VZCZCXRO4166
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0107/01 1710451
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200451Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0665
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0651
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0716

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/20/2016 
TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: DIWANIYAH PROVINCE: MAHDI MILITIA ON THE OFFENSIVE? 
 
REF: HILLAH 0102 
 
HILLAH 00000107  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO 
Hillah, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:   During a recent visit to Diwaniyah, REO staff 
found that with the fulcrum of political influence in Diwaniyah 
swinging toward the Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS) and its 
associated Mahdi Militia (MM or Jaysh al-Mahdi), the Mahdi 
Militia are increasingly able to declare large sections of the 
city off-limits to Iraqi Security Forces.  The reluctance of ISF 
units to patrol within Sadrist neighborhoods encourages Mahdi 
Militia to attack Coalition Forces patrols, as seen in a major 
MM assault against a Latvian patrol on the night of June 16. 
That same night, an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) attack 
south of Diwaniyah killed one US soldier.  The next morning, an 
EFP strike on an Aegis convoy left three severely wounded.   The 
attack occurred within city limits, close to Camp Echo, and not 
far from a police checkpoint.  An Iraqi Army intelligence 
contact placed the attacks in context, saying that local MM 
strategy has moved from targeted assassinations to mounting high 
visibility operations aimed at intimidating the local population 
and displaying MM strength with attacks on unpopular targets. 
END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C) On the night of June 16, a routine Latvian patrol passing 
through a Sadrist neighborhood in the center of Diwaniyah came 
under intense RPG and small arms fire in what appears to have 
been a deliberately pre-staged ambush.  Patrol participants 
estimated that upwards of one hundred MM members fired on the 
patrol from second-story rooftops, beginning with an initial 
wave of RPGs.   The patrol had been accompanied by Iraqi Army 
gun trucks who refused to go further just before the ambush, 
saying it was too dangerous.   Iraqi police were not present. 
The patrol pushed out of the immediate area without casualties. 
For Diwaniyah, the intensity of the assault was unprecedented. 
 
¶3. (C) An EFP strike the same night left one American soldier 
dead south of Diwaniyah in what had been a historically calm 
rural area.  The next morning, a hastily placed EFP hit a 
civilian convoy not far from the entrance to Camp Echo, severely 
wounding three Aegis private contractors.   COMMENT:  There is 
as yet no evidence as to the intended target, but the attack 
closely coincided with the expected arrival time of a REO 
Al-Hillah convoy headed to Diwaniyah for the biweekly PRDC 
meeting. END COMMENT   Disturbingly, the EFP was quickly placed 
without site preparation in an area near a police check point in 
an example of the new "drop and pop" IEDs. 
 
¶4. (C)  The security situation in Diwaniyah has dramatically 
worsened over the last two months.  Since January, there have 
been 38 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents within the 
province, of which twelve were found and 26 exploded.  Seventeen 
of those were placed within the last 45 days. 
 
¶5. (C) Frequent, but thankfully inept indirect fire (mortar and 
rockets) against Camp Echo continued over the same period.  Four 
Katushka rockets were fired on the night of June 15.  The next 
night, thirteen unidentified explosions were heard within the 
city along with small arms fire.  While the explosions may have 
been caused by a tribal or tribal/sectarian dispute within 
Diwaniyah, it is more likely that the thirteen explosions were 
mortar rounds fired across the city from northern Sadrist 
neighborhoods toward Camp Echo on the south, falling short, and 
reportedly damaging at least one home and a school.  Since 
April, formerly rare indirect fire against Echo is now occurring 
1-2 times per week.  A base contact noted that these days, the 
lights often are turned on after hours at the downtown OMS 
office building as MM members gather to celebrate the latest 
attack. 
 
Putting it into Perspective:  Mahdi Militia Moving into a New 
Phase? 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------- 
 
¶6. (C) Provincial officials, Camp Echo intelligence personnel, 
and local contacts concur that a ring of neighborhoods on the 
north side of Diwaniyah are considered by Sadrists to be under 
their control.  Local police will not patrol in those quarters. 
Qadisiyah provincial governor Hamza last month attempted to 
issue a "no go" order to Iraqi Security Forces and CF that 
placed those neighborhoods and some central areas close to 
Diwaniyah's OMS office building into a no-go "red zone." 
Provincial government and ISF contacts invariably urge REO staff 
to ask CF not to patrol in those areas, stating that patrols are 
an unnecessary provocation to the Sadrists.  COMMENT:  Coalition 
Forces retain full authority to decide patrol routes without 
prior consultation with the provincial government.  Given the 
frequency of indirect fire attacks originating in these areas, 
 
HILLAH 00000107  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
unimpeded ability to patrol and react to threats in these 
neighborhoods seems essential.  END COMMENT 
 
¶7. (S) A local Iraqi security forces intelligence contact 
offered his personal assessment of the escalation of significant 
acts in Qadisiyah Province.  He linked the Mahdi Militia's more 
aggressive stance to the assassination of former Governor Jamal 
Susoon Al-Lizimali on May 29 (reftel).   Claiming that Muqtada 
al-Sadr's mother lives in Diwaniyah and that MAS frequently 
visits the city, he said that Mahdi Militia elements in the city 
were pushing forward to make the city a MM stronghold.  Their 
campaign, he claimed, had an initial organizational phase, 
including the infiltration of IP units.  The second phase 
included assassinations of ex-Baathists and Iraqis working with 
Coalition Forces (including public mention of a target "Black 
List").   Mahdi Militia has now entered the third phase, he 
stated.  In order to intimidate a public which had grown 
increasingly weary of religious parties due to the lack of basic 
services,  Mahdi Militia was moving toward more public acts of 
terror, beginning with the assassination of Al-Lizimali.   He 
believed that MM now placed a high priority on showing the 
public that MM controlled the police at will and no longer 
recognized the Coalition Forces as having the "right" to enter 
Diwaniyah.  In his view, the most effective way to respond would 
be to conduct raids, detaining leaders and cell organizers, 
while avoiding patrols that Sadrists would view as a 
"provocation."  He urged that CF assign more attention and 
assets to counter the increased terrorist activity in the 
province. 
 
¶8. (S) COMMENT:  No one has claimed specific responsibility for 
Al-Lizimali's shooting, and while MM are suspect, the Badr 
Organization is also capable of ordering and carrying out the 
attack.   The disappearance of the police from the scene during 
the shooting is one indicator pointing to possible Badr 
involvement, given their extensive influence within local IP 
units.  Our contact figuratively threw up his hands, noting that 
Fadilha's militia, al-Sarkhi/al-Hassani, and Wahibists are all 
active within the province, with each group willing to carry out 
operations in ways that suggests another.   Regardless, the 
Qadisiyah provincial government seems increasingly at a loss in 
restoring order within the city.   Governor Hamza's principal 
response so far has been to step up anti-CF rhetoric, taking on 
a Sadrist tone in his public comments. 
 
¶9. (C) Arguably, terrorist acts are up across all five South 
Central provinces.  However, Qadisiyah's travails are a reminder 
that significant differences exist across provinces in what 
might appear from the outside to be a monolithic region.  To 
Qadisiyah's east,  Wasit Province remains relatively calm and 
most acts of violence are assassinations and murders.  To the 
north, Babil has avoided significant public unrest, in part 
because of effective police enforcement.  The religious centers 
of Najaf and Karbala see occasional militia posturing, but 
security concerns are more along the lines of stemming 
assassinations, rolling up IED cells, and preventing car bombs. 
 END COMMENT 
FONTENEAU