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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0773
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0646
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 1074
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0227
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RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 2695
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1811
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0782
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0231

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000778 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: PRESIDENT, OPPOSITION ACKNOWLEDGE NEED FOR 
DIALOGUE 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 772 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
(D). 
 
SUMMARY: 
--------- 
 
¶1. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto discussed with 
Chad's President Idriss Deby Itno on 30 May the pressing need 
for the creation of a space for political dialogue between 
Deby and Chad's political opposition.  Opposition politicians 
were fulsome in their description of the barriers and 
challenges they face in dealing with President Deby's regime, 
but agreed to consider ideas for how a dialogue might be 
conducted.  President Deby declared that he is already well 
along in planning such a national discussion -- but stressed 
that he did not necessarily think the result should be 
political reform. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) AF DAS Don Yamamoto met 30 May with seven key 
representatives of Chad's political opposition, grouped under 
the umbrella of the Coordination of the Political Parties for 
the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC), with Ambassador Wall 
at the latter's residence.  AF/C Director, S/CRS Director, 
PRM DAS, and Pol/Econ officer (notetaker) attended.  The CPDC 
group consisted of Lol Mahamat Choua (RDP), Ibni Oumar 
Mahamat Saleh (PLD), Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue (UDR), Salibou 
Garba (AND), Saleh Kebzabo (UNDR), Jean Alingue (URD), as 
well as Naralejy Yorongar of the FAR.  DAS Yamamoto also 
engaged President Deby on the same subject later that day. 
(Discussions with Deby of Chadian support for groups 
undermining the Darfur Peace Agreement were reported reftel). 
 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
CAN FACILITATE DIALOGUE 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) DAS Yamamoto opened the discussion with both the 
political opposition representatives, and with President 
Deby.  He said that, after his most recent visit to Chad five 
weeks prior, he had done his homework.  This had meant 
extensive coordination with international partners in the EU 
and AU, as well as with France.  Yamamoto reported that there 
is now unity of purpose among Chad's friends in seeking to 
help in the creation of a political space for dialogue 
between the President and his government, on the one hand, 
and the political opposition, civil society, unions and other 
concerned parties, on the other. 
 
¶4. (C) Yamamoto stressed that such a space for dialogue would 
need to be used to discuss both political and economic 
reform.  Important subjects such as reform of Chad's 
electoral system, preparations for municipal and legislative 
elections, good governance and transparent accounting of 
revenues would be of critical importance.  He presented a set 
of ideas for possible outcomes of the discussions, including 
the appointment of a strong Prime Minister drawn from the 
opposition, who would be a European-style executive in charge 
of managing the government.  The PM could draw ministers from 
a mix of the ruling party and opposition groups, with the 
goal of national reconciliation reflected in the government 
itself. 
 
¶5. (C) Yamamoto acknowledged that much of the international 
community has viewed Chad solely through the lens of the 
Darfur conflict, and committed to push for more focus on 
Chad's own domestic political challenges.  He asked his 
interlocutors to exercise continued patience; to provide 
input, guidance, and support to initiatives of the 
international community to encourage a political opening; to 
conduct their own dialogue from a basis of cooperation; and 
to see the international community as a facilitator.  He 
acknowledged that the process would be difficult, and 
progress may be initially marginal, but good will was 
required for Chad to avoid chaos. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000778  002 OF 003 
 
 
OPPOSITION SEES NEED, 
AS WELL AS OBSTACLES 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The political leaders were generally united in their 
responses to Yamamoto's ideas.  The PLD's Ibni Oumar Mahamat 
Saleh called the situation one of deep crisis, leading to 
open rebellion, conflict and war.  The crisis had passed the 
point of "electoral solutions" and required "non-exclusive 
dialogue", including the participation of the armed 
opposition.  Saleh Kabzabo of the UNDR agreed with Yamamoto 
that patience would be a virtue, with the hardest 
negotiations yet to come.  He made the link between Chad, the 
conflict in Darfur, and domestic political conflict, saying 
it was clear that solutions for Darfur must include solutions 
for Chad's political crisis.  The UDR leader, Salibou Garba, 
called Yamamoto's ideas indicative of where a process might 
end, but he asked, by what road would Chad get there?  He 
repeatedly stressed that all possible solutions must be in 
conformity with the Chadian Constitution -- President Deby 
and his National Assembly would be able to easily reject any 
proposal that did not meet this minimum requirement on 
constitutional grounds, and a strong PM from the opposition 
had constitutional implications. 
 
¶7. (C) Former PM and URD leader Jean Alingue reminded 
Yamamoto of the similarities between some of the ideas the 
international community put forward, and those already tried 
in Chad, as recently as 2001.  He stressed taking into 
account Chad's past experience, as well as the need for 
Chadians to start the dialogue in order to define their own 
end point for the process.  The FAR's Naralejy Yorongar 
closed the first exchange, saying that the political 
opposition had tried to effect change from inside the Chadian 
system, and had failed.  He stressed the impact of external 
interference from Chad's neighbors, and the existence of 
genuine armies among the opposition that had to be considered. 
 
AGREE TO TRY 
------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The discussion evolved to focus on the need to build 
confidence required for dialogue, and to move quickly before 
the window of opportunity closes, and Chad descends again 
into open warfare.  UDR leader Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue 
warned that France sought to maintain Deby in power, and said 
that only "cutting out the cancer" of Deby could bring real 
reconciliation.  The RDP's Lol Mahamat Choua agreed, calling 
Deby Chad's Noriega -- a criminal, not a president. 
Ambassador noted that a roadmap toward a peaceful, democratic 
Chad would require a willingness to turn a page on 
deep-seated animosities, and to work with partners that have 
in the past been unreliable.  DAS Yamamoto pushed them to 
start the dialogue among themselves, so that they will have 
unity of purpose and ownership of the process.  The political 
leaders made clear that, while they were in close 
concertation with each other, and ready for peaceful 
dialogue, the ideas set forth had, as their end result, a 
removal of the President from his dominant position -- and 
this would not come easily to President Deby.  They 
nevertheless agreed to come together in a smaller group to 
work on proposals for how such a dialogue might proceed. 
 
DEBY: WILL PROPOSE DIALOGUE SOON 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) President Deby responded to similarly structured ideas 
later that afternoon.  He accused the CPDC parties of 
"putting the bar too high" on opening a dialogue with his 
government, seeking to create a constitutional crisis with 
the help of "foreign friends".  He stressed that continued 
outside interference would not help the process of dialogue 
to progress, and that Chad should be allowed to evolve "like 
a normal country" without the meddling of prejudiced or 
biased foreigners.  Deby stated that he would take the 
initiative to launch a dialogue with the entire political 
class, in preparation for municipal and legislative 
 
NDJAMENA 00000778  003 OF 003 
 
 
elections.  He welcomed the help of Chad's true friends, as 
long as there were not attempts to jeopardize the national 
institutions he had built.  He declared that he had created a 
30-person Committee of Wise Men (Comite des Sages), under the 
chairmanship of former President Malloum, that would present 
him as soon as 2 June with proposals for structuring a 
political dialogue.  Deby stated that his time frame would be 
to conduct this dialogue in the period between his 
investiture as president and the expected legislative 
elections in 2007.  He declared himself ready to call on the 
help of Chad's friends, should he find that necessary. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador told the President that the President's 
comments were welcome, especially his discussion of plans for 
encouraging a new, more positive political process in Chad. 
He stressed that political reform would be critical to 
ensuring a peaceful and democratic Chad.  Deby quickly 
clarified that what he intended to launch was a dialogue, not 
necessarily political reform. 
 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶11. (C) Notwithstanding their deep mistrust and reservations, 
the opposition leaders were more open to the idea of engaging 
in a political dialogue than they were before the May 3 
election.  In our exchange with them, they ruled out any 
dialogue with President Deby's government unless the 
elections were postponed.  President Deby is also now 
preparing a plan for launching discussions.  But in this 
meeting, he was careful to note his concerns about foreign 
involvement and to correct any mis-perceptions that he might 
have in mind a new, more inclusive political process.  His 
message seemed to be: Don't ask us, we'll ask you.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
WALL