VZCZCXRO4778
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0098/01 1521438
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011438Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0632
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0646
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0697

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000098 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/1/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KISL PREF PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: INTERNAL DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTH CENTRAL IRAQ: AN UPDATE 
 
HILLAH 00000098  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO 
Hillah, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On May 24, Ali Abbass Jahaker, head of the 
Wasit Office, Ministry of Displacement and Migration briefed REO 
staff  on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) situation in 
South Central Iraq.  Jahaker provided updated Ministry 
statistics for South Central IDPs:  Najaf 1600 families, Wasit 
1551,  Karbala 1393, Qadisiyah 580,  and Babil 550 for a total 
of  5674 families or  an estimated 34,044 individuals.  Jahaker 
noted that to date, virtually no IDPs have returned to their 
homes.  He stated there was growing reluctance from provincial 
governments to rehabilitate housing and provide long term 
assistance that might encourage IDPs to settle permanently in 
the region.  He characterized his Ministry's assistance as 
limited to initial subsistence items, and acknowledged that the 
main brunt of assistance in other provinces was being borne by 
religious organizations in Najaf and Karbala, and by a 
relatively effective Red Crescent  in Qadisiyah.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Jahaker stated that these figures were somewhat higher 
than the number of refugees registered by provincial governments 
as they include families seeking assistance, but not yet 
registered.   He described the situation as tense in many IDP 
clusters throughout the region, noting that families would 
rather camp in the desert than suffer the humiliation of living 
in government-sponsored tent settlements.  He said that his 
staff found it increasingly dangerous to repeatedly visit IDP 
clusters.  Displaced families were now less likely to restrain 
themselves to questions about when additional aid would arrive, 
and were threatening his staff with physical violence if nothing 
was done. 
 
¶3. (C)  Jahaker noted that the situation was made more difficult 
by the increasing tendency of provincial governments to limit 
assistance and find ways of "encouraging" refugees to move on. 
He cited the example of Najaf, where the provincial government 
had sent up a tent center thirty kilometers from the city that 
housed sixty families.  No one stayed there long, he said, 
because the living conditions were unbearable, citing a lack of 
potable water and numerous scorpions.  Nonetheless, Jahaker 
said, refugees in Najaf were relatively better off than in other 
provinces.  Religious organizations were providing extensive aid 
and because of the tourist infrastructure for pilgrims, there 
were sufficient vacant buildings to house IDPs.   However, the 
Governor had rejected an offer by his Ministry to establish an 
office there.   Jahaker noted that an episode involving four 
terrorists who had allegedly infiltrated refugees in Kufa had 
also alarmed the provincial government.  He stated that 
hardening provincial attitudes throughout South Central toward 
IDPs had  led to some national political figures in Baghdad 
threatening to displace Sunni families in South Central in order 
to provide housing for displaced Shi'a families. 
 
¶4. (C) Jahaker noted that provincial reluctance to begin medium 
and long term assistance for IDPs was hampering his Ministry's 
operations  in the region.  He stated that Najaf Governor 
Al-Ta'ee had initially refused a Ministry request to open an 
office there, and that Qadisiyah Governor Hamza was refusing to 
cooperate with the Ministry representative in his province.  In 
Babil Province, the Ministry had an enthusiastic, but 
inexperienced representative who had yet to gain traction in 
providing assistance.  He stated that Coalition Forces should 
consider the Ministry's regional offices as natural partners, 
given provincial government reluctance to deepen assistance and 
the unreliability of NGOs such as the Red Crescent. 
 
¶5. (U) Jahaker inquired about the possibility of USAID-funded 
assistance in Wasit, stating that because of the province's 
proximity to Baghdad and geographic size, the humanitarian 
situation there was worse than in other South Central Provinces. 
 He noted that a substantial percentage of families had serious 
medical problems.  In addition, children had a high prevalence 
of disease and chronic medical conditions, ranging from skin 
rashes to cases of typhoid.   He said that while some families 
had been able to relocate to an apartment complex outside of Al 
Kut originally built for Iranian refugees, many were living in 
abandoned or heavily damaged buildings, often relying on tarps 
and corrugated tin panels for shade.   Jahaker also noted that 
the province had incarcerated two hundred Afghan families who 
had illegally entered Iraq from Iran.  According to Jahaker, the 
Iraqi government intended to deport the Afghans after they 
served a six-month jail term, but so far, the Iranian government 
had refused to cooperate. 
 
¶6. (C/NF)  Bio notes: Ali Abbass Jahaker ~ grandfather and 
mother born in Iran~ claims to have worked as a representative 
of the Marjaya'a (Ayatollah Ali Sistani's religious leadership) 
 
HILLAH 00000098  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
in Wasit, transferring funds for the Marjaya'a since the fall of 
Saddam Hussein~ also claims to have been involved in the 
stand-up of an ad hoc local militia, the "Al Mukhtar" battalion 
immediately after Saddam's regime collapse~ offered to 
facilitate introductions to the Marjaya'a in Najaf. 
MEURS