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FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KUALA LUMPUR 001034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR FOR B. WEISEL AND J. JENSEN 
COMMERCE FOR 4430/MAC/EAP/BAKER 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016 
TAGS: ETRD EFIN EINV MY
SUBJECT: MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE FTA 
 
REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 0930 
 
     ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 0797 
 
Classified By: Charge' David B. Shear for reasons 1.5 (A & B). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Government procurement plays a large role in 
the Malaysian economy -- valued at an estimated 20% of GDP. 
The Government of Malysia has formal procurement rules and 
officials explain that they are designed to serve a variety 
of goals, including economic development and the improvement 
of ethnic Malay economic status.  American firms operating in 
Malaysia complain that implementation of the rules lacks 
transparency; they suggest that corruption is a significant 
problem. particularly for larger contracts; and they find 
"bumiputera" set asides for ethnic Malays restrictive, if not 
prohibitive.  U.S. firms would like to see more discipline in 
the process so that procurement goes to tender through a 
definable, systematic and fair system.  They also would like 
greater market access, perhaps through a phase out of 
bumiputera preferences over an agreed timeframe.  Finally, 
they want a mechanism that would allow them to submit 
questions and complaints about tender awards and have them 
answered in a timely fashion. 
 
¶2.  (C) Phasing out bumiputera preferences may not be 
feasible, but even achieving  transparent, rules based 
procurement would make a big difference to U.S. firms. 
Linking our goals to international "best practices" may make 
them more acceptable to Malaysian officials.  We also can 
point to Prime Minister Abdullah's public statements about 
the importance of improving public service delivery and 
defeating corruption as support for our position.  End 
Summary. 
 
GOM Procurement - The Theory 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Government of Malaysia (GOM) procurement policies are 
consistent with the "bumiputera policy" that aims to advance 
the economic interests of ethnic Malays (REF A).  The 
government frankly acknowledges that it uses tenders and 
contracts to advance the development of a Malay business 
community.  Malaysian bidders are extended a preference that 
varies with the contract size, and bumiputera firms enjoy an 
additional preference factor.  For example, the Ministry of 
Defense's general guidelines state that all tenders under RM 
100,000 ($27,778) will be reserved for bumiputera companies. 
International tenders will be offered only if the goods and 
services are not available locally.  Each ministry prepares 
the contract specifications and tender documents and 
advertises for bids.  For international tenders, bidders have 
at least 56 days to submit bids and must furnish a tender 
deposit (195 days for defense tenders).  Bids are evaluated 
on technical and financial grounds.  The agency's tender 
board or the Ministry of Finance awards the contract.  The 
American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) estimates 
that government tenders accounted for about 20% of Malaysia's 
GDP in 2004. 
 
¶4. (U) A ministry may directly purchase from known suppliers 
when procuring goods, services or works under RM 50,000 
($13,889).  For purchases of RM 50,000 ($13,889) to RM 
200,000 ($55,556), a ministry must solicit quotations from at 
least five suppliers or contractors, each of whom must be 
registered with the government.  Companies must register with 
the Government Procurement Management Division at the 
Ministry of Finance and there is now a system of 
e-registration.  Procurement of goods, services and works 
above the value of RM 200,000 ($55,556) must be considered 
and awarded by Tender Boards established at each federal 
ministry.  However, goods and services tenders over RM 30 
million ($8.3 million) and works tenders over RM 50 million 
($13.9 million) must be referred to the Ministry of Finance. 
Its Government Procurement Management Division procures 
common-use items (e.g. office equipment and supplies, 
furniture and vehicles) via Federal Central Contracts usually 
made through open local tenders.  Federal and state agencies 
are required to purchase from these contracts. 
Government-linked companies (GLCs) are not bound legally by 
the Government's procurement procedures.  In practice, some 
GLCs allow foreign companies to bid directly, others allow 
for no foreign competition, and still others seem to require 
companies to follow the basic Ministry of Finance guidelines. 
 
 
¶5. (U) GOM rules state that all tenders must be advertised in 
at least one local newspaper in the Malay language. 
International tenders must be advertised in one Malay and one 
English newspaper.  Some procurement opportunities can also 
be accessed through Malaysia's myGovernmet website 
(www.gov.my/MYGOV/BI/MISC/GovernmentTender) or the respective 
ministries' homepages.  There also are a number of private or 
quasi-private companies that offer websites purporting to 
list all government tenders.  Not all of the ministries 
advertise their tenders online, nor do all of them do so in 
English.  In any case, many of the tender announcements 
require the prospective bidder to buy tender documents from 
the ministry in person, which would only be possible after 
showing an original Ministry of Finance registration 
document. 
 
¶6. (U) Malaysia has not signed on to the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA), and has not entered negotiations 
or sought observer status.  It has declined to include 
government procurement in its bilateral FTA agreements to 
date.  Malaysia's lack of participation in GPA has a negative 
impact on U.S. companies in Malaysia because they are not 
allowed to participate in U.S. government procurement.  One 
example is Dell Computers, which maintains a special assembly 
line in the U.S. for USG sales, since cannot source from its 
factory in Malaysia. 
 
GOM Procurement - In Practice 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In actual practice, many Malaysian government 
tenders do not follow the government's procurement rules.  In 
fact, even obtaining a copy of the Ministry of Finance 
circular detailing the rules can be a challenge.  (Note: 
USTR requested a copy of Finance's procurement regulations at 
the first TIFA discussions with no success.  Econoff recently 
reiterated this request with the same results.  End Note.) 
Malaysia's procurement process falls short in three key 
areas:  lack of transparency, outright corruption, and 
bumiputera requirements and preferences. 
 
Lack of Transparency 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Members of the American-Malaysian Chamber of 
Commerce (AMCHAM) would like much greater transparency in how 
contracts are awarded, and have recommended a model similar 
to what exists in Singapore (i.e., the Ministry of Finance 
posts all tenders online, indicates which companies were 
chosen for the tenders, and the criteria which determined 
their selection).  While many U.S. firms chafe at Malaysia's 
policy of granting most government tenders to bumiputera 
firms, they acknowledge this practice is similar to some USG 
procurement, with certain projects earmarked for bids from 
qualified small and minority-owned businesses, or with those 
firms receiving additional "points" in the decision process. 
AMCHAM's general stance on the issue of bumiputera 
preferences is that it would like to see them reduced, and 
eventually removed, over time so this sector will be more 
open to competition. 
 
¶9. (SBU) However, simply increasing transparency would 
benefit AMCHAM members.  If Malaysia were to clearly indicate 
which projects are earmarked for qualified bidders from 
particular groups, foreign bidders could plan accordingly. 
However, GOM agencies frequently award contracts without 
having gone through the established bidding process.  There 
also are instances of government agencies being directed to 
purchase products through designated local or bumiputera 
firms. 
 
Frequent Favouritism 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) In some cases, a prime contractor is selected without 
a formally announced tender.  For example, the Chinese 
language daily Nanyang Siang Pau recently reported that a 
project from the Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) to develop the 
South Johor economic region (a contract worth RM 10.2 billion 
or $2.8 billion) has been directed to UEM World Berhad, 
apparently without tender.  UEM is owned by Khazanah, the 
GOM's development arm, and is the largest land owner in the 
south Johor region.  There are widespread rumors that 
projects from the Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) (REF B) are being 
handed out with no formal tendering process. 
 
¶11. (C) A representative of a U.S. aerospace company 
complained about the basic unfairness of a system that does 
not follow a transparent procedure.  All too often, tenders 
never actually get to the bidding stage; an award is simply 
announced.  While his firm has had success in Malaysia, he 
observed he cannot plan when and where he should spend his 
resources to compete.  There is simply no way to know what is 
coming and when, especially in the military arena. 
Malaysia's Ministry of Defense has a published reference book 
with basic policies and procedures, explaining registration 
requirements, but does not always follow these procedures. 
In any case, while his company may deal with different 
ministries on different tenders, he explained that:  "Finance 
controls it (procurement).  Regardless of the rules, they are 
in control." 
 
¶12. (C) The government programs manager of a U.S. ICT firm 
complained about a similar lack of transparency in the 
decision-making process.  His firm once made the short-list 
for a tender with Malaysia Telecom (a government linked 
company), but lost to another company that did not even bid. 
While the winning company may have been qualified, Malaysia 
Telecom never explained its decision or why it had selected a 
contractor who had not expressed enough interest to 
participate in the tender process. 
 
A Caveat on Transparency 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) The U.S. aerospace executive observed, however, that 
sometimes U.S. firms have been able to work the system to 
their advantage.  He cautioned that one potential unintended 
consequence of the FTA negotiations might be an unraveling of 
various waivers and special arrangements obtained by U.S. 
companies currently operating in Malaysia.  Over time, the 
GOM has offered different incentives to different companies 
to attract their investments.  Should the FTA negotiations 
instill more discipline into the system, some of these 
preferences could be affected.  He also stressed that if old 
laws stay on the books, the GOM always has the option of 
simply reinstating them.  He noted that the capital controls 
Malaysia enacted during the 1997 Asian financial crisis were 
not new, but rather a case of the GOM enforcing laws that it 
had relaxed. 
 
Corruption 
---------- 
 
¶14. (C) Corruption is a significant problem, particularly for 
larger contracts.  The U.S. aerospace firm has done fairly 
well on the commercial side of its business, but has not won 
a major defense contract in Malaysia in over a decade.  The 
U.S. executive described a variety of defense deals made over 
this period through shadowy agreements with no tendering 
process.  In one instance, Prime Minister Abdullah's 
sister-in-law arranged a $400 million contract to purchase 
military cargo aircraft from Airbus.  The Prime Minister 
announced the purchase following his return from a visit to 
France.  There had been no indication that the Malaysian 
military were in the market for a new cargo aircraft prior to 
this announcement.  The U.S. executive asserted that PM 
Abdullah's brother told him this deal was "done for political 
or other reasons, such as commission."  The executive 
described similar scenarios for procurement of T91 Polish 
tanks and SU-30 Russian Aircraft, alleging that the sellers, 
as well as Malaysian politicians, agents, civil servants and 
military personnel all received a 30% "commission."  Once, 
someone purporting to work for Deputy Prime Minister Najib 
approached him about a deal suggesting, "you will get a part 
of it."  He declined this offer. 
 
¶15. (C) The ICT company manager agreed that "there is 
corruption.  Transparency is just a nice word for it."  He 
described how his firm must work through partners who file 
the tender, saying that he does not always know what is going 
on with the tendering process.  "After all, the Chairman 
could go to jail if he knows too much," he stated.  Malaysian 
political parties, including the ruling United Malay National 
Organization (UMNO), rely on "money politics" for much of 
their operating funds.  Projects or tenders often are awarded 
as political patronage, with a cut of the funds circulating 
back to the party through different channels. 
 
¶16. (C) Malaysian firms also are targets of corruption.  The 
ICT firm executive related the experience of a cousin, whose 
firm had bid on a government tender.  A ministry tender board 
informed her that she had won, but instructed her to double 
the amount of her bid.  Concerned about the suggested 
corruption, she withdrew her bid.  Our contact plans to 
discuss this case with another cousin at the Anti-Corruption 
Agency, but has no confidence that action wQl be taken. 
 
Bumiputera Requirements and Preferences 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) The U.S. aerospace firm has not found the system of 
bumiputera procurement to be an impediment and simply works 
through a Malay middleman.  The firm prefers to maintain 100% 
ownership of its local branch, rather than developing a local 
partnership that would permit it to bid directly.  The U.S. 
executive would, however, like to see the FTA confirm a 
commitment to open tendering throughout the GOM and its 
related GLCs.  He is concerned, for example, that Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (or PNB, a Malaysian government investment 
trust), in its capacity as purchasing agent for Malaysian 
Airlines, will make decisions behind closed doors that could 
lock his firm out of the commercial aircraft market. 
 
¶18. (C) The government accounts for 30% of the U.S. ICT 
firm's business in Malaysia.  Our contact at the firm 
believes agencies lack the freedom to select the best 
contractor due to the bumiputera preferences.  Our contact 
also admitted that his business plan requires partners in 
some areas and he would not bid on all contracts as a prime. 
But in areas such as services (consulting, designing, and 
maintenance and support, etc), he would like the customer to 
be able to approach his firm, or for his firm to be able to 
bid directly on government tenders, so it can bring its best 
practices to the table.  Also, our contact suggested that 
local companies often are poor project managers.  His firm 
must take on management of many contracts even though it is 
not the prime.  Lamenting his firm's inability to bid 
directly, he said:  "By not being flexible and open to 
foreign competition, it adds to costs.  The prime contractor 
adds their mark up.  Are they giving the best service?  Are 
they giving any service?  Sometime 
s yes and sometimes no." 
 
¶19. (C) A senior manager at another U.S. ICT firm suggested 
the "rules are restrictive but not prohibitive."  He 
explained that his company does about 30% of its business in 
Malaysia with the government through various middleman 
companies or as a subcontractor on larger tenders.  He would 
also bid directly for some projects if the rules allowed. 
But he cautioned that many U.S. firms would still not want to 
bid on everything due to the heavy GOM regulations regarding 
bonding.  He said that while he is often comfortable with 
taking on specific risk as a subcontractor on a portion of a 
large tender, neither he nor his parent company would 
necessarily want to take on the bond for the whole tender. 
Without a significant change in the bonding rules and the 
requirements for contract completion, this executive would 
still choose carefully in responding to tenders. 
 
¶20. (SBU) In its FTA submission, AMCHAM reported on a number 
of other cases that describe the impact of the bumiputera 
preferences and the lack of transparency in the system.  The 
most egregious and recent of these cases was the October 2005 
Ministry of Finance Directive that government agencies may 
only procure roadway, decorative, and outdoor lighting from 
three bumiputera companies.  Any ministry that does not 
comply will be penalized and the unauthorized contractors 
could be blacklisted from future GOM tenders. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The Ministry of Finance took eight months to 
respond to AMCHAM's request for a meeting to discuss this 
case.  In a May 2006 meeting, Finance Secretary General Sri 
Izzuddin bin Dali explained the Ministry had reviewed these 
companies and confirmed their qualifications.  He submitted 
that there would be a new circular posted on ministry's 
website that more clearly explained the matter and that the 
number of approved companies would be increased, most likely 
to six.  He did not respond to questions about tendering 
procedures and why foreign companies were not allowed to bid. 
 He clearly stated that only companies which are majority 
bumiputera-owned would be qualified to bid. 
 
Government Procurement in the FTA 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) The Malaysian government's high sensitivity 
concerning government procurement is suggested by the 
repeated efforts of GOM officials to try to remove this 
subject from the FTA agenda, despite clear statements from 
USG officials that it must be on the table.  The topic also 
has come under scrutiny in parliament and has been a target 
of public concern in the press.  No other issue has received 
such intense local attention.  Nevertheless, there are 
tactics with the potential to make this issue more amenable 
to negotiation. 

¶23. (C) Those goals involving transparency, responsiveness 
and simply getting the GOM to follow its own rules should be 
easier to tackle, although some Malaysian officials bristle 
at the suggestion that their system is not transparent.  Even 
though Malaysia is not a party to the GPA, couching our 
objectives in terms of "international best practices" may 
make them more acceptable.  We also can point to Prime 
Minister Abdullah's public statements about the importance of 
improving public service delivery and defeating corruption. 
Such linkages could be the "sugar" that helps Malaysian 
negotiators accept the "medicine" of procurement reform. 
 
¶24. (C) As noted REF A, the bumiputera preferences will be 
the most difficult element of these negotiations. 
Eliminating them, even with a phase out period, would be an 
unrealistic objective.  A more feasible approach might be to 
seek a "de minimis" level below which bumiputera preferences 
would be allowed to remain, but above which contracts would 
be open to international competition.  Even this may be more 
than the Malaysian government could concede, but merely 
instilling discipline, transparency and responsiveness in the 
current system would make a big difference to U.S. firms. 
SHEAR