VZCZCXRO4317
RR RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0772/01 1520907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010907Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3845
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1414
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1805
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1198
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0776
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0225
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0719

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR 
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR 
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: CHADIAN OFFICIALS DENY 
ASSISTANCE TO ANTI-DPA FORCES 
 
REF: A. STATE 85835 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 748 
 
NDJAMENA 00000772  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: P/E Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto 
raised the reports of Chadian support for groups undermining 
the Darfur Peace Agreement with President Idriss Deby Itno on 
May 30 and with his close advisor, Minister of Territorial 
Administration General Mahamat Ali Abdullah on May 29.  Deby 
and Ali denied that Chad could financially afford to support 
dissident Sudanese rebel groups.  Deby said that he has made 
efforts to persuade Dr. Khalil Ibrahim to sign the agreement 
and would throw him out of the country if needed.  Deby did 
not react to the likelihood that the African Union is 
considering sanctions against non-signatories and those 
undermining the DPA.  We did not find either Deby or Ali 
persuasive in their denials.  The Chadian Government is not 
convinced that the DPA will succeed and may calculate that it 
can deflect allegations of support by blaming the parties 
themselves.  We will continue pressing the issue at various 
levels, but can make a stronger case if the African Union 
conducts a thorough investigation of the reports.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto met 
President Idriss Deby Itno May 30 to raise U.S. concerns 
about reports of Chadian support for Sudanese rebel groups 
opposed to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) per ref A.  He 
was accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population, 
Migration, and Refugees Bill Fitzgerald, Office for Central 
African Affairs Director Jane Gaffney, Ambassador Wall, and 
P/E officers.  On May 29, DAS Yamamoto raised the reports 
with Minister for Territorial Administration Gen. Mahamat Ali 
Abdullah. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DEBY READY TO KICK OUT KHALIL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C)  DAS Yamamoto thanked Deby for Chad's continued 
engagement on Darfur issues.  The United States has worked 
hard to meet Chad's requests for assistance on external 
security.  The signing of the DPA and deployment of U.N. 
forces on the border will improve Chad's security and 
stability.  DAS Yamamoto told Deby that the United States is 
concerned about reports from various sources that weapons are 
transiting Chad to Sudan with Chadian military escort for 
groups opposed to the DPA.  He advised Deby that the African 
Union (AU) and U.N. are preparing to sanction groups that 
have not signed the agreement and those supporting attacks on 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minnawi. DAS 
Yamamoto requested that Deby investigate and stop arms 
transfers to various parties.  In addition, Yamamoto 
suggested that a public statement in support of the peace 
agreement would help, particularly one that asks Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM)'s Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and SLM's 
Abdelwahid Nur to sign the DPA. 
 
¶4.  (C)  President Deby assured DAS Yamamoto that, even 
though Chad was not part of the mediation effort on the DPA, 
Chad is ready to assist and support the agreement.  He stated 
that Chad is the country that has suffered the most from the 
Darfur crisis.  Deby said he is closely monitoring the 
situation in the east and that Chad knows about the problems 
between Minni Minnawi and his ex-commander Adam Bahkit, which 
arose during the Haskenita Conference in October 2005.  Deby 
said that he advised Minni, with whom he met three times over 
the past week, on the need for dialogue.  Deby said he met 
with Dr. Khalil Ibrahim three times as well and described a 
joint meeting with both the leaders.  Deby stated that he 
advised both of them (who are both operating in the same 
region) that stability in Darfur means stability in Chad. 
Deby said he spent over three hours with Khalil trying to 
convince him to sign the agreement.  He noted that the 
Chadian Government made these efforts on their own, without 
any consultation with the African Union.  Deby said he called 
 
NDJAMENA 00000772  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Libyan leader Qaddafi on May 29 to see if Minni was still 
there.  He said he would send an investigative team to 
Tripoli to strengthen the agreement because Chad has 
information that there are mercenaries being trained to enter 
Chad from Sudan. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Deby asserted that Chad is a victim of Sudanese 
aggression, janjaweed attacks, militias, Sudanese rebellion, 
as well as the presence of the refugees, some of whom do not 
behave very well.  He added that Chad is the victim of the 
international community's belief that Chad has the means to 
give arms to various groups when it cannot equip its own 
troops to protect the country.  He outlined the costs of land 
cruisers and noted the availability of vehicles and arms 
throughout the region as a result of the Darfur crisis.  Deby 
alleged that arms are so plentiful, that one has to buy them 
in bulk in arms markets near El Geneina.  He also complained 
that the AU has not made any statements about what is going 
on in Darfur and Chad.  He said that a U.N. force was 
necessary  to implement the DPA, which is an agreement not 
signed by all parties.  Deby also stated that he would never 
give weapons to one Zaghawa group to kill other Zaghawas.  He 
accused the Government of Sudan of misleading people as part 
of its destabilization campaign against Chad.  Deby concluded 
by saying that he was ready to make a public statement and, 
if it is helpful, to expel Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and the SLM 
dissidents.  Those who have not signed the DPA, can leave 
Chad, Deby said. 
 
¶6.  (C)  PRM DAS Fitzgerald praised Chad's continuing 
hospitality for the 200,000 Sudanese refugees and said that 
the U.S. is interested in helping to bolster camp security 
measures.  He stated that recruitment in the refugee camps by 
various groups over the past months is unacceptable and 
wondered if this was related to the lack of security for the 
camps.   Deby agreed that it is difficult to provide security 
for so many refugees when the number of gendarmes and 
equipment is severely limited and the government is 
hard-pressed to provide security.  Deby welcomed any 
assistance to improve security and told Fitzgerald that many 
gendarmes have been killed protecting the camps.  He blamed 
dissident SLM commander Khamis Abdullah for the recruitment. 
Deby said that his government is talking to the U.N. and 
European Union about providing forces to protect the camps. 
 
¶7.  (C) DAS Yamamoto expressed appreciation for Chad's 
efforts and commitment to stop the arms flows and then 
outlined for Deby the AU's plan to sanction those who impede 
the peace process or do not sign the agreement.  He told Deby 
that there would be an AU meeting next week to discuss next 
steps on preparing a list of those to be sanctioned for 
Darfur violations. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ONLY CHAD UNDERSTANDS DARFUR'S COMPLEXITIES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C)  The previous day, DAS Yamamoto discussed the reports 
of Chadian facilitation of arms flows to dissident Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) members and other forces against 
the DPA with Minister of Territorial Administration Gen. 
Mahamat Ali Abdullah.  Yamamoto described U.S. efforts to 
negotiate the peace deal, which is needed to get U.N. troops 
along the Chad/Sudan border.  He told Ali that the presence 
of U.N. forces could significantly improve Chad's security 
situation.  However, delivery of weapons and support for 
dissident Sudanese rebel groups is counterproductive to the 
DPA and Chad's own security situation and should cease. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ali responded by describing Chad's efforts to broker 
a durable, just peace deal.  He complained that Khartoum is 
trying to destabilize Chad and that a solution is needed.  He 
outlined the complexities of the situation, including 
differing agendas among the Sudanese rebel groups and 
emphasized that Chad understands these realities better than 
the African Union and international partners.  Ali compared 
the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement with the DPA 
and claimed there was little difference between the two.  Ali 
 
NDJAMENA 00000772  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
criticized the African Union for not reconciling the parties 
and stated that a lot of money has been wasted. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Gen. Ali restated his opinion that the DPA is not 
complete and that the agreement does not resolve the crisis' 
underlying issues.  He said that the movements needed to be 
integrated together and that some were more important than 
others.  Minni Minnawi has the larger military forces and 
Abdelwahid Nur is more politically-oriented.  He criticized 
international support for Minni Minnawi, who as a 
Zaghawa-Tuer does not represent all Darfurians.  Abdelwahid 
Nur represents the majority Fur tribe.  Ali stated that 
allegations that the Justice and Equality Movement are 
receiving weapons from Chad are made up.  Weapons and cars 
can be purchased anywhere in the region.  Many Chadian 
vehicles came across the border into Sudan with the Chadian 
military deserters and he assured DAS Yamamoto that no 
official cars were given.  In addition, Chad has not chosen 
any one group over another because the same ethnic groups 
live on both sides of the border. 
 
¶11.  (C)  The Chadian Government does not even give its own 
military weapons, according to Ali, and would never disarm 
its own military to arm rebels.  President Deby is making 
every effort to counter Sudanese aggression.  The DPA needs 
to be signed by other groups and it may be too late as the 
agreement is insufficient.  Ali said that Adam Bahkit, one of 
Minni's ex-commanders, leads an important faction and that 
the international community needs to make supplementary 
efforts for peace.  Ali said that there is a deficit of 
information on the DPA.  There is fear because no one 
understands it, in his view.  Ali stated that Minni came to 
N'Djamena after Abuja and requested Chadian passports for ten 
members of his group, the use of Radio Chad to give messages 
to the refugees on the DPA, and vehicles.  In response, the 
GOC told Minni to get Sudanese passports. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶12.  (C)  It comes as no surprise that the President and 
Minister denied Chadian involvement in supplying JEM and 
dissident SLM members.  Deby did not react when the 
possibility of sanctions was raised.  We will continue 
pressing the Chadians and other principal actors (Ref B) at 
various levels and in more private settings.  The African 
Union needs to thoroughly investigate the reports about am 
armed camp near Bahai.  This would make it more difficult for 
the Chadians to deny their involvement and possibly deter 
more deliveries to JEM mercenaries and SLM dissidents.  It 
will be hard for Deby, however, to completely cut these 
groups off, because he may calculate that he needs them to 
provide a counter-force to the Sudanese-backed Chadian 
rebels.  Chadian officials may believe that they can 
attribute failure of the agreement to the fact that there is 
only one signatory.  As a result, they can deflect blame if 
it fails. 
WALL