This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000868 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/ES, NEA, NEA/IR, NEA/ARP 
NSC FOR HADLEY 
SECDEF OF OSD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2026 
TAGS: PREL MNUC OPRC IR MU
SUBJECT: OMAN'S FM REPORTS INITIAL IRANIAN RESPONSE TO USG 
INITIATIVE; MFA ISSUES STATEMENT OF SUPPORT 
 
REF: A. MUSCAT 866 
 
     ¶B. SECSTATE 87682 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo.  Reason: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Omani FM Yusuf bin Alawi personally contacted Iranian 
Security Council Secretary Larijani and FM Mottaki in the 
hours following announcement of the USG initiative toward 
Iran.  While Mottaki was tight-lipped, Larijani offered a 
negative reaction to the U.S. announcement, saying that it 
ignored clear Iranian conditions.  Nevertheless, the Iranians 
indicated they will withhold formal reaction until after the 
June 1 Ministerial in Vienna.  Bin Alawi suggested a slight 
softening of the USG proposal might win Iranian acceptance. 
End summary. 
 
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Initial Iranian Reactions 
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¶2. (C) Following the Ambassador's ref A conversation May 31 
with Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi 
regarding the USG initiative towards Iran (ref B), the 
Minister convoked the Ambassador shortly after midnight June 
1 to report the results of his late-evening intercessions 
with Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottaki and Supreme National 
Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani. 
 
¶3. (C) Bin Alawi reported that he had first phoned FM Mottaki 
to urge Iran's positive consideration of the USG offer.  He 
said it was immediately clear that Mottaki had not yet seen 
the full text of the Secretary's statement, and was awaiting 
formal notification by the Swiss Embassy before reacting. 
Mottaki was evasive and unsubstantive in his initial 
reactions to his Omani counterpart. 
 
¶4. (C) Bin Alawi followed with a phone call to Ali Larijani, 
whom the Minister also thought had not yet seen the full text 
of the official USG proposal but who was aware of the broad 
outline.  In contrast to Mottaki, Larijani was talkative yet 
"quite negative" in his initial reactions to the American 
offer.  Per Bin Alawi, Larijani felt the USG proposal 
"ignores the political dimension of the issue.  The Iranian 
people will not accept it."  Larijani said he had been 
working tirelessly to make the Iranian position clear to the 
U.S., EU-3 and others, claiming he was honest and open in 
describing the Iranian position vis a vis maintaining its 
"right to development," which remains unchanged.  The USG 
proposal, however, ignores the Iranian position, said 
Larijani.  (Note: Bin Alawi's personal observation at this 
point was that Larijani may fear acceptance of the USG offer, 
as currently formulated, would be seen as capitulation by the 
Iranian public.  He added that the USG might need to add more 
to make the offer acceptable to Iran.  End note.) 
 
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Iran Awaits Vienna Outcome Before Officially Responding 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶5. (C) Bin Alawi said he repeatedly urged Mottaki and 
Larijani to give the USG proposal "very serious 
consideration."  "This is what you have been wanting all 
along," he reminded the Iranians.  Larijani replied that Iran 
will likely wait until after the results of the June 1 
Ministerial of the U.S., EU-3, Russia and China in Vienna 
before officially responding to the U.S. offer.  Bin Alawi 
said he urged Larijani to accept the USG proposal, sit at the 
table, then negotiate to resolve whatever reservations the 
Iranians may have.  That would give Tehran the opportunity to 
make its case directly on both the nuclear file and all other 
outstanding issues.  "This is a big step for the Americans," 
he reminded Larijani. 
 
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Bin Alawi's Interpretation 
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¶6. (C) Bin Alawi told the Ambassador he was disappointed with 
Larijani and Mottaki's initial reactions.  He speculated that 
Larijani's reaction may also be influenced by domestic 
political considerations, possibly fearing that President 
Ahmadinejad would use the USG proposal to "declare victory" 
in forcing the U.S. to the table, further boosting the 
populist leader's public standing at the personal expense of 
Larijani. 
 
¶7. (C) Bin Alawi suggested that the USG consider putting a 
more positive spin on its offer to Iran during the 
Secretary's meetings in Vienna to further lure Iran into 
 
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accepting the offer.  He specifically suggested more "nuance" 
in the pre-condition concerning uranium enrichment.  Asked by 
the Ambassador if he would continue pressuring Tehran to 
respond favorably, Bin Alawi said he was prepared to do so if 
there was further development on the USG offer.  "Any way the 
U.S. can soften the conditions would help," he stated. 
 
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Omani Public Statement 
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¶8. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's urging for a public 
Omani statement of support for the USG proposal, Bin Alawi 
assured that an official statement would be forthcoming on 
June 1.  Bin Alawi said the Omani statement would be 
"positive, but leave the door open to both sides."  The 
Embassy will report the public statement septel. 
GRAPPO