not 
be opened without the consent of the shippers, and the 
Japanese Coast Guard believed there was a high probability 
that the shippers would deny permission.  Japan needs a legal 
basis to take action to suspend or stop the transit or 
transshipment of items.  Japan is working on domestic 
measures to deal with these issues to include transit, 
transshipment, and brokering. 
 
¶49.  (U)  For additional information on the 2006 AG 
information exchange or copies of presentations, where 
available, contact Christian Westermann, Department of State 
(INR/SPM), Washington, DC 20520; e-mail 
westermanncp2@state.sgov.gov or cwestermann@state.ic.gov or 
(202) 647-8230 or SECURE 978-2011.  This cable has been 
coordinated with Embassy Paris and the AG U.S. Delegation. 
 
STAPLETON 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON