VZCZCXRO3493
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKU #2394/01 1701431
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191431Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5279
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL KU FREEDOM AGENDA ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS IN 
KUWAITI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 2271 - THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY 
        FRIEND: SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO 
        REFORM UNITES POLITICAL OPPOSITES 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 2150 - FREEDOM AGENDA: GRASSROOTS REFORM 
        MOVEMENT BLOSSOMS IN KUWAIT'S ORANGE 
        MOVEMENT 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 2148 - FREEDOM AGENDA AND JUNE 29 
        ELECTIONS: PROGRESS ON REFORM DEFINED BY 
        PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVISM 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 1638 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM 
        BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE 
        ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART II 
     ¶E. KUWAIT 1637 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM 
        BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE 
        ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART I 
     ¶F. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE 
        VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN 
        AT "AMERICAN DIWANIYA" 
     ¶G. 05 KUWAIT 4993 - FREEDOM AGENDA: NOW SHOWING AT 
        EMBASSY KUWAIT: USING FILM TO PROMOTE 
        DEMOCRATIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew H. Tueller 
 for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: There is a strong possibility that the 
Kuwaiti Parliament elected on June 29 will include more 
Islamist members than the previous one.  Islamists are 
well-organized and poised to capitalize on the women's vote. 
While there are legitimate concerns about the impact this 
would have on U.S. interests, a more Islamist Parliament 
should not be viewed as a major setback for our Freedom 
Agenda.  First, Islamists are unlikely to gain a majority in 
Parliament (33 seats), without which they will be unable to 
advance their conservative social agenda.  With its 16 
Ministers and strong bloc of pro-Government MPs, the 
Government will still be able to control what legislation is 
approved by Parliament.  Second, although they generally 
cooperate in Parliament and during elections, Kuwaiti 
Islamists are not a monolithic bloc.  Even if more Islamist 
MPs are elected, there are important differences between 
Islamist groups in Kuwait; some are far less hostile to U.S. 
interests than others.  Third, the election of more Islamist 
MPs could increase the chance for political reform in Kuwait. 
 Islamists in the now dissolved Parliament strongly supported 
electoral reform and are likely to continue pushing for a 
reduction to five constituencies in the next Parliament. 
Without Islamist support, this and other important political 
reforms have little chance of being implemented.  End summary. 
 
Increase in Islamist MPs Likely 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) There are several reasons to believe that there 
will be more Islamist members in the next Parliament.  First, 
Islamists are poised to benefit most from the participation 
of women in the upcoming parliamentary elections.  Islamists 
are well-organized and enjoy the support of a strong, 
conservative base whose female members are likely to vote for 
male Islamist candidates.  Second, Islamist MPs in the 
previous Parliament were quick to join liberal MPs in 
supporting electoral reform.  Islamist candidates are likely 
to capitalize on their support for reform to attract more 
moderate voters (ref A).  Third, regional events have 
contributed to a growing conservatism in Kuwaiti society, 
leading some Kuwaitis to support Islamist candidates whom 
they believe will protect Kuwait's conservative culture. 
Finally, the short campaign period benefits Islamists who are 
better organized and better funded than other political 
groups. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) According to Post's rough estimate, out of the 96 
candidates who have a good chance of being elected to the 50 
open seats, 41 are Islamists or supported by Islamists, 
including two Shi'a Islamist candidates; 40 are 
Government-leaning; 8 are liberal; and 7 are independents. 
(Note: There were 15 Sunni Islamist MPs in the 
recently-dissolved Parliament.  End note.)  Although there 
are differences between Islamist candidates, Islamist groups 
are pooling their resources in an effort to increase overall 
Islamist representation in Parliament.  The 56 candidates 
believed to genuinely support political reform include all 41 
of the Islamists from our short-list of strongest candidates. 
 
 
The Spectrum of Islamists in Kuwait 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Though they often cooperate in Parliament and 
 
KUWAIT 00002394  002 OF 003 
 
 
during elections, Kuwaiti Islamists are not a monolithic 
bloc.  There is a great degree of variety between Kuwait's 
different Islamist groups, whose political ideologies range 
from pragmatic and open, to extremist and vehemently 
anti-American.  (Note: For a brief overview of Kuwait's 
Islamist, Shi'a, and liberal political blocs, see our 
classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/. 
End note.)  The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), the 
political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, is one of 
the most vocal advocates of political reform in Kuwait and 
strongly supported recent proposals to reduce the number of 
electoral constituencies, seen as crucial to limiting 
electoral corruption (refs D and E).  The two ICM MPs in the 
recently-dissolved Parliament also set a precedent in January 
by disclosing their financial records, an example no other MP 
followed.  Other Islamist groups, like the Salafi Movement 
and the Ummah (Nation's) Party, similarly support political 
reform, which they believe will increase their political 
influence.  In the previous Parliament, Islamist MPs 
cooperated through the 14-member Islamic Bloc, which showed 
some signs of division earlier in the year. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) The main difference between Kuwaiti Islamist 
groups is in how pragmatic they are in pursuing their 
objectives and the degree of animosity they have against the 
West.  Salafis are generally uncompromising in their policies 
and strongly anti-American or anti-Western in their rhetoric, 
though in private meetings some can be friendly and engaging 
while differing with U.S. policies.  The ICM, on the other 
hand, is extremely pragmatic and, while critical of U.S. 
policies, supportive of a dialogue with the U.S. on regional 
issues.  Despite their criticisms, few Kuwaiti Islamists 
actively advocate the departure of U.S. troops from Kuwait or 
Iraq.  Indeed, Kuwaiti Islamists often have to justify their 
toleration, and even support, for the extensive U.S. presence 
in the country to their regional counterparts.  In addition, 
many tribal candidates with conservative leanings are 
supported by Islamist groups, but are ultimately beholden to 
their tribes rather than a pan-Islamist ideology.  When 
analyzing the results of the elections, therefore, a 
distinction should be made between the Islamist MPs elected: 
the election of more Salafis could be seen as a setback for 
our freedom agenda, whereas the election of more pragmatic 
Islamists, like ICM members, would be less worrisome to U.S. 
security and strategic interests. 
 
Issues of Concern 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) The one issue almost all Kuwaiti Islamists agree 
on is the need to fully "Islamize" Kuwaiti legislation by 
amending Article 2 of the constitution to make Islamic 
Shari'a "the source of legislation," rather than "a main 
source."  In order to amend the constitution, however, 
Islamists would need the support of 44 out of the 65 members 
of Parliament.  With the Government controlling 16 of these 
seats, obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority would be 
practically impossible.  (Note: The Prime Minister is 
required to appoint one elected MP as a Minister, meaning 
there are always 49 elected MPs and 16 Government Ministers, 
who serve as ex officio MPs, in Parliament.  End note.)  In 
addition, the Amir retains the right to exercise his 
constitutional right to dissolve Parliament and call new 
elections if the Islamists push this issue, which is unlikely. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) The greater concern is that Islamist MPs would 
push a conservative social agenda and/or block important 
legislation, like the $500 million pledged by the Kuwaiti 
government to aid victims of hurricane Katrina.  Islamist MPs 
could also obstruct passage of a U.S.-Kuwait free trade 
agreement that included a provision requiring Kuwait to end 
its economic boycott of Israel.  In addition, Islamists might 
advocate increasing Kuwaiti assistance to the 
Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority, revising Kuwait's 
educational curricula to bring it more in line with their 
conservative values, or introduce other legislation inimical 
to U.S. interests.  One must keep in mind, however, that 
Islamists are unlikely to win a majority in Parliament (33 
seats) and that the Government is still likely to have a 
clear majority capable of blocking conservative social 
legislation and passing legislation it supports.  It is also 
important to note that Kuwaiti parliamentarians have an 
extremely limited ability to shape foreign policy, which is 
considered the sole purview of the Government.  If anything, 
the Islamists are likely to be just a vocal opposition, but 
not a real threat to the Government. 
 
No Political Reform Without Islamists 
------------------------------------- 
 
KUWAIT 00002394  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Ironically, the election of more Islamist MPs 
could increase the chance for political reform in Kuwait. 
All 14 members of the Islamic Bloc in the previous Parliament 
were also part of the 29 MP "orange" bloc whose insistence on 
grilling the Prime Minister unless the Government adopted 
five constituencies led the Amir to dissolve Parliament. 
Since the number of liberal and truly independent MPs is 
likely to remain unchanged or even decline, the greatest 
chance for the number of pro-reform MPs to increase is for 
more Islamist candidates to be elected.  This explains some 
liberals' support for Islamists despite their ideological 
differences (ref A).  On the other hand, some liberal 
contacts question Islamists' sincerity (ref C), arguing that 
Islamists' support for political reform is based purely on 
the calculation that it will increase their political power. 
Unfortunately, this may be true; but without Islamist 
support, these reforms are not likely to be implemented in 
the first place. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Post will continue to attend the election 
diwaniyas of candidates from all political backgrounds, 
paying close attention to the rhetoric and support of 
Islamist candidates and noting any significant differences 
between them.  We will also continue to seek constructive 
ways to engage Islamists through events like American 
diwaniyas (ref F) and movie nights (ref G), as well as 
occasionally nominating moderate Islamists for IVP or 
MEPI-funded programs focusing on political reform, as 
suggested in post's report on the ICM (refs D and E).  In 
reporting on the influence of Islamists in Kuwait, we will 
focus on analyzing both the similarities and differences 
between Kuwaiti Islamist groups, the alliances that emerge 
between them, and any potential threats to U.S. interests 
that emerge from their increased representation in 
Parliament. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
TUELLER