VZCZCXRO8778
OO RUEHCN
DE RUEHKT #1663/01 1741240
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231240Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2062
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RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 4768
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001663 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR RPREF NP
SUBJECT: FORMER PRIME MINISTER SURYA THAPA WORRIED ABOUT 
THE EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE MAOIST-LED GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: BEIJING 13004 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) In a June 22 meeting with the Ambassador, Surya 
Bahadur Thapa, chairman of the Rastriya Janashakti Party 
(RJP) and five-time Prime Minister, condemned the eight-point 
agreement that Prime Minister G. P. Koirala had signed with 
Maoist chairman Prachanda on June 16.  He stressed that the 
political parties must rethink their strategy and suggested 
that PM Koirala utilize political party members who could 
create and manage a solution.  He described the havoc in 
Nepal and the region that would occur if the Maoists were in 
power.  The Ambassador informed Thapa that under the Patriot 
Act, the United States would likely have to cease all 
assistance to Nepal if the Maoists were to join the 
government before laying down their arms.  The Ambassador 
noted that the government had the people's support to stop 
making concessions to the Maoists and said that we would 
continue to emphasize that point to the seven parties.  End 
summary. 
 
THUMBS DOWN FOR EIGHT-POINT AGREEMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a June 22 meeting, Thapa told the Ambassador that 
he was apprehensive about what would come from the 
eight-point agreement, which he described as a "suicidal 
blunder."  Thapa said that if the agreement proceeded without 
modification, the Maoists would take over the government from 
the inside within six months.  Thapa, referring to PM 
Koirala's regret about the eight-point agreement (septel), 
said that the government would be a lost cause if it did not 
attempt to make corrections.  The unmodified eight-point 
agreement would lead to a Nepal bereft of democracy, stripped 
of the monarchy, and controlled by terrorists.  He noted that 
the government had two important institutions at its 
advantage--the army and the civil service--and that it should 
refrain from disturbing their operations or meddling with 
personnel assignments. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO BETTER 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Thapa insisted that a Maoist government was not 
inevitable if Parliament reorganized its strategy.  He 
suggested that PM Koirala exploit the talents of the many 
intelligent, imaginative people in the different political 
parties who were capable of managing a Maoist solution and 
form a private forum for discussion.  Thapa said that a new 
democratic front would not have to be a public spectacle but 
could take place in a private forum.  He judged that King 
Gyanendra was no longer a threat to the government and agreed 
with the Ambassador that the political parties--once the 
weakest corner of the King/Maoist/Parties triangle--needed to 
realize that they were now stronger than the Maoists.  The 
Nepali people were not demanding that the government make 
concessions to the Maoists, and doing so only made the GON 
look weaker. 
 
MAOISTS IN THE GOVERNMENT BAD FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4.  (C) Thapa explained that a Maoist-infiltrated government 
would have serious regional implications, particularly for 
Bangladesh and India (each fighting its own insurgencies), as 
well as Bhutan and China (each requiring the cooperation of 
the Nepalese government; Bhutan because of the refugee issue 
and China because of the issue of Tibetan sovereignty). 
Thapa said that the Chinese government was debating its 
policy of non-interference in Nepal's affairs; he speculated 
that China could be tempted to support Maoist entry into the 
government, if the Maoists agreed to honor China's position 
on Tibet.  Thapa cautioned that a Chinese alliance with 
Nepal--which traditionally had been under the influence of 
India--would upset the balance of power in the region.  He 
noted that the government of India (GOI) had always painted 
 
KATHMANDU 00001663  002 OF 002 
 
 
Nepal's political woes as an internal situation.  Now the GOI 
had realized that, if they seized power, the Maoists would 
support international terrorism, especially in India. 
 
AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS MAOISTS IN GOVERNMENT COULD AFFECT USG 
ASSISTANCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Ambassador stated that the United States would 
likely have to cease all types of economic and military 
assistance to Nepal if the Maoists were to join the 
government before disarming; the U.S. Patriot Act prohibits 
support of proscribed terrorist organizations, the Ambassador 
amplified.  Thapa stressed the importance of the roles the 
United States and India could play by bolstering support for 
PM Koirala and encouraging the Nepalese government to 
strengthen its resolve against the Maoists. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Surya Bahadur Thapa is a veteran Nepalese politician. 
 He understands that the government has placed itself in a 
precarious position but could still easily prevail if only it 
would use its resources effectively.  His comments on the 
PRC's being tempted to play with the Maoists in return for 
the insurgents' support on Tibet appear to have some 
plausibility in light of recent conversations in Beijing 
(reftel) and reporting in other channels. 
 
BIO NOTE 
-------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Surya Bahadur Thapa has been highly visible on the 
Nepali political scene for forty years.  As Prime Minister 
(1963-64, 1965-69, 1979-83, 1997-98, and 2003-04) he was 
known for his statesmanlike approach and his iron-fisted use 
of executive power.  Intelligent, articulate, and wily, Thapa 
is known for his combative and often colorful public 
rhetoric, but he is courteous in private conversation, 
especially with foreigners. 
 
¶8.  (C) Thapa joined the Nepali Congress Party in 1954 and 
since then has repeatedly changed parties, alliances, and 
slogans.  He formed the Rastriya Prajantantra Party (RPP) in 
1990 to integrate the Panchayat-era groups that had joined 
the palace to resist the restoration of democracy.  During 
his tenure as party president (1991-2002), Thapa changed from 
champion of the party-less Panchayat system to advocate for 
multiparty democracy.  In March 2005, Thapa broke away from 
the RPP to form the RJP. 
 
¶9.  (C) Thapa was born on March 21, 1928, into an affluent, 
land-owning Chhetri (warrior class) family in the eastern 
district of Dhankuta.  He was a better-than-average student 
at India's Allahabad University.  He is married with four 
grown children, a son and three daughters.  He enjoys reading 
and gardening.  In addition to his native Nepali, which he 
prefers, Thapa can make himself well-understood in English 
and Hindi. 
MORIARTY