VZCZCXRO2246
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0106 1680534
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 170534Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0664
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0650
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0715

S E C R E T HILLAH 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR NCT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/17/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED: PART II 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department 
of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is a Babil PRT Cable. 
 
¶2. (S) SUMMARY: During a series of recent meetings Babil 
Province Governor Salem Saleh Mehdi Al-Muslimawi and members of 
the Provincial Council (PC) related to REO and PRT staff that 
the security situation in the province is deteriorating as 
evidenced by the violent June 6 protest at Al-Qasim (reftel). 
The recent rash of attacks against both Coalition Forces (CF) 
and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), however, has only solidified 
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI)-dominated PC's conviction that Babil Police Chief 
General Qais Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri is the wrong individual to 
command the Iraqi police forces in the province.  It is also 
highly possible that the governor and the PC are exploiting 
these recent events as an excuse to acquire further control over 
all ISF in Babil.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) During a June 14 Provincial Council Reconstruction 
Development Committee meeting the governor, the PC Chair and one 
PC member presented a short video, which showed portions of the 
protest at Al-Qasim (reftel).  In line with previous information 
received by the PRT, the angry demonstrators protested outside 
of the city's municipal building and severely damaged the 
governor's U.S.-provided armored SUV with rocks and sticks.  The 
short clip additionally showed that Iraqi Police (IP) assigned 
to protect the venue failed to intervene or even attempt to 
appease the disorderly crowd. 
 
¶4. (C)  The governor and the PC members reiterated during a June 
15 meeting at the REO that the failure of the IPs to act 
demonstrated at best Qais' incompetence and at worst his 
loathing of legitimately elected officials.  One PC member 
stated, "When mortars landed near the REO the other day, General 
Qais arrived within five minutes.  When the governor and PC 
members were attacked by protesters at Al-Qasim, General Qais 
took an hour and a half."  Al-Muslimawi more forcefully noted, 
"Are the governor and PC members not important enough to have 
police protection?" 
 
¶5. (C) The governor further articulated that additional 
"security infractions" will produce decidedly negative 
consequences for the capital and therefore the nation as a 
whole.  The violence at Al-Qasim, he noted, can easily spread 
throughout Babil and beyond.  The possibility of such an 
increase, one PC member stated, has led the Babil provincial 
government to create a new committee directly charged with the 
coordination of all Babil security forces, including the Iraqi 
Army and the police forces. 
 
¶6. (C) Dr. Usama, a member of the PC, charged that the problem 
with Qais runs much deeper than professional competency.  Qais, 
he maintained, could have resolved his personal problems with 
the PC through compromise.  (COMMENT: Dr. Usama did not 
articulate what type of compromise he or the PC wanted from 
Qais.  END COMMENT).  Usama explained that General Qais - and 
not the Babil PC - aspires to control the provincial security 
forces for the purpose of establishing a dictatorship over the 
province.  Furthermore, Usama stated that Qais' continued 
insistence to bypass the recommendations of the council and 
ignore other governmental bodies has not passed unnoticed.  "I 
can do nothing," the doctor concluded, "General Qais has simply 
gone too far.  The security of the province does not rest upon 
the shoulders of one individual." 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: The events at Al-Qasim and the current 
province-wide deterioration in security have forced the governor 
and the SCIRI PC members to actively seek REO and PRT assistance 
and collaboration.  The governor proposed a larger security 
meeting that would bring together ISF, the U.S. military, the 
provincial government and the REO to discuss an overall strategy 
for the province.  While on the surface, the reengagement with 
the governor is a positive step that will hopefully translate 
into increased coordination between the Babil government and the 
PRT, the governor's possible motivations are disturbing.  In all 
likelihood the SCIRI governor is exploiting the security card as 
pretext for garnering increased influence over the provincial 
security forces.  The PC's interest in establishing a new 
security committee and the endless attempts to hold Qais 
responsible for the events at Al-Qasim certainly lends credence 
to this probability.  Despite the governor's and Dr. Usama's 
allegations, REO assessment continues to be that General Qais is 
competent, effective, and non-sectarian.  END COMMENT. 
 
FONTENEAU