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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRANCE ON POST-ELECTION STRATEGY 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 775 
 
Classified By: LUCY TAMLYN, DCM, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.  In a meeting with Ambassador Wall, French 
Ambassador Bercot outlined the Paris-blessed strategy for 
expanding a political dialogue and establishing the 
foundations for better economic and political governance in 
Chad after elections.  He cautioned that the regime's ongoing 
efforts to buy off individual members of the opposition (and 
their willingness to be bought off) threatened any serious 
political dialogue.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Ambassador Wall met with French Ambassador 
Jean-Pierre Bercot at his request on June 2.  DCM (notetaker) 
also attended.  Ambassador Bercot was eager to relay 
information from his most recent meeting with President Deby 
(which had taken place after the visit of AF Deputy Assistant 
Secretary (DAS) Don Yamamoto), and also to explain France's 
 
SIPDIS 
post-election strategy. 
 
President Deby Reactions to U.S. Visit 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ambassador Bercot said that President Deby had been 
surprised that DAS Yamamoto had publicly raised the issue of 
naming an opposition Prime Minister in his meeting with 
President Deby.  Deby acknowledged that this had been 
discussed between him and Ambassador Bercot, but noted that 
this had been done one-on-one.  If he subsequently named an 
opposition Prime Minister, President Deby complained, he 
would be seen as acting on the recommendation of the United 
States, and this would "expose him to his enemies." 
Ambassador Bercot reported that he had assured President Deby 
that he should take advantage of the fact that the United 
States was now focused on Chad.  He reported that President 
Deby had described DAS Yamamoto's visit overall as positive, 
and confided to Bercot that he hoped to be invited to the 
United States next year for a visit -- even a short one. 
 
¶4. (C) As far as protection of refugees, Ambassador Bercot 
reported that President Deby was open to an international 
force, on the condition that he would be able to vet the 
selection of troop-contributing countries.  On the subject of 
such an international force, Ambassador Bercot pointed out 
that having French gendarmes (in such a mission) next to 
French soldiers stationed in Chad would be extremely 
confusing, and he would prefer not to confuse France's 
mandate in Chad. Bercot noted in passing that President Deby 
believed that the United States was "manipulated" by SLM 
leader Minni Minawi, and reiterated that President Deby 
believed that the recent skirmishes in Darfur had been the 
result of Minni's attacks on JEM positions.  President Deby 
reported that in his three meetings with Minni last week, 
threats from SLM breakaway groups or JEM had never been 
brought up.  Ambassador Bercot commented:  of course, (Deby's 
half-brother) Daussa Deby and (Minister of Territorial 
Administration) Mahamet Ali "have a gun at his back." 
 
France's "Road-Map" for Chad 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ambassador Bercot explained that Paris had now 
formally blessed a proposed political road-map for Chad 
(described reftel) which included 1) naming an opposition 
prime minister, who would be allow to name his government, 
and who would stay in place for at least a year; and 2) 
implementation of a plan for reform of the army, the 
electoral system, the justice system and economic reform. 
Bercot showed Ambassador two letters from French President 
Chirac and French Prime Minister de Villepin in which Deby 
was congratulated on his election, but was also directed to 
commence a political dialogue.  Ambassador Bercot reported 
that he understood that some in the President's office might 
be in touch with former Prime Minister Jean Alingue.  Bercot 
explained that the thinking was that Alingue would be allowed 
to pick his own government as long as President Deby retained 
control over defense issues.  Bercot reported that he had 
told President Deby that insisting on leaving the current 
Minister of Finance, Abakar Tolli, was equally important in 
terms of maintaining continuity and good relations with 
donors. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador clarified that DAS Yamamoto had only 
mentioned naming an opposition Prime Minister as one of 
several possible steps that President Deby could take to show 
an opening.  Other options, including reform of the electoral 
system, were mentioned.  Furthermore, the idea of an 
opposition Prime Minister was not a new one.  He noted, 
however, that the meeting did not leave the impression that 
President Deby was looking to the international community to 
facilitate the process.  True, commented Ambassador Bercot, 
but the international community has an important role as a 
"verifier." 
 
¶7.  (C)  Turning to the opposition groups which make up the 
CPDC, Ambassador Bercot noted with concern that practically 
all of the smaller parties therein could be bought -- and 
some for a fairly low price.  He was concerned that the 
President's political party, the MPS, would be systematically 
picking off the CPDC, thereby corrupting the process.  He 
agreed with the Ambassador that the significant members of 
CPDC (i.e, Kamougue, Garba, etc) were not seen as having a 
price, but he also noted that the opposition groups were 
still holding out in the hope that the donors would deny the 
results of the elections, rather than taking the initiative 
to put forward concrete proposals. 
WALL