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INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3680
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, S/CT, SCA/A, 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN, ABAUKOL 
STATE PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PREF PTER USAID MASS PINR AF
SUBJECT: ASSESSING THE PASHTUN BELT 
 
REF: ISLAMABAD 11430 
 
KABUL 00002841  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is a joint Embassy Kabul-Embassy 
Islamabad-CFC cable. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:   On June 7, Ambassador Neumann, 
Ambassador Crocker, CFC Commanding General Eikenberry, 
and their senior staffs met at Embassy Kabul for the 
first of a series of planned periodic inter-Embassy 
meetings prompted by common recognition that 
developments in the Pashtun Belt pose a common and 
growing threat to Afghanistan and Pakistan, their 
respective futures, and US national interests in both 
countries and regionally.  The Embassies and CFC plan 
a follow-up meeting in September.  The Pashtun Belt 
sits astride the Afghan-Pakistan border, and parts of 
it are largely beyond the control of either 
government; these areas provide sanctuary and abundant 
recruiting potential that has allowed the Taliban to 
target both countries with growing effectiveness.  Our 
June 7 meeting allowed us to assess the situation in 
the Pashtun Belt and to reach some tentative 
conclusions about its strategic implications.  We also 
developed a list of measures that our embassies and 
CFC could undertake jointly, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
could adopt bilaterally, and Washington agencies 
should consider supporting.     End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (S) Joint Embassy-CFC Assessment:  When OEF swept 
the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies into Pak-Afghan 
border areas, much of the surviving leadership found 
sanctuary on the Pakistan side of the Pashtun Belt, 
mostly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) but also in Peshawar to the east and Quetta to 
the south.  Over time and in safe havens provided by 
the terrain and isolation of the Pashtun Belt, the 
Taliban have gradually reconstructed their command and 
control functions and have found plentiful recruitment 
in an easily co-opted and uneducated tribal 
population; they have also re-established funding 
links, including to foreign and narco-money sources. 
The Taliban's reconstitution has been facilitated by 
terrain, cross-border tribal bonds, weak governance, 
the unprecedented but largely ineffectual entry of 
Pakistan military forces into the area, low levels of 
investment, and a security environment which 
complicates efforts to bring needed economic 
development.  The environment on the Afghanistan side 
of the border is better, given that the GOA has had a 
four-year head start with the help of the 
international community, but conditions similar to 
those in the FATA still prevail in many areas, i.e., 
inadequate governance and law enforcement 
capabilities, spotty security protection, and limited 
government resources for reconstruction and 
development.  This permissive environment has not only 
allowed the Taliban to grow in strength, but also in 
ambition.  In Afghanistan, while the situation remains 
militarily manageable, the Taliban once again operate 
in larger formations.  In Pakistan, the Taliban 
increasingly threaten even nominal government control 
in some FATA agencies by killing moderate officials, 
mullahs, government supporters, and Pakistan Army and 
Frontier Corps troops.  Last year, the Pakistan 
military lost more soldiers in the FATA than did 
Coalition and Afghan forces combined in Afghanistan. 
The GOP recently has refocused its military, political 
and economic development efforts to fight al Qaeda and 
Pakistani Taliban in the FATA, but this is only one of 
several major security issues that the GOP faces, 
 
KABUL 00002841  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
including a separatist insurgency in Balochistan, and 
sectarian terrorism in Karachi and other parts of 
Pakistan.  Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to harden 
its psychological, political, and military opposition 
to our own goals in both countries, and is operating 
with growing effectiveness not just in Kandahar, 
Oruzgan, Zabul and Helmand, but also in North and 
South Waziristan. 
 
¶5.  (S) Strategic Implications:  While failure of the 
two governments to eliminate safe havens for the 
Taliban and other anti-coalition militia in the 
Pashtun Belt threatens the success of the OEF campaign 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan Army operational coordination 
with Coalition and Afghan forces has been significant. 
For example, during the recent CFC-A Operation 
Mountain Lion, Pakistani blocking maneuvers in the 
border area prevented insurgents from reaching their 
traditional sanctuaries and frontier safe havens. 
However, until Pakistan is successful in disrupting 
the resident senior Taliban leadership, it will be 
difficult to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan.  At 
a minimum, we will need to extend not just our time on 
the ground in Afghanistan but also our resource 
expenditures and our expectations for the pace and 
development of governance.  If unchecked, trends in 
the FATA could challenge Pakistan's long-term 
stability more broadly, with attendant consequences 
for U.S. national security.  Finally, while Pakistan 
has been a key partner in the campaign against Al 
Qaeda and other "foreign fighters" on its territory, 
the largely ungoverned spaces on its side of the 
Pashtun Belt pose a potential strategic threat to the 
United States as they threaten to degenerate into a 
permissive environment for international terrorism 
analogous to the Afghan environment that triggered the 
9/11 attacks and the subsequent OEF intervention in 
Afghanistan.  Pakistan's leadership is very aware and 
deeply concerned about this threat, but has so far 
exhibited little ability to harness its resources and 
tactics to meet the challenge of stabilizing the FATA. 
 
¶6.  (S) Way Forward:  Leaders in both capitals 
acknowledge that they share a common enemy in the 
Pashtun Belt and that this threat cannot be addressed 
through military means alone.  Pakistan's new FATA 
strategy (reftel) recognizes the solution must also 
include governance and economic development.  However, 
both Pakistan and Afghanistan will require substantial 
resources to effectively implement this multi-pronged 
strategy.   Given the significant U.S. interests at 
stake, it would be prudent to review U.S. assistance -- 
diplomatic, military, and economic -- and consider 
additional steps we can take to support both 
countries' respective efforts and coordinate our work 
on both sides of the border.  Both governments 
acknowledge that an effective approach to the Pashtun 
Belt will require coordinated action by Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. 
 
¶7.  (S) Working on an embassy-embassy basis, there are 
several steps we are jointly considering and will 
refine in our next meeting in September in Islamabad. 
Among them: 
 
- Where possible, coordinate and link our 
respective assistance programs in the Pashtun 
Belt across all USG agencies, particularly, roads 
but also smaller infrastructure so that there is 
a better cross-border balance of assistance 
inside discrete tribal areas. 
 
 
KABUL 00002841  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
- Use USG resources to catalyze contributions from 
other donors and the two host nations. 
 
- Address asymmetries in size and types of USG 
assistance for each country. 
 
- Encourage expanded government-government ties, 
including contacts among respective National 
Security Advisors, trade officials and 
legislators. 
 
- Where some third party impetus is needed, 
consider "tri-lateralizing" fora along lines of 
the successful Tripartite Military Commission. 
The two embassies have agreed to explore with the 
GOP and GOA the possibility of a joint briefing 
on USG assistance and road building in the border 
areas which we would offer under the auspices of 
the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Economic Committee 
(JEC).  Other areas of possible trilateral 
engagement under the JEC include Pak-Afghan trade 
and economic cooperation, OPIC/TDA programs, 
ROZs, and measures to attract investment to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 
- Other econ/trade possibilities: develop 
communication links from Pakistan to Afghanistan 
to reduce international telecom costs; U.S. 
assistance to boost Pak-Afghan and regional 
trade, including transit trade, to encourage 
trade via Pakistan vice Iran; coordinate design 
of Gwadar Port road and rail links to reduce 
time/cost of transport to Kabul; and promote 
energy discussions, including support for non- 
Iran pipeline options and for the planned 
Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity 
transmission line. 
 
- Both embassies agreed to look at expanding the 
U.S. Geological Service survey of mineral 
resources, which is being carried out from 
Kandahar, to both sides of the border.  This 
would lay the groundwork for joint 
exploration/development. 
 
- Consider bilateral ties between FATA and 
neighboring Afghan Provinces at Governor level 
(Note: given deep sensitivities in both 
governments, now is not the time to encourage 
tribal and other unofficial linkages that might 
be perceived as blurring the legitimacy of the 
existing border.) 
 
- Increase communication between counter-narcotics 
officials (with the eventual goal of undertaking 
joint cross-border operations).  DEA could set up 
frequent meetings between officials of each 
country's vetted unit (ANF/SIC and NIU), to 
include helping them develop means of 
communication.  Also, DEA and NAS will set up a 
meeting in a neutral location, such as Dubai, 
between the senior CN official from each of the 
two countries. 
 
- Embassies are encouraging refugee camp closures 
on schedule as some refugee settlements in 
Pakistan pose a criminal and terrorist threat. 
 
- Encourage GOA public recognition of the $250 
million in GOP assistance pledged to Afghanistan 
(of which approximately $105 million has been 
spent on roads, railway studies, trucks/buses, 
 
KABUL 00002841  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
and health facilities). 
 
- Brief President Karzai on road construction and 
other development activities we are undertaking 
on both sides of the border; objective would be 
to obtain buy-in and stimulate senior-level 
interest in closer cross-border cooperation. 
 
There is considerable scope for progress here and we 
will pursue it aggressively; but there are limits to 
what can be achieved through creativity and energy in 
the field, beyond which Washington's role will be 
critical.  Clearly there is a need for greater 
reconstruction and development assistance to 
facilitate the transformation of the Pashtun Belt and 
to provide economic prospects for its inhabitants that 
make Taliban ideology unattractive.  Additionally, 
greater political pressure must be brought to bear on 
both governments to keep their disputes out of the 
media and project an image of partnership in pursuit 
of mutual interests in the Pashtun belt. 
 
¶8.  (S) Conclusion:  We must be prepared at the 
national level to consider how to adapt to changes in 
the strategic environment here; failure to do so risks 
meeting goals that are out-dated and no longer 
sufficient to satisfy national objectives.  This 
ambitious vision requires a significant investment, 
including resources sufficient to meet emerging 
threats with a robust response.  It projects 
Afghanistan and Pakistan as reliable and stable 
partners over the long term and as participants and 
proponents for greater South-Central Asian economic 
and security cooperation. 
NEUMANN