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DE RUEHMO #6563/01 1721039
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P 211039Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7885
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1049
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0411
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1794
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0214

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER RS IR AF CN KZ
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 5413 
 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 5483 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs 
Kirk Augustine.   Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov 
gave us a readout June 20 of the June 15 SCO Summit.  He 
encouraged the United States to have more dialogue with the 
SCO to avoid misunderstandings, perhaps as a formal "dialogue 
partner" to the organization.  He said Russia and the SCO 
have their own misgivings about U.S. intentions in the 
region, and acknowledged that more dialogue would be 
warranted on that subject as well.  Vorobiyov recounted 
dissatisfaction expressed by all SCO members, except for 
Russia and China, with the performance of the Afghan 
government and admitted that no efforts to combat drug flows 
from Afghanistan had been particularly successful.  Vorobiyov 
characterized the summit tasking to develop guidelines for 
the admission of new members as a way to appease the current 
observers; he thought the guidelines would take years to work 
out.  He also offered views on Ahmadi-Nejad's performance at 
the summit as well as on SCO component organizations.  End 
summary. 
 
The U.S. Presence 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov discussed 
the June 15 Shanghai Summit and SCO developments with us on 
June 20.  The USG's repeated demarches in the lead-up and the 
Secretary's phone call to Chinese FM Li hours before the 
 
SIPDIS 
summit gave Vorobiyov the impression throughout the event 
that the United States was a silent "eleventh participant," 
he told us only half in jest.  He said the U.S. ought to find 
 ways to talk with the SCO directly as an organization.  He 
understood that the USG would not be seeking observer status 
in the organization at this time, but thought that the 
concept of a "dialogue partner" might be developed and might 
be appropriate for the U.S.  He said that SCO members were 
eager for more dialogue with the U.S., and a report that SCO 
SYG Zhang distributed on his recent meeting with Ambassador 
Randt in Beijing had been very well received.  Vorobiyov was 
pleased that Zhang and Amb. Randt had agreed to continue 
talking. 
 
Strengthening the Secretariat 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  Vorobiyov thought that the decision taken at the 
summit to strengthen the authority of the Secretariat would 
make interlocutors take it more seriously.  He showed us the 
resume of incoming SYG Bolat Nurgaliyev, the current Kazakh 
Ambassador to Japan, whose election to the post had been 
approved at the summit.  Vorobiyov said he did not know 
Nurgaliyev, but his past posts as ambassador to both the 
United States and to various East and South Asian countries 
made him a well-qualified choice. 
 
Misunderstandings 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Vorobiyov was concerned that there was still much 
misunderstanding in the U.S. about the SCO's intentions, and 
cited reports he had seen in the Western press of U.S. 
lawmakers giving voice to those misunderstandings (he was not 
specific about which lawmakers or which comments).  He 
emphasized that the SCO is and will remain a transparent 
organization, eager for dialogue. 
 
¶5. (C)  We pointed out the emphasis of Russian press reports 
about the summit on its alleged anti-American character, 
including Putin's comments that Russia opposed "the 
duplication of organizations, unnecessary competition, and 
establishment of closed clubs" in the region.  Vorobiyov said 
the idea had taken hold in circles within the Russian and 
other SCO member governments that the U.S. remained intent on 
establishing new regional organizations that were intended to 
exclude Russia and China.  He said Putin had raised these 
concerns with both the President and Secretary.  The concerns 
had been around for several years, but only now did some 
believe that the alleged U.S. plans had become official USG 
policy and had begun to be operationalized.  He cited the 
"Greater Central Asia Initiative" as an attempt to "mix the 
problems of Central Asia with those of Afghanistan and South 
Asia."  Vorobiyov said the concerns were shared by the SCO as 
an organization, so it had to react by opposing them in the 
summit declaration.  He stressed that the declaration 
reference had been indirect, in order that it not be viewed 
as confrontational 
 
¶6. (C)  We told Vorobiyov that the U.S. had no plans to 
establish duplicative or exclusionary structures in Central 
Asia.  Our efforts, for instance, to combat narcotics 
trafficking through the region were inclusive and focused on 
a widely shared goal.  Vorobiyov agreed that fighting drugs 
traffic was a "tremendously difficult" endeavor, and that no 
one may even sufficiently understand how to go about it, much 
less be able to reduce the flow.  We told him that the "Paris 
2 Moscow 1" conference, to be convened later this month in 
Moscow under G-8 auspices, would be useful for coordinating 
efforts and deconflicting.  Vorobiyov did not argue with U.S. 
plans for economic development ideas in Central Asia, saying 
each country could make up its own mind about its interests. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Vorobiyov was not specific about when the SCO's 
long-planned Afghanistan Contact Group would be on the 
ground.  He said its mandate would be to involve itself with 
"all forces" in the country.  Vorobiyov noted that President 
Karzai had drawn open criticism at the summit from all SCO 
members -- except for Russia and China -- for the failures of 
Afghan authorities to maintain control.  Karzai had "said 
words in defense, maybe defensively" about his government's 
efforts.  Vorobiyov thought the criticism would persist. 
 
New Members 
----------- 
 
¶8. (C)  Commenting on the leaders' tasking to ministers 
during the summit to develop guidelines and procedures for 
the admittance of new members to the organization, Vorobiyov 
said that it was simply a bureaucratic exercise to show that 
it was taking requests for new members seriously.  Among the 
current observers, only Pakistan had formally requested 
admission, but Vorobiyov doubted the Pakistanis had a clear 
idea of what membership meant.  He related that President 
Musharraf had cited only three of the SCO Charter's numerous 
paragraphs before pronouncing that the organizations terms 
were acceptable.  While the other observers had not filed 
formal membership applications, Vorobiyov reported that Iran 
was "actively sounding out" the possibility, and there had 
been "heavy hints" from India.  Despite the new tasking, he 
said the membership admission guidelines would take years to 
develop.  In the meantime, the SCO was looking for ways to 
involve the observers more deeply in the organization. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶9. (C)  Vorobiyov provided his impressions of Ahmadi-Nejad's 
summit appearance.  He was not surprised that the Iranian 
chose not to use strong or inflammatory rhetoric at either 
the summit plenary of in his press appearance.  What did 
surprise Vorobiyov, he related, was that Ahmadi-Nejad spoke 
so "smoothly," as though he were signaling that he could be 
"constructive," and not always "narrow-minded."  An 
unidentified Central Asian friend pointed out to Vorobiyov 
that Ahmadi-Nejad was using "strange literary language" and 
that the "Shiite influence on his mentality" was obvious.  He 
did not discount that the Iranian's choice of language may 
have been intended to show that he was not speaking for 
domestic consumption. 
 
SCO-Affiliated Bodies 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Vorobiyov touched briefly on the SCO Business 
Council and Interbank Union -- both formally inaugurated at 
the Shanghai summit -- and the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure (RATS).  The Business Council and Interbank Union 
were both intended to be nongovernmental bodies that followed 
only general official guidelines.  The "Scientific-Expert 
Forum" launched in Moscow in May (ref B) was meant to operate 
the same way.  The SCO hoped that the Council and Union would 
consult with and make recommendations to member governments 
and the Secretariat to fulfill the SCO's 2020 goal of free 
movement of capital and technology within the SCO space. 
Vorobiyov added that bringing together businessmen and 
bankers in an informal but structured format would spur 
concrete cooperative projects.  He said the Council was 
modeled on a similar forum within APEC. 
 
¶11. (C)  Vorobiyov said the summit-approved changes to the 
SCO Charter on the role of the Secretariat would affect the 
operations of the RATS.  Whereas before, the RATS was an 
autonomous body, now its overall budget would be approved by 
the Secretariat.  The RATS Executive will retain authority 
for now on how its funds get spent, but the SCO is also 
considering making the Executive formally subordinate to the 
SYG.  Vorobiyov said RATS members have not all agreed on a 
common list of terrorists. 
BURNS