VZCZCXRO8102
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #2623/01 1740207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230207Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1651
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0117
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002623 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINSKISL MY RP
SUBJECT: CONTINUED GRP-MILF COMMITMNT TO PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: MANILA 2013 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Scott Bellard for reasons1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary. Following a caim by the MILF for an 
additional 1,000 wards asMuslim-dominated ancestral domain, 
the Governmen of Malaysia will help to facilitate a joint 
survey by GRP/MILF census experts, with a goal of compltion 
by October 2006.  The GRP believes that theMILF also remains 
committed to the peace process but i under increased 
pressure from religious eaders and faces internal strains. 
The Swedish goernment is providing technical assistance on 
posible disarmament models, but this would likely notfigure 
in the initial peace accord.  The GRP hop is for an interim 
peace accord by late 2006 or arly 2007, possibly bypassing 
final resolution ofboth ancestral domain and disarmament, 
while aimng to work out these and other "details" in a 
"plitical transition" over six to ten years.  It sees 
increasingly clear that both sides now view imrovements in 
the situation on the ground - where peace is growing and 
where the MILF is increasingly cooperating against crime and 
terrorism -- as the key goal, not agreement on the substance 
of a written accord.  We need to continue our assistance 
efforts to promote these positive developments on the ground, 
whatever happens with the substance of the interim or "final" 
peace accord.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  More demands:  Chairman of the GRP Negotiating Panel 
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Silvestre 
Afable provided additional details about the latest snag 
(reftel) in the ancestral domain talks between the GRP and 
the MILF in May.  In addition to the 600 wards ("barangays," 
the smallest governmental unit in the Philippines) offered up 
by the GRP as Bangsamoro ancestral domain, the MILF claimed 
1000 more wards as either currently or historically 
Muslim-dominated.  The GRP has asked the Government of 
Malaysia to oversee a joint or even tri-partite technical 
survey, which would initially include some technical training 
for MILF representatives by the Philippine National Census 
Board.   Due to a clear lack of MILF expertise and 
insufficient personnel (as many as 4,000 census workers might 
be necessary), Afable said that he had encouraged the MILF to 
appoint representatives from civil society instead of or in 
addition to MILF officials.   He predicted that the one-month 
training could start as early as July, with the joint census 
taking about two months.  His goal would be to have its 
recommendations by October.  Afable said that the GRP would 
nonetheless insist on making the final decisions based on 
current social demographics, not historical data, and 
expressed optimism that the MILF would ultimately go along, 
once it had participated in the joint survey and seen 
conditions on the ground in these wards.  He explained, 
however, that these communities would ultimately have a free 
choice to decide in a referendum whether or not they wished 
to be part of a new Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, which he 
said would only be phased in after the end of the current 
tenure of elected officials in the Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao in 2008.  Afable claimed that ongoing 
MILF/MNLF talks were making some progress, although the 
future status and role of Nur Misuari remained unresolved 
issues. 
 
¶3.  (C)  MILF dynamics:  Afable suggested that the MILF 
Central Committee was coming under increased pressure to make 
additional demands from various religious leaders (ulamas), 
and commented that the Central Committee did not appear as 
unified as it had a year or even six months ago.  He admitted 
the possibility of a splintering of the MILF Central 
Committee, but said that the GRP wanted the splinter to be as 
"small as possible."  He claimed that the MILF leadership 
under Chairman Murad nonetheless remained committed to the 
peace process and an eventual peace accord.  He inquired 
about the possibility of bringing members of the MILF Peace 
Panel, along with GRP Panel representatives, to Washington in 
the next couple of months to meet with NGOs, the USG, and 
Congress.  Pol/C noted potential visa problems, and urged 
that Afable share names of possible participants with Embassy 
soonest in order to begin vetting process to avoid such 
problems. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Disarmament:  Afable explained that the Government 
of Sweden in May had provided five disarmament experts to 
meet with the MILF.  The next step will be a seminar in 
Malaysia.  He claimed that the MILF was "open" to the concept 
of disarmament, but had insisted that it be 
"across-the-board," notably including weapons belonging to 
local political chiefs not necessarily affiliated with the 
MILF or MNLF.  He said that the Swedes had pushed the idea of 
creating a combatant database -- names, addresses, photos -- 
in order to have a very clear picture of the problem, and 
 
MANILA 00002623  002 OF 002 
 
 
that the MILF was willing to consider working with a "third 
party" on such a project.  He noted that MILF "regular 
troops" might only be two or three thousand men, with up to 
another 10,000 more like local militia, not all of whom were 
even armed.  He welcomed an eventual role for USAID in a 
program like LEAP for MNLF ex-combatants. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Prognosis:  Despite the hurdles ahead, Afable opined 
that the two sides might "bypass" the final resolution of 
ancestral domain and disarmament and move to sign a sort of 
interim agreement as early as fall 2006, or more 
realistically in early 2007.  He claimed that both sides 
clearly understand that an extended period -- perhaps six to 
ten years -- of "political transition" will be necessary to 
work out final details on these two key remaining issues as 
well as to seek a modus vivendi with the ARMM in the 
meantime, while pressing for Constitutional change ideally 
leading initially to expanded autonomy and, eventually, to a 
federal system. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment:  The apparent ever-lowering of the bar of 
what it would take to achieve a "peace accord" is 
disappointing, but mostly in an ideal world in which the 
written word is the goal.  In the real world of Mindanao, it 
may be instead a valid recognition by both sides that what 
truly counts most is the growing peace on the ground, with 
better hopes for prosperity and development, and a greater 
weaning away of the MILF from terrorist links with the ASG 
and JI, along with enhanced GRP-MILF cooperation against 
crime and terrorism through the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group. 
If this can continue even absent a meeting of minds yet about 
the logistics and substance of the post-accord era, it may be 
an acceptable risk for both sides that we should continue to 
encourage and support with new assistance programs, as 
security permits. 
Kenney