VZCZCXRO6907
RR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKUK #0119/01 1711441
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 201441Z JUN 06 ZDS
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0668
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0630
INFO RUEHWW/BAGHDAD GULF WAR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0696

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, POL-MIL, NCT, IRMO/CRRPD WARNER, STRATEFF 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - CLASSIFICATION SHOULD 
READ   SECRET   VICE  CONFIDENTIAL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF NORTHERN IRAQ FROM DEPARTING A/RC 
 
KIRKUK 00000119  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Team Leader, Kirkuk, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
Classified by Scott Dean, Acting Regional Coordinator, Regional 
Embassy Office, Kirkuk, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S)  SUMMARY.  The Kurds have long made clear they want the 
territories Saddam stripped from Kurdish control.  Kirkuk 
province is main prize.  We believe the Kurds would let Hawijah 
go in exchange for the other territories they seek.  The 
Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes is 
turning out decisions far too slowly to achieve in the north its 
fundamental purpose of reducing popular anger over Arabization. 
We suspect the only realistic way to prevent/delay a Kurdish 
victory in the constitutionally mandated referendum on the 
future of Kirkuk is not to carry out the referendum, so the 
preparations for and timing of the required census and the 
referendum may well spark argument.  The Kurds are now watching 
whether the rest of Iraq will be stable and democratic enough 
for autonomy to continue.  We would not be surprised if, even 
after creating the new KRG Asayish, the KDP and PUK each retain 
their own separate party Asayish.  The KDP and PUK routinely 
intimidate most media outlets; party affiliation is required for 
any professional job or government favor.   Dissatisfaction 
occasionally erupts in violence; however, this seems nowhere 
near threatening the KDP and PUK hold on power.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S)  Kurdish Revanchism.  The Kurds have long made clear 
they want the return of those territories Saddam stripped from 
Kurdish control.  PM Barzani's statement to this effect at the 
creation of the unified KRG government May 7 was only the most 
recent reiteration.  Kirkuk province remains the top prize for 
the KRG.  The Kurds have carefully prepared for this since 
liberation and are now fairly far along in realizing that plan. 
 --  Both the KDP and PUK have long sponsored major Kurdish 
settlement programs in Kirkuk in preparation for the 
Constitutionally required referendum. 
 --  The Kurds would like to force out Arabization Arabs, or at 
least prevent them from voting in the referendum.  Given clear 
U.S. opposition, Kurdish leaders publicly soft-pedal talk about 
forcing out Arabs.  However, the Kurds probably also expect 
Arabs will voluntarily leave as the houses around them fill with 
Kurds.  The Arab community is (predictably) split: some willing 
to head south if paid, some wanting to stay. 
 --  While pressing ahead with Kurdification, the Kurds have in 
general played their cards carefully enough to avoid a 
destabilizing violent backlash by minorities.  The exception is 
Arab Hawijah in the south of Kirkuk province.  We believe the 
Kurds would let Hawijah go in exchange for the other territories 
they seek. 
 --  The Kurds have greased the skids with the Governor of Salah 
ad Din Province enough so that he (in contrast to his Arab 
constituents) will not object to Tozkhurmato's return to Kirkuk 
province. 
 --  A Talabani heads the Kirkuk IECI office; he actively 
conspired to let unregistered Kurds vote. 
 --  The KDP and PUK almost certainly brought Kurds across 
provincial lines into Kirkuk province for both the October and 
December polling.  We expect the Kurds will do this again in the 
referendum. 
 --  The Kurds won constitutional change to allow Kirkuk to join 
a region (the TAL's prohibition on this was specifically not 
carried over into the constitution). 
 --  As we predicted last fall, the Kurds made "normalization" 
(i.e., carrying out TAL Article 58/Constitutional Article 140) a 
major condition for their support of a new government. 
 --  The Kurds are making Article 140 implementation a major 
theme at Kirkuk Provincial Council meetings. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Commission for the Resolution of Real Property 
Disputes is turning out decisions far too slowly to achieve in 
the north its fundamental purpose of reducing popular anger over 
Arabization.  CRRPD success would not dissuade the Kurds from 
continuing their own settlement program, but would remove the 
major example in Kurdish minds of how the Baghdad government 
does not keep its promises to or serve the Kurds. 
 
¶4.  (S)  We believe that the Kurds have reason to be confident a 
near-term referendum in Kirkuk province will show a majority 
wants to join the KRG.  (That is as opposed to a snap referendum 
that some non-Kurds on the Provincial Council are unsuccessfully 
trying to spark.)  We suspect the only realistic way to prevent 
a Kurdish victory is not to carry out the constitutionally 
mandated referendum.  We suspect other Iraqis know this as well, 
so the preparations for and timing of the required census and 
the referendum may well spark argument.  The only way to stop 
the Kurds from continuing to create further facts on the ground 
would be for the U.S. military to stop them physically; we doubt 
demarches would be enough.  That said, further settlement might 
well be unnecessary for the Kurds to win a majority.  Since the 
constitutional deadline for the referendum is the end of 2007, 
we expect this issue to come to a head over the next 18 months. 
 
 
KIRKUK 00000119  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  (S)  Going for the Big One: Independence?  The Kurds want 
independence and are preparing for it, notably by trying to 
regain territory and take control of oil and other revenues. 
The KRG leadership, however, knows that autonomy gets the Kurds 
most of what they want without the combat a declaration of 
independence would spark.  The Kurds are now test-driving 
autonomy: watching whether the rest of Iraq will be stable and 
democratic enough for autonomy to continue.  That calculation 
may determine whether they later declare independence.  They 
hope, of course, for a U.S. presence and support, but could 
decide to go it alone if they thought an Iraqi implosion gave 
them a real shot for a viable independent Kurdistan.  The 
distrust between Baghdad and the KRG continues: the KRG almost 
certainly underpays its assessments and, by all appearances, 
Baghdad ministries underserve the KRG. 
 
¶6.  (S)  KRG Unification: Keep a Pistol in Your Pocket.  By 
combining their cabinets on May 7, the KDP and PUK have made a 
major step forward.  That said, it remains common wisdom in the 
region that, without a U.S. military presence, KDP and PUK 
rivalry could again rise and destroy the new joint KRG 
government.  The KRG has announced it will take a year to merge 
its two Peshmerga (regional defense forces).  Even after that 
public proclamation, the outgoing Peshmerga ministers were 
telling us privately they had no plans to merge.  By contrast, 
the KDP and PUK have agreed to create a new internal security 
force (Asayish) whose members would be vetted by both parties. 
We would not be surprised if, even after creating the new KRG 
Asayish, the KDP and PUK each retain their own separate party 
Asayish.  The delicacy of revealing one's corruption to 
political rivals also will complicate merging the finance 
ministries.  Deadlines come due next spring for KRG Interior, 
Peshmerga, Finance and Justice ministry mergers. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Democratization: An Educational Process.  The Kurds can 
recite in their sleep our talking points on democratization. 
They also routinely announce their opposition to corruption.  In 
truth, though, the KDP and PUK see democracy as akin to a 
Student Council: the students can debate and affect secondary 
questions, but cannot change their teachers, let alone the 
principal.  Part of this is the two parties' concern that the 
main opposition parties, like the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired 
Kurdistan Islamic Union, would end even the appearance of 
democracy were they to take power.  However, the KDP and PUK 
would not be willing to lose power, even if they saw the 
opposition as benign.  Therefore, the KRG routinely intimidates 
most media outlets and harasses the rest through criminal 
defamation suits.  Party affiliation is required for any 
professional job or government favor.  Amid this bleak picture, 
though, the PRT is having a positive effect on democratization 
and transparency, partly by convincing politicians of the need 
to appeal to public opinion. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Corruption/Stability.  The older generation of KDP and 
PUK leaders think their years of fighting Saddam for Kurdistan 
have earned them the spoils of victory.  This is starting to 
wear thin after 15 years of autonomy.  Most people are 
disillusioned with the parties and thus with elections, which 
offer no immediate hope of changing the current leaders.  This 
dissatisfaction occasionally erupts in violence, such as the 
riots in Halabjah.  However, this seems nowhere near threatening 
the KDP and PUK hold on power.  The populace remains wary of 
Baghdad and, if problems erupted with the central government, 
would immediately turn to the Kurdish parties for security. 
That said, the KIU is playing its cards cleverly: eschewing a 
militia, let alone violence, maintaining a rigorously clean 
image, providing services, running moderate-sounding, 
intelligent spokesmen, and speaking out for democracy.  Their 
plan is to undercut the major parties over the long term.  The 
Islamic parties are probably making some headway, but this will 
be a slow process so long as the PUK and KDP can continue to buy 
and bully support. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Despite media reports to the contrary, Kirkuk is not 
Iraq's flash point.  If Iraq came to civil war, it is unlikely 
to start here.  That said, events in the KRG and Kirkuk over the 
next 12-18 months will pose challenges for Kurds and the U.S. 
that could well affect Iraq's unity and viability. 
BIGUS