VZCZCXRO7321
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0109/01 1731313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221313Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0668
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0654
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0719

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR NCT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL SCIRI BOSS ON SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
 
REF: HILLAH 0106 
 
HILLAH 00000109  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO 
Hillah, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1. (U) This is a Babil PRT cable. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY.  During a recent meeting Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraqi (SCIRI) Babil party boss, and also 
Provincial Council (PC) member, Ali Al Qasser presented 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) staff with an insider's 
view of the party's aspirations in the region.  Qasser also 
noted that Coalition Forces (CF), the Regional Embassy Office 
(REO), the PRT and the Babil provincial government must 
intimately coordinate political and security efforts to 
stabilize the province and embolden emergent democratic 
institutions.  While the meeting was highly cordial, it was 
obvious from the beginning that Qasser's primary mission was to 
advocate increased U.S. political support of SCIRI and to 
underscore a positive image of the party as a whole.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------- 
BABIL PROVINCE AND SECURITY 
--------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Qasser started the meeting by reiterating a commonly 
expressed theme amongst local and provincial politicians that CF 
need to pay greater attention to strategically important Babil 
Province.  The "political process" and "democratic development," 
he added, are moving forward with the encouragement of the 
United States and CF, but he cautioned that "democracy is still 
new to the Iraqi people."  If "the people get a wrong 
understanding of democracy [e.g. the U.S. not overtly supporting 
decisions of local and provincial governmental bodies] the 
security situation in the province will almost certainly 
deteriorate." 
 
¶4. (C)  Qasser also suggested that the REO, the PRT and the PC 
need to harmonize security efforts.  As previously expressed by 
the SCIRI governor, (reftel) Qasser seemed to insinuate that 
security issues should be debated and evaluated outside of 
currently existing structures, such as the weekly briefs held at 
the REO.  (COMMENT.  This suggestion appears to be an attempt to 
marginalize Babil Police Chief General Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri 
Qais who regularly attends the weekly REO security meeting.  END 
COMMENT).  PRT staff countered that the REO always welcomes the 
participation of PC members in security meetings despite the 
fact that the past record of attendance of the PC invitees has 
been far from stellar.  Qasser answered, "We cannot continue 
cooperation if your support is hidden.  We need Coalition Forces 
to make security plans open for all and we should jointly agree 
upon them." 
 
----------------------- 
THE PC AND GENERAL QAIS 
----------------------- 
¶4. (C) When asked about SCIRI's position on the current 
controversy surrounding General Qais, Qasser stated that the PC 
decision to fire the popular general is unalterable.  Moreover, 
as the PC retains the highest legal authority in Babil, the 
United States has a moral obligation to support the decision in 
order to hearten the nascent democratic institutions in the 
province.  In line with declarations made by other PC members, 
Qasser added that Qais' termination rested upon his inability to 
compromise with the council.  Such insubordination, Qasser 
stated, is the basis of the PC's decision to remove the general, 
"but don't worry," he concluded, "Qais will find another job." 
 
¶5. (C)  Qasser stated bluntly that it is commonly known that 
General Qais enjoys unfettered U.S. support.  This backing, he 
maintained, only weakens the rapport between the PC and 
Coalition Forces and also might confuse the people of Babil.  He 
admonished that the public will no longer trust U.S. actions and 
statements because the United States, while overtly advocating 
the development of democracy in the province, is seemingly 
subverting the legal authority of the PC.  Moreover, he said 
that the United States should not view the verdict to fire Qais 
as politically motivated considering that only twelve of the 
forty-one PC members actually belong to a political 
organization. (COMMENT.  All information received by the REO and 
PRT concerning party loyalties of the Babil PC indicates that 
this contention is incorrect.  END COMMENT). 
 
---------------------------------- 
SCIRI, BADR, AND POLITICAL PARTIES 
---------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Qasser stated that SCIRI in Babil is not so much of a 
political party, but "an arbiter of political cooperation that 
looks to enable every Iraqi to join the [democratic] process," 
 
HILLAH 00000109  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
including supporting weaker, likeminded political entities to 
compete in local and national elections.  "We also advocate 
cultural activities," Qasser added, "and ask for very little in 
return."  Qasser failed to mention that the Islamic Da'wa party 
and many Sadrists have been deeply critical of the current 
SCIRI-dominated provincial administration. 
 
¶7. (C) When asked to describe the relationship between the Badr 
Corps and SCIRI, Qasser stated that while Badr was previously 
the military arm of SCIRI before the 2003 U.S.-led liberation, 
such militias are no longer needed.  Badr, he maintained, has 
essentially transformed into a sister political organization of 
SCIRI, but remains presently independent of SCIRI leadership. 
"Badr," he continued "is loyal to its own leadership and 
therefore does not want to unify with SCIRI at this time. 
However, at some point in the future, the two parties may 
decided to unify into a single entity." 
 
¶8. (C) When asked if he could list specific philosophical and 
theological differences between SCIRI and the other Shi'a 
Islamist political parties in South-Central, Qasser responded 
that, in fact, there are none.  The Shi'a Islamist parties, he 
declared, agree largely upon major political issues, including 
the creation of a moderate Islamic state that codifies core 
religious values.  Qasser added "individuals who are not Muslim 
will be respected, but Islam must take precedence over all 
others in Iraq."  Moreover, Qasser observed that SCIRI intends 
to change its name to the "Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq 
(SICI)," as the revolution was completed with the 2003 U.S.-led 
liberation. 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT.  Qasser is a friendly and straightforward 
politician, with little intention of hiding SCIRI political 
goals in Babil or nation wide.  While his polemical commentary 
is difficult to take seriously, including his interpretation of 
the Qais controversy, the PC and the role of Badr in Babil, he 
did offer some interesting observations pertaining to the Shi'a 
Islamist parities in general.  His reflection that most of these 
political parties share the same ultimate objective of creating 
an Islamic Iraq is perhaps most striking.  PRT staff have asked 
local contacts time after time if they could articulate key 
political differences between the various Shi'a Islamist parties 
- with little success.  Also interesting is his assertion that 
SCIRI intends to support other Shi'a Islamist parties in 
upcoming local and provincial elections, which possibly alludes 
to a combined 555 ticket.  It remains to be seen what level of 
cooperation SCIRI officials in Babil will be ableQo obtain from 
the other Shi'a Islamist parties, many of which remain highly 
critical of the current SCIRI administration of the province. 
END COMMENT. 
FONTENEAU