VZCZCXRO8733
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0104/01 1651220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141220Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0661
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0647
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0712

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/14/2016 
TAGS: KISL PGOV PTER MARR IZ
SUBJECT: RUMBLINGS IN SOUTH CENTRAL PROVINCES 
 
HILLAH 00000104  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO 
Hillah, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Events in four South Central provinces over the 
last twenty-four hours indicate that although the incidence of 
terrorist acts remains low in this seemingly stable region, 
tensions are increasingly manifesting themselves in public 
demonstrations, ultimatums to provincial governments, and 
increasingly tense, sometimes violent  confrontations.  The 
Al-Hassani militia may be taking advantage of  public 
dissatisfaction with local government to build up its strength, 
similar to moves by Muqtada al-Sadr in 2004.   END SUMMARY 
 
Qadisiyah Province:  Sadrists to Governor - "We will Burn Down 
the City" 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------- 
 
¶2. (S)  An incident involving Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
personnel in civilian clothing escalated into public demands by 
the Diwaniyah Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) for the release of 
"three gunmen" by Coalition Forces.   Governor Hamza called REO 
staff on June 12, stating that the Sadrists will carry out their 
threat to "burn down" Diwaniyah if the three "detainees" are not 
turned over to the Iraqi Police by 1700 that day.  OMS Sheikh 
Sadiq Al-Hasnawi told the press, "Diwaniyah will be the center 
of the first spark of public anger against the American 
occupation."  He characterized the alleged release of the 
"gunmen" to Coalition Forces as evidence that "the Americans are 
supporting death squads in Diwaniyah." 
 
¶3.  (C)  Throughout the afternoon and evening of June 12, Iraqi 
Police maintained a heavy presence in downtown Diwaniyah, 
including patrol cars using their sirens to dissuade public 
gatherings.  Coalition Forces were also present downtown around 
the Provincial Government building.  The situation was finally 
defused by the reported intervention of the Prime Minister's 
Office with OMS officials in Diwaniyah. 
 
¶4. (C)  Separately, up to two hundred members of Al-Sarkhi aka 
Al-Hassani,  a rapidly growing "Twelfth Imam"  militia 
demonstrated in downtown Diwaniyah on the same day.  According 
to REO contacts, the group protested a lack of basic services, 
the gas shortage, and overall poor governance in the province. 
Al-Hassani may have marched as a way of distinguishing 
themselves from similar groups that condone wife swapping, 
alcohol, and drugs as a way of hastening the return of the 
"Twelfth Imam."   Qadisiyah contacts tell us that the militia is 
aggressively recruiting new members.  Warning flyers are going 
up in some Diwaniyah neighborhoods, associating Al-Hassani with 
the fringe groups.  Contacts note that Al-Hassani appears 
well-armed and well financed.  In the June 12 demonstration, 
however, marchers did not carry weapons and wore white (a color 
that can sometimes signify willingness to commit suicide). 
 
Karbala:  Al-Hassani Moves Against Iranian Consulate 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  On June 11, Al-Hassani members also attacked the 
Iranian consulate in Karbala, breaking windows.  A local contact 
reported that the previous night, ten microbuses with Mahmoud 
Al-Hassani Al-Sarkhi supporters arrived in Karbala, parking by 
the "Husseinyat Al-Iman Al-Sadi" Mosque. 
 
¶7. (C)  Al-Hassani's militia members may have had several goals. 
 The first was to make a public showing at the Al-Hussein and 
Al-Abbas shrines, probably to demand a larger percentage of 
donations.  Al-Hassani had shown up at the shrines two weeks 
before with the same objective. 
 
¶8. (C)  On June 12, the Al-Hassani militia demonstrated in front 
of the Iranian Consulate to protest an Iranian television news 
broadcast (Al-Kawther) that announced that according to the Qom 
hamza,  Mahmoud  Al-Sarkhi Al-Hassani was neither an Ayatollah 
nor a religious authority.  The broadcast also (correctly) noted 
that there is an Iraqi warrant out for his arrest.  Consulate 
guards shot in the air to warn Al-Hassani off. 
 
¶9. (C) COMMENT:  Al-Hassani is probably the most anti-Iranian 
militia in the South Central provinces, in part because of 
Hassani's uncompromising stance against Ayatollah Ali Sistani 
and SCIRI as well as Mahmoud Al-Hassani's complicated, but 
undoubtedly competitive relationship with Muqtada al-Sadr.  END 
COMMENT 
 
Babil:  Another Al-Sarkhi/Al-Hassani Demonstration and Mortar 
Attack Against REO Al-Hillah 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------ 
 
HILLAH 00000104  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶10. (C)  On June 10, five hundred members of 
Al-Sarkhi/Al-Hassani publicly marched in Babil Province. 
Al-Hassani has not made a public demonstration in Babil in 
recent memory.  Members wore white shirts, perhaps to 
distinguish themselves from the Mahdi Militia. 
 
¶11. (C)  On June 11, the REO was attacked for the second time in 
two weeks by indirect fire.  Six rounds were launched in broad 
daylight against the compound.  The REO had been under mortar 
attack since a single round in October, 2005.   There are no 
suspects in the attack at this point.   On the same day, a road 
clearing patrol out of Baghdad was hit by an Explosively Formed 
Projectile (EFP) outside of Hillah.  Two wounded were medevaced 
from the REO.   The attack is part of an overall intensification 
of incidents against CF in the region. 
 
COMMENT:  Al-Hassani Using Muqtada al-Sadr's Play Book? 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT:   The sudden spate of public appearances by 
Al-Hassani militia members is reminiscent of Muqtada al-Sadr's 
followers marching in 2004 prior to the August uprising.  While 
the degree to which Al-Hassani is conducting IED and other 
attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces is 
unclear, it appears that the Al-Hassani miltia is gathering 
strength and publicly flexing its muscles.   As shown by events 
in Diwaniyah this week, the aggressive posturing of non-SCIRI 
militias is becoming a serious political headache for 
SCIRI-affiliated politicians in South Central Iraq.  END COMMENT 
MEURS