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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000897 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO GC ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: DRC'S ELECTION CALENDAR: LONG-TERM VIEW 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason: 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: While there are still many hurdles to clear 
to ensure a successful July 30 first-round election as 
scheduled, the Independent Election Commission (CEI) and the 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) 
have initiated detailed planning for the second round, and 
the corresponding successful completion of the DRC,s 
long-running Transition.  The picture is somewhat 
discouraging, with a relatively optimistic scenario featuring 
an October 15 second-round election date, and a possible new 
President and government taking office by the end of November 
or December.  The CEI and CIAT members are trying to find 
ways to shorten this timetable, but requirements of the 
election law and practical realities of the DRC render this 
difficult.  The CEI will not announce a second round 
timetable until it is confident the timeline is as short as 
possible, and that the schedule can be maintained.  Increased 
fiscal pressures and inadequate budget revenues will compound 
problems in coming months.  The bottom line is an extended 
period of uncertainty and weak government, and increased 
pressure from domestic critics, all contributing to a 
particularly vulnerable period.  It will be important for the 
international community to offer strong assurances of 
support, and hopefully solidarity in coming months (see para 
8), to help realize a successful end to the DRC transition 
and installation of a democractically elected government. 
End summary. 
 
Campaigning, Counting, Contesting and the Calendar 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Nobody in the DRC is yet taking the announced July 
30 first-round election target for granted.  Various 
opposition politicians have already announced positions 
opposing any continuation of the existing Transition 
institutions beyond June 30 and threatening demonstrations 
and disruptions.  Major logistical and organizational hurdles 
remain as well to be overcome for a successful July 30 
election exercise.  Nonetheless, preparations are proceeding, 
including distribution of polling place "kits," the printing 
of ballots - with an expected 1,800 tons of printed ballots 
expected to be delivered to holding points in the DRC by the 
end of this month - and preparation of final voter 
registration lists.  In recent weeks, members of the 
Independent Election Commission (CEI) and the 16 member 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) 
have been looking at requirements to complete the election 
process, and thus the DRC,s Transition.  Specifically, both 
groups have been studying what is needed for the planned 
second election round and full completion of the Transition. 
The second round election will include a potential 
presidential run-off if no candidate gains an absolute 
majority in the first round, and elections for provincial 
legislatures who will in turn select national Senators and 
provincial governors. 
 
¶3. (C) Initial discussions involving CEI President Malu Malu 
and the CIAT have not encouraged hopes for a short, tidy 
process.  For example, given logistics difficulties and legal 
requirements, current CEI planning indicates that all 64 
regional compilation centers across the DRC may not be able 
to compute and verify provisional election results for 
Congo,s 169 voting districts before August 20, with official 
results verified and announced by the CEI in Kinshasa by 
September 2.  Legally required periods to contest these 
results would result in final official results of the 
presidential race published on September 14.  A thirty-day 
campaign would then result in a second round election around 
October 15.  This assumes that work already underway to 
prepare candidate lists and ballots for provincial elections 
will also be completed by that time. 
 
¶4. (C) Similar calculations for an October 15 second round, 
including compilation, transmission of ballots and 
provisional results to the compilation centers, final 
verification in Kinshasa, and required resolution of 
inevitable legal challenges would bring a final definitive 
announcement of the presidential winner around the end of 
November.  At best, this would likely result in a new 
government being formed and taking office before the end of 
the calendar year.  The possibilities for further delays in 
the complicated process are clear, potentially pushing dates 
back further.  Happily, none of these internal discussions 
have yet found their way into the local press or public 
debate.  CEI President Malu Malu has assured CIAT members 
that he has no intention of announcing a timetable for a 
 
KINSHASA 00000897  002 OF 004 
 
 
second round until work to identify the required time has 
been completed, and the CEI has full confidence that the 
announced target date can be met. 
 
And the Consequences 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The scenario outlined above poses many obvious risks. 
The already barely functional Transition government will 
increasingly lose its authority, as well as its already 
limited ability to function as the country progresses through 
the campaign and election cycle.  The prospect of a very lame 
duck and weak government limping through months of electoral 
ambiguity is not comforting.  Worse still, the March 31 
suspension of the IMF,s formal program with the DRC implies 
major and growing financial pressures on the GDRC,s 
relatively small budget, further hobbling Kinshasa,s ability 
to manage its policies and programs.  Given the elimination 
of budgetary support from various sources associated with the 
IMF program suspension, an IMF mission last week calculated 
that the GDRC will have available about USD 68 million per 
month in revenues.  Roughly half of that is needed for 
salaries, and another USD 10 million for debt service (if 
paid) and other legal recurring obligations, leaving around 
USD 23 million for everything else - clearly insufficient for 
a normal range of government operations.  Various spoilers, 
including the opposition UDPS party and those who see 
themselves as election losers, are also likely to choose to 
step up anti-government activities during the time of 
greatest government weakness.  Overall, stability of the 
Kinshasa government will be under substantial threat over a 
period of several months until a new government is named and 
begins to function. 
 
Questions Over Succession 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) A final element of uncertainty of this final 
Transition period is the how and when of the move from 
Transition government to post-election government.  The new 
DRC Constitution specifies, for example, that the future 
Prime Minister should be named from the "parliamentary 
majority" following consultations between the President and 
the Parliament.  It is unclear, however, if this refers 
uniquely to the National Assembly, expected to be elected in 
the July 30 first round, or both the Senate and National 
Assembly.  Future Senators are to be chosen by provincial 
legislatures, themselves elected in the second round, pushing 
likely formation of a Senate well into 2007.   CEI President 
Malu Malu recently told the CIAT that he believes that only a 
National Assembly majority is relevant to the choice of Prime 
Minister, and a number of legal experts argue that other 
constitutional references, precedents set in France (which 
also uses a mixed Presidential/parliamentary system), and 
relevant laws support this position.  In practical terms, it 
will be important for the "National Assembly only" view to 
prevail, at least for the first post-election government, to 
avoid an even longer and likely untenable period of 
uncertainly before a new government is formed.  There is not 
yet, however, a consensus view in Kinshasa on this question. 
 
¶7. (C) Given the obvious weakness of the Transition 
government and the increasingly clear period of uncertainty, 
others are beginning to debate the merits of interim 
structures.  For example, one idea is the formation of some 
kind of caretaker government to oversee daily operations 
until a post-election government is formed.   Such ideas are, 
however, impractical and even potentially dangerous.  Many 
Congolese politicians view such an idea as a great 
opportunity to reposition themselves and/or get access to the 
trough.  Negotiations among the DRC political class to form 
yet another interim government could drag on forever. 
Related, a number of parties, led by the UDPS but including 
some with the government as well, have been calling for a new 
"dialogue" to chart the future, a pretext for at least some 
to attempt to reset the entire electoral process.  Not 
surprisingly, President Kabila and his PPRD party strongly 
oppose such a proposal as an unacceptable risk to further 
delays in the election process and completion of the 
Transition.  Should talk of new negotiations gain traction, 
the risk to the election timetable is clear. 
 
What We Can Do 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Given the factors described above, there is no magic 
answer to assure safe and successful Congolese passage 
 
KINSHASA 00000897  003 OF 004 
 
 
through the period of uncertainty ahead and successful 
installation of a democratically elected government.  The 
success of this process, however, is of great importance for 
the country and general regional stability.  There are a 
number of steps which can be taken to help get through this 
difficult period. 
 
a) Strong and hopefully unified international community 
support to the process will be critical.  It will be 
important for all major international players to offer 
repeated and strong public messages of support to the CEI and 
the general Transition process to reassure the Congolese 
public, and keep political leaders on notice that actions 
will not be tolerated which threaten the timely and 
successful completion of the Transition.  The CIAT will be 
maintained as an institution until an elected President is 
sworn in, and it represents one vehicle for such messages. 
Bilateral messages or senior-level visits from key 
governments, the Security Council and MONUC, the European 
Commission  and other interested parties will also be 
important. The principal and overriding messages must be to 
focus on the progress of the election process, underscore the 
importance of the established calendar, and reiterate the 
determination of the international community to support the 
Congolese people to see this process through to successful 
completion.  Such international solidarity and support has 
been critical to the achievement of peace agreements and 
generally helping shepherd the Transition to its current 
point.  It will be even more important during this final 
phase. 
 
b) The CIAT, the Elections Steering Committee, and technical 
working groups must continue to identify all possible 
measures to compress the election calendar as much as 
possible.  The CEI retains final authority for setting the 
election calendar and is well aware of the need to keep the 
election period as short as possible, but all potential 
viable measures to reduce the required time should be 
explored.  One item already identified, for example, is to 
reduce the planned 30 day second-round campaign period to 15 
days. 
 
c) MONUC,s mandate is scheduled to expire September 30. 
While most if not all observers recognize the need to extend 
MONUC,s operations, hopefully the Security Council debate 
and decisions accompanying a presumed extension resolution 
will provide further reassurances of international community 
will to see the DRC,s Transition through to timely and 
successful completion. 
 
d) We should encourage other institutions and governments to 
avoid overloading the agenda.  The list of critical needs in 
the DRC is huge, but the government during this remaining 
Transition period will have a very limited ability to deal 
with problems.  We should avoid levying too many demands in 
coming months, focusing only on elections, critically 
important security sector issues, key humanitarian crises, 
and general fiscal discipline sufficient to ensure essential 
needs are addressed. 
 
e) We should identify anything we can do to mitigate the 
fiscal pressures that will increasingly be felt in the DRC as 
a result of the IMF formal program suspension, and the 
resultant cut-off of budgetary support from a variety of 
sources.  The fact is there will be insufficient GDRC budget 
revenues for many government operations under any realistic 
scenario.  We must not only insist on strict GDRC budget 
discipline, but as well seek to assist to moderate the 
negative impact on Congolese of program and service cuts, and 
encourage other governments and institutions to do likewise. 
 
f) We should also ensure that potential regional tensions are 
kept in check.  Relations in recent months between the DRC 
and Rwanda have improved, although those with Uganda have 
deteriorated.  Whatever the specifics of regional relations 
among these key players, as well as with Burundi, 
Congo-Brazzaville, and other countries in the region, it will 
be important that regional tensions or actions do not 
exacerbate destabilization pressures inside the DRC during 
the fragile period leading to establishment of the 
post-election government. 
 
Final Comment: Hope and Fear 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Congolese and their international partners, 
certainly including the U.S., have traversed a long, painful, 
 
KINSHASA 00000897  004 OF 004 
 
 
and often circuitous path to bring an end to years of 
conflict and offer the prospect of a democratically-elected 
government for the first time to the Congolese people.  The 
country is now closer to legitimate and credible elections 
than at any point since independence over 40 years ago, with 
the first round elections now less than two months away. 
Fundamental changes are taking place in the country, and 
there are now grounds for more hope and optimism for a 
positive future than has been the case for decades - possibly 
ever.  With the opportunity are also grave risks, however, 
and the next few months represent a particularly difficult 
and vulnerable period. 
 
MEECE