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69193
2006-06-23 13:21:00
06MEXICO3465
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
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TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
SUBJECT: A ONCE MIGHTY PRI STRUGGLES FOR RELEVANCY 
 REF: A) MEXICO 3325 B) MEXICO 1370 C) MEXICO 3196 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR ALAN MELTZER, REASON 
S: 1.4(B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  With Election Day ten days off, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) remains divided and 
debilitated, struggling to maintain its relevance in a 
political scene it once dominated.  On the one hand, party 
insiders tell us that presidential candidate Roberto Madrazo 
appears genuinely to believe that he remains in contention, 
and contacts involved in his campaign are doing their best to 
put on a brave face.  Many others in the party, particularly 
members of Congress, are more realistic and candid, 
acknowledging that Madrazo has fallen out of contention, and 
pinning their hopes on a strong result in congressional 
races.  Most contacts admit that a serious lack of funds 
severely handicapped their campaign this year; while some 
attribute this problem to the fine the party paid for 
campaign finance violations in 2000, others speculate that 
party funds may have been misappropriated.  Virtually all of 
our contacts predict that the party will witness a 
post-electoral blood-letting which may well determine its 
future direction and even viability.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) As the 2006 electoral campaign draws to a close, a 
reduced PRI is sending mixed messages about its electoral 
expectations.  On the one hand, several party insiders insist 
that Roberto Madrazo appears genuinely to believe he is still 
a contender, perhaps buoyed by the fact that the last two 
polls published in Milennio -- including one published June 
22 -- show that the gap between him and first place candidate 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) is within the polls' 
margin of error.  Chamber of Deputies Vice President 
Francisco Arroyo (PRI) told poloff that in recent 
conversations, Madrazo has seemed surprisingly "calm and 
serene," not betraying any hint of resignation.  Those 
involved directly in Madrazo's campaign -- citing the 
Milennio polls -- also project a degree of optimism, albeit 
less convincingly.  PRIistas further removed from the 
campaign's inner circle are more realistic about the 
prospects of their presidential candidate.  A British 
diplomat told us yesterday that in a meeting with European 
Union election observers, PRI Secretary-General Rosario Green 
confessed she did not believe Madrazo could win.  Many in the 
party appear to be pinning their hopes on a strong showing in 
congressional races: according to the poll published in 
Milennio on June 22, the PRI enjoys a solid first place 
showing nationwide for both the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies.  (Comment:  While we are generally skeptical of 
Mexican polls, we are especially skeptical of Milennio's 
poll.  Although well-respected, Maria de las Heras, the 
pollster responsible for the Milennio poll, has very close 
personal links with the PRI, and her polls consistently have 
been more favorable to the PRI than have other polls (ref A) 
. End comment.) 
 
Where Has All the Money Gone? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Among the many handicaps facing the PRI in this 
election season has been a lack of funds, a problem affecting 
the party's efforts at every level.  For example, a PRI 
insider told poloff that the party,s coordinator in Mexico 
City, Jesus Salazar, has complained that he literally has 
received no party funds to run the campaign in what is 
Mexico's second largest constituency; he has been paying 
office staff from his personal funds and has loaned his own 
computers to the campaign office.  Given this utter lack of 
resources, Salazar threatened to quit his position, in the 
heat of the campaign's final stretch.  Similarly, the press 
recently reported that the party's national organization had 
not made good on its promise to provide approximately USD 
36,000 to each Chamber of Deputies candidate; the PRI state 
president in Guanajuato claims candidates have received less 
than 25% of that amount.  For its part, the Guanajuato state 
organization has been able to provide a mere USD 200 to each 
PRI candidate for the state legislature. 
¶4.  (C) When asked about funding, Deputy Arroyo told poloff 
that the party was saving its limited resources to finance 
its expensive, nationwide, get-out-the-vote machine, which is 
perhaps the only advantage it has over its rivals.  Yet 
Heladio Ramirez, President of the National Confederation of 
Farmers, the PRI's largest corporatist sector and a key 
player in the party's get-out-the-vote operation, told 
poloffs that in his memory, the party has never been as hard 
pressed as this year to finance this crucial operation. 
 
¶5.  (C) The party's financial crunch is undoubtedly 
attributable in part to the approximately USD 100 million 
fine the party was ordered to pay as a result of the Pemex 
 
MEXICO 00003465  002 OF 003 
 
 
campaign finance scandal during the 2000 election.  A senior 
party contact told poloff, however, that he believed the lack 
of campaign funds could not be entirely attributable to the 
fine, since the party finished paying the fine months ago. 
He suspects that high-ranking party insiders -- realizing 
that they are doomed to lose the election and possibly their 
influence in the party -- may be siphoning off party funds 
while they still can. 
 
A Shrinking Party Base 
---------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) While few doubt that the PRI's get-out-the-vote 
machine remains by far the most effective of the three major 
parties, even the most effective of party machines can only 
produce results when there are willing voters to bring to the 
polls.  A pessimistic Dulce Maria Sauri, a prominent PRI 
Senator from the Yucatan, opined that the Madrazo campaign 
seriously overestimates the size of the party's base of loyal 
voters that it hopes to mobilize on Election Day.  Analyzing 
the likely voting trends state-by-state, Sauri pointed out 
that Madrazo recently has polled under 10 percent in Mexico 
City, a PRD stronghold and Mexico's second most populous 
entity after the State of Mexico (Edomex).  She said that 
such a meager showing in such a large constituency would 
create a vote deficit that would be almost impossible to make 
up in other states.  Moreover, she added that recent state 
elections in the long-time PRI stronghold of Edomex (ref B) 
reveal that the vote there is likely to divide in roughly 
equal thirds, with the PRI hardly guaranteed to take first 
place.  She opined that the PRI could even fail to place 
first in its traditional bastion of Puebla, as a result of 
the scandal involving PRI Governor Mario Marin. 
 
Losing with a Winning Hand 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Sauri added that the PRI managed to squander a huge 
advantage that it brought into this campaign, i.e. its 
control of 17 of Mexico's 32 statehouses: governors have 
access to considerable resources to mobilize voters. 
Nevertheless, as a result of his unpopularity within the PRI 
and the party's divisions, many PRI governors are supporting 
Madrazo in name only.  Sauri estimated that perhaps only half 
of the PRI governors were actually offering the campaign any 
substantive assistance.  Deputy Arroyo countered, however, 
that these dissident governors, such as Eduardo Bours of 
Sonora, had to maintain a delicate balance.  They all had 
state and local candidates on the PRI ticket that they hoped 
to see win, so even if such governors were not working to 
support Madrazo directly, they were working to support the 
PRI ticket.  Arroyo opined that their recent efforts might 
account for the slight rise in several polls that Madrazo has 
registered recently. 
 
Pinning Their Hopes on Congress 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) With much of the party hierarchy -- if not Roberto 
Madrazo himself -- having already written off the 
presidential race, attention is now focusing on the party's 
congressional races.  Arroyo said that in the recent past, as 
many as 30% of Mexicans split their vote between two or more 
parties and he expected that proportion to increase this 
year, to the benefit of the PRI's legislative candidates.  He 
added that the PRI's internal polls show the party's Senate 
candidates running 6-7% ahead of Madrazo, with its slate for 
the Chamber of Deputies running 3-4% ahead of Madrazo. 
Published polls also have consistently shown the PRI's 
legislative slates running ahead of Madrazo, albeit their 
results are not uniform; some project that the PRI will 
maintain its congressional plurality while others have 
suggested it may fall to second or even third place in the 
Congress. 
 
Looking Forward to A "Night of Long Knives" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Party insiders almost universally agree that a 
Madrazo defeat will lead to a fierce internecine struggle for 
control of the party, or as Senator Sauri put it, a "night of 
long knives."  Some, like Sauri, expect the conflict to erupt 
soon after the election.  Others, like former presidential 
candidate Everardo Moreno and former Oaxaca Governor and 
Secretary of Government Diodoro Carrasco, expect it will 
 
SIPDIS 
occur months later, as Madrazo maintains a fairly tight grip 
over the party's machinery and as there will be little to 
fight over before the new Congress is seated on September 1. 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Literally everyone we have spoken with in the party 
 
MEXICO 00003465  003 OF 003 
 
 
agrees that the party will have to transform itself in order 
to remain competitive.  Some contacts, like former President 
Echeverria, envision the party rebranding itself with a new 
name (reftel C), whereas others, like Senator Sauri, argue 
that the PRI "brand" remains valuable and that the struggle 
will be to see which faction assumes control.  PRI Governors 
are expected to be among the most influential forces in this 
power struggle.  Numerous contacts concur that former 
Tlaxcala Governor (and current candidate for Mexico City 
Mayor) Beatriz Paredes, and Senate President Enrique Jackson, 
are the two strongest reformist candidates for the party's 
leadership.  Sauri suspects that if AMLO wins the presidency, 
the party will turn to Paredes, who leans to the left and 
would be a natural interlocutor with the PRD, although her 
support in the party could be undermined by her lackluster 
campaign in the Mexico City mayoral race.  If Calderon wins, 
the party is likely to turn to the more conservative Jackson. 
 Another possible leader is  Deputy (and senatorial 
candidate) Manlio Fabio Beltrones, a PRI caudillo from the 
state of Sonora and one of Madrazo's closest political 
operatives.  Although politically adept and influential, 
Beltrones represents the unreformed wing of the PRI and his 
selection would alienate the party's reformers. 
 
Winning With a Losing Hand 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Despite this bleak scenario, none of our contacts 
predicted the PRI's imminent, post-election demise, even if 
they expected a third place finish in the presidential race 
to lead to further defections.  A few even expect the party 
to emerge stronger in the long term from an Election Day 
rout.  Former presidential candidate Everardo Moreno said the 
PRI could "win by losing," as a loss would provide the 
impetus needed to transform the party into a modern, social 
democratic institution, worthy of the public's trust. 
Moreno's optimistic view assumes that party leaders, who 
generally come from its dominant, unreformed wing, will learn 
the lesson they failed to learn after their 2000 electoral 
defeat, that the party will not remain competitive unless it 
adapts to Mexico's modern, multiparty democracy. 
 
Comment:  When the Voting Ends, the Jockeying Begins 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶12.  (C) While July 2 will bring about the end of Mexico's 
electoral season, it will not bring about the end of its 
political season.  Once the election is over -- and 
especially once the new Congress is seated on September 1 -- 
we  expect to see a considerable amount of political 
jockeying as the governing party seeks to attain a 
legislative majority by luring wavering PRI legislators to 
their ranks.  Those efforts are likely to reap even greater 
dividends if the same party wins both the presidency and a 
legislative plurality.  Accordingly, once the new government 
takes shape, the PRI will be under considerable pressure to 
offer its legislators a compelling reason to stay with the 
party.  We are not yet convinced it is up to the challenge. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
GARZA