VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0579/01 1701628
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191628Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2920
INFO RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE 1507
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0089
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 1408
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0058
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0050

UNCLAS KIGALI 000579 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/C, AND IO/PSC 
USUN FOR SANCTIONS UNIT 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR ETTC PTER PINR RW
SUBJECT:  TRIPARTITE PLUS SUB-COMMISSION STRENGTHENS FUSION 
CELL AND PROPOSES NAMES FOR SANCTIONS 
 
REF:  BUJUMBURA 389 
 
This is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
¶1.  Summary:  The U.S.-facilitated Tripartite Plus Sub- 
Commission on Security and Defense met in Kigali May 26-27 
to discuss ways to enhance the operational effectiveness of 
the Tripartite Fusion Cell (TFC) and to develop a 
consolidated "most wanted" list to submit to the Tripartite 
Plus Council of Ministers for sanctioning by member states 
and possibly also by the African Union (AU) and the UN.  Sub- 
Commission members agreed to improve the quality and 
quantity of intelligence to the fusion cell, outlined 
standard operating procedures for operationalizing 
"actionable" intelligence, and developed initial lists of 
rebel leaders to be sanctioned.  The ministers will next 
meet informally on the margins of the AU Summit in Banjul in 
July and possibly in a formal ministerial in New York in 
September on the margins of UNGA.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  The Government of Rwanda hosted a U.S.-facilitated 
meeting of the Tripartite Plus Sub-Commission on Security 
and Defense in Kigali May 26-27 to follow up on agreements 
made during the April 20-21 Bujumbura ministerial (reftel). 
This was the 14th meeting of the Tripartite Plus Joint 
Commission and second meeting of the Sub-Commission. 
Representing the four Tripartite Plus member states were: 
Amb. Richard Sezibera, Special Presidential Envoy for the 
Great Lakes Region (Rwanda); Col. Godefroid Niyombare, 
Deputy Army Chief of Staff (Burundi); Mbadu Khonde, 
Diplomatic Office of the Presidency (DRC); and LTC Octavius 
Butuuro, Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence (Uganda). 
Amb. Don Yamamoto, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs (U.S.), facilitated the meeting in conjunction with 
host representative Amb. Sezibera.  MONUC representatives 
LTC Patrick Van Hees and LTC Mike Burke, and ONUB 
representatives Col. Waldemar Vrey, LTC Wiese, and Col. 
Mzinjana participated as observers. 
 
¶3.  As mandated by the Bujumbura ministerial in April, the 
Sub-Commission focused on improving intelligence processing 
by the fusion cell, developing standard operating procedures 
for acting on intelligence, developing a timeline for 
operational effectiveness, and drawing up a list of rebel 
leaders for the Tripartite Plus Council of Ministers to 
approve and submit to the AU and UN for possible 
sanctioning. 
 
Opening Remarks 
--------------- 
¶4.  In opening remarks, Amb. Sezibera, head of the Rwandan 
delegation hosting the meeting, noted that the Tripartite 
Plus Commission has come a long way since its formation but 
that there is more work to be done to strengthen regional 
cooperation and to reduce the threat of armed rebel groups. 
He welcomed the continued support of the U.S., and 
reiterated the Commission's decision to hold accountable 
armed groups that failed to voluntarily disarm by the 
September 30, 2005 deadline by recommending imposition of 
sanctions to restrict their activities. 
 
¶5.  Amb. Yamamoto thanked the delegations for their 
commitment to work together to address the fundamental 
problems that affect all their countries:  countering the 
threat of rebel forces, enhancing diplomatic relations, and 
promoting and developing economic integration.  He commended 
the delegations for their exemplary commitment, which has 
served as a model for other bodies.  He pointed out that 
everything that has been accomplished has been the 
collective effort of each of the member countries and that 
the U.S., as facilitator, is their "service provider."  He 
reaffirmed U.S. commitment to continue its support. 
 
Improved Regional Relations 
--------------------------- 
¶6.  Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister Charles Murigande 
commended the delegates for their participation and 
commitment to addressing issues that are critical to the 
region.  He observed that problems in the region, which are 
primarily security-related, affect diplomatic relations 
among the states and that improved regional security would 
lead automatically to improved diplomatic relations. 
 
 
¶7.  He expressed Rwanda's appreciation to the U.S. for 
creating the Tripartite Plus forum and commented that Amb. 
Yamamoto's frequent visits to the region demonstrate the 
commitment of the U.S. to the process, which has already 
yielded tangible results.  For example, relations between 
Rwanda and the DRC, which were "extremely bad," are now 
"very cordial."  The two countries have agreed to exchange 
envoys and they no longer exchange sharp words at 
international meetings.  (Note:  DRC officials have 
repeatedly said that a formal exchange of ambassadors would 
not be possible until after the July 30 presidential 
elections.  End note.)  He reiterated the GOR's commitment 
to the process and assured that it will attempt to implement 
whatever decisions are made. 
 
Tripartite Fusion Cell 
---------------------- 
¶8.  Parties reaffirmed their commitment to making the U.S.- 
facilitated fusion cell fully operational and integrated 
with national intelligence operations, and adopted a 
timeline with measurable milestones for attaining 
operational effectiveness by August 30, 2006.  They agreed 
to provide intelligence to the TFC, enhance the quality and 
quantity of data for "fused" actionable intelligence to more 
effectively respond to the regional threat of armed groups, 
and form a military planning component within the cell to 
coordinate immediate and long-term responses to actionable 
intelligence. 
 
¶9.  They requested that the U.S. play a more active role in 
providing requisite logistical and material support for the 
processing and analysis of intelligence, assist the TFC in 
evaluating intelligence, and serve as a neutral advisor in 
resolving disagreements among member states and 
deconflicting competing intelligence.  In addition, parties 
requested that MONUC, within its mandate, play a more active 
role in sharing intelligence and providing logistical 
support to the TFC, and formally respond to the TFC's 
earlier request for assistance. 
 
¶10.  MONUC observer LTC Mike Burke reaffirmed MONUC's 
commitment to the fusion cell, stressing that sharing of 
intelligence and other joint efforts to remove the threat of 
negative forces are "of paramount importance to regional 
security."  He noted, however, that no guidelines have yet 
been developed to instruct MONUC on its responsibilities. 
He pledged to work with UNDPKO to hasten development of 
guidelines, but noted that if the UN Security Council 
changes MONUC's Chapter VII mandate to a Chapter VI mandate 
after the July DRC elections, MONUC's ability to undertake 
joint operations would be hampered. 
 
¶11.  Col. Timothy Rainey, U.S. Senior Military Advisor for 
African Affairs, emphasized that the role of the fusion cell 
is to receive, process, analyze, and disseminate 
intelligence, not to collect information. 
 
Most Wanted Lists 
----------------- 
¶12.  Parties reaffirmed their commitment to impose 
sanctions, as outlined in "The Way Forward" signed by the 
Council of Ministers in Uganda in October 2005, on armed 
groups and their leaders and supporters who have not met the 
September 30, 2005 deadline for voluntary disarmament. 
These measures include an assets freeze and restrictions on 
travel, fundraising, political discussions and negotiations, 
and restricted access to the media and visas. 
 
¶13.  As a follow-up to their October 2005 commitment, each 
member state developed and submitted to the facilitator an 
initial list of "most wanted" political and military leaders 
of negative forces.  These lists will form the basis of a 
consolidated, focused list of individuals to be subject to 
sanctions within the four member states, and possibly also 
by the AU and UN. 
 
¶14.  Parties agreed to submit to the facilitator requests 
for clarification on the provisional lists that they failed 
to resolve among themselves.  The USG agreed to harmonize 
the provisional lists and to submit a consolidated list to 
the Tripartite Plus Council of Ministers prior to the AU 
Summit in Banjul in July for approval and submission to the 
 
AU for sanctioning.  (Note:  if approved, this would be the 
first time the AU has imposed sanctions.  End note.)  Amb. 
Yamamoto noted that imposing sanctions would be the first 
step, and that the second step -- determining the 
consequences when member countries fail to enforce the 
sanctions -- would be discussed at the next ministerial 
meeting.  The USG agreed to provide proposed procedures for 
arrest and prosecution, sample legislation and extradition 
treaties, ideas on steps for improved diplomatic relations, 
and to explore the possibility of using the fusion cell as a 
mechanism for tracking sanctioned individuals. 
 
Final Outcome Documents 
----------------------- 
¶15.  The two-day Kigali meeting concluded with the signing 
by delegation heads of a Summary of Conclusions, with three 
attachments (attachment 1, modifications to the Security 
Experts' recommendations of January 30, 2006, on the TFC 
communications architecture and operational coordination; 
attachment 2, procedures for operationalizing actionable 
intelligence; and attachment 3, Tripartite fusion cell 
actions and milestones).  The ministers will next meet 
informally on the margins of the AU Summit in Banjul in July 
and possibly in a formal ministerial in New York in 
September on the margins of UNGA. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶16.  The commitment of all four Tripartite Plus member 
states, and facilitation by the U.S., to improve cooperation 
toward eliminating the common threat of negative forces 
ensured the success of this meeting.  While negotiations 
were at times prolonged and difficult, especially during 
discussions of specific individuals for sanctioning, the Sub- 
Commission succeeded in meeting its overall objectives.  The 
evident willingness of the parties to cooperate on regional 
security, despite past differences, sends a strong, positive 
message for the future of conflict prevention and resolution 
in the Great Lakes region.  With greater operational 
effectiveness, the Tripartite fusion cell will serve as a 
critical mechanism in ensuring regional peace and stability. 
ARIETTI