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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0102/01 1631611
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121611Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0655
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0641
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0706

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 HILLAH 000102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KISL MARR PTER IZ
SUBJECT: QADISIYAH PROVINCE:  SADR, SCIRI, AND SECURITY 
 
HILLAH 00000102  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO 
Hillah, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Militia (MM) and his 
political organization, Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS), 
increasingly dictate the pace of events in Qadisiyah Province. 
While the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) holds 
20 seats out of 41 on the Provincial Council, SCIRI is on the 
defensive, hobbled by growing public resentment against a 
provincial government that fails to provide basic services. 
Popular support for Sadr is growing, fueled by rural 
displacement, Sadr-provided social services, and OMS willingness 
to intercede with provincial government workers.  Mahdi Militia 
is also taking advantage of its infiltration into police units 
and the reluctance of SCIRI to move against Mahdi.  MM is 
showing a more aggressive public posture, including pressing 
Governor Hamza to declare large swathes of Diwaniyah "no go" for 
Coalition Forces.  Upcoming elections will likely lead to a 
Sadr-dominated Provincial Council. END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C) On the evening of May 29th, ex-Qadisiyah Governor Jamal 
Susoon Al-Zamili left a crowded Diwaniyah cafi, crossed the 
sidewalk, and was gunned down at the door of his car.  The hit 
was immediate and professional.  A team of shooters in a moving 
car, accompanied by two spotters, quietly left the scene. 
Although the murder took place on a crowded, downtown street, 
the police, unaccountably absent from their normal evening 
patrol, did not respond for an hour. 
 
¶3. (S) This assassination illustrates several trends in 
Qadisiyah's security and political situation:  1) local 
political parties are focusing on upcoming provincial elections. 
 Al-Zamili was likely killed to prevent his running. (Note:  The 
killing may also have been linked to announcement of a Sadrist 
"fatwa" against local collaborators with Coalition Forces); 2) 
In perverse testimony to Al-Zamili, politicians here expect 
voters will be pulled toward candidates exhibiting leadership 
and proven ability to perform; 3) The police are politicized, 
infiltrated by both Badr Organization (SCIRI-affiliated) and 
Sadr militias, and are poorly led; and 4) intensified violence, 
including assassinations, is spreading northward from Basra into 
formerly quiet South Central provinces.  For the first time, 
Multinational Division - Central South (MND-CS) last month 
categorized the provincial security situation as "unstable." 
 
Sadr's Growing Political Clout -  SCIRI's Growing Anxiety 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶4. (C) REO Staff talked to provincial politicians, community 
leaders, journalists, and staff at Camp Echo (just outside of 
Diwaniyah) in assessing the province's current security and 
political situation.   Most observers linked the heightened 
tension and levels of violence in the province to the growing 
influence of Muqtada al-Sadr's followers (Office of the Martyr 
Sadr) and its associated militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (aka Mahdi 
Militia) and various offshoots. 
 
¶5. (C) During 2004 and 2005, the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Party took advantage of voter support 
for candidates seen as following the marjaya'a (school of 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani) in Najaf.  Even though many SCIRI members 
are more attuned to the preachings of Iranian Ayatollah Khameni 
than to Sistani, the party campaigned hard in Qadisiyah rural 
communities, associating itself as a religious party affiliated 
with Sistani whenever possible.  Ultimately, SCIRI took 20 out 
of 41 Provincial Council seats with Sadrist landing just five 
seats. 
 
¶6. (C) REO contacts agree that if provincial elections are held 
within the next six months, that proportion will likely reverse 
itself.  The editor-in-chief of Diwaniyah's newspaper predicted 
an Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS) sweep in a recent talk with REO 
staff. 
 
Behind A Sadrist Victory at the Polls:  Social Services, 
Nationalism, and Intimidation 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Surging Sadrist strength in Qadisiyah Province rests on 
several factors.  An accelerating depopulation of rural 
communities is packing the disenfranchised into three poor and 
overwhelmingly Sadrist neighborhoods in Diwaniyah City.  Rural 
villages are losing residents due to acute potable water 
shortages, abandoned irrigation because of siltage and weed 
infestation, widespread grain and rice smuggling that displaces 
local agricultural production, and chronic fuel shortages that 
hinder transportation. 
 
 
HILLAH 00000102  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶8. (S) In the last six months, OMS has put considerable effort 
into providing social services and a "shadow government."  An 
Allawi-affiliated politician remarked that Mahdi Militia 
occupies mosques and other community buildings and the police 
remain silent.  A recent report suggested that Qadisiyah OMS 
received eighty million Dinars (approximately USD 500,000) in 
April to fund assistance to poor families.  A community activist 
commented that Sadrists are known for providing small loans to 
newlyweds and for paying for medical treatment.  Applicants are 
interviewed, screened, and if accepted, the local OMS office 
directly pays a local hospital to perform the procedure 
(generally disbursing between 100 and 200 USD). 
 
¶9. (C) Frequently, residents in Sadr neighborhoods who want 
something from local government turn instead to Sadrist clerics 
or OMS representatives who in turn send a militia delegation to 
meet with the appropriate Director General (DG) in the 
provincial government.  A Diwaniyah lawyer recently noted that 
perhaps in response, many of the DGs are growing out their 
beards in order to appear more religious.  Another contact 
offered up pictures of Sadrist-organized clean-up campaigns in 
Sadrist neighborhoods.  The newspaper editor concluded that the 
"shadow government" is, in fact, the real government for many in 
Diwaniyah. 
 
¶10. (C) Finally, at the grassroots level, Sadrists continue to 
identify themselves as Iraqi, not Iranian (regardless of 
whatever munitions and terrorist training Mahdi Militia and 
Muqtada al-Sadr accepts from Iran behind the scenes).  Iranians 
are not popular in Qadisiyah, and Muqtada al-Sadr's appeal as a 
homegrown nationalist has not diminished.  In the last two 
months, drivers have widely taken to affixing MAS stickers to 
car windows.  The Diwaniyah lawyer commented that teenagers have 
taken to wearing MM-style black clothing, partly out of respect, 
and partly because they believe they will be hassled less by the 
police if they look like Mahdi Militia.  In April, the two weeks 
of sporadic campus riots that paralysed Diwaniyah University 
would likely have ebbed away if not for the popularity of 
Sadrist campus leaders working behind the scenes. 
 
SCIRI Counter-Moves: Taking Over the Reins of Government 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11. (C) SCIRI has not stood still in countering growing OMS 
strength.  But their countermoves are primarily aimed at 
consolidating control over governmental functions.  SCIRI 
leaders are reportedly actively recruiting professionals, 
particularly physicians, to give themselves more of a 
technocratic sheen.  The head of the Diwaniyah Authors 
Association reported that members are being told that the 
Association's activities are anti-Islamic and participants would 
be better off attending SCIRI functions.  The SCIRI Provincial 
Council bloc has not hesitated to remove independent DGs; for 
example, the Education DG.  The newspaper editor argued that 
SCIRI intends to remove all secular DGs before the next 
elections. 
 
¶12. (C) SCIRI is putting considerable energy into strengthening 
control over provincial security forces.  In August 2005, after 
a protracted political struggle, Police Chief Abdul Wahabb was 
removed from his post by Minister of Interior Jabr and 
dispatched to Baghdad.  During his tenure, Wahabb, a former 
Brigadier General in the Iraqi Army, successfully suppressed 
overall violent acts in Qadisiyah.  Wahabb's replacement, Abd 
al-Abass, has impeccable Badr credentials - ex-POW in Iran and 
years of resistance activity against Saddam Hussein from across 
the border - but reportedly, no law enforcement or formal 
military experience.  Abbass is universally regarded as weak and 
ineffective.  COMMENT:  A similar campaign is underway in Babil 
Province as the Governor and Provincial Council SCIRI members 
seek to replace the independent and effective incumbent with a 
SCIRI party loyalist.  END COMMENT 
 
¶13. (C) With Abbass in place, the Qadisiyah Provincial Council 
is moving to place Badr Organization (militia) members and SCIRI 
party loyalists into IP units.  Following what is now common 
practice in South Central provinces, the Minister of Interior 
has reportedly agreed to allow the PC to allocate slots in a new 
1000 officer police battalion to be stood up in Qadisiyah.  Each 
Council member will nominate their share of 900 places, giving 
the bulk of the battalion to Badr and Mahdi Militia.  The 
remaining one hundred places are to be distributed among local 
tribal leaders (Sheikhs). 
 
¶14. (S) For SCIRI, however, the integration of Badr militia 
members into provincial IP units may have limited impact. JAM 
has its own placement campaign.  One source stated that the 
Jaysh al-Mahdi regularly pay $300 per head to have members 
registered on police payrolls. Irregular check points are 
sometimes manned by militia members wearing either official IP 
uniforms or military-style clothing. A May 30th raid found 
IED-making materials at the house of a MM-affiliated Diwaniyah 
 
HILLAH 00000102  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
police officer.  NOTE: Throughout South Central, fringe Sadrist 
units appear to operate independently of Muqtada al-Sadr's chain 
of command.  These groups, for example, the Fadilah unit (not 
associated with the political party of the same name) are 
outside of the scope of this cable.  END NOTE 
 
¶15. (S) JAM units in Qadisiyah regularly intimidate provincial 
police.  Two weeks ago, Mahdi Militia gunmen reportedly broke 
into the Diwaniyah police headquarters, put a gun to the head of 
a top commander, and demanded the release of MM members detained 
two days prior.  A MM-launched rocket attack against Camp Echo 
took place not far from a police checkpoint that offered no 
interference.  In the last two months, MM attacks against police 
stations in Diwaniyah have increased.  Often, militia members 
direct small arms fire against stations manned by police from 
outside the community.  On June 5, for example, police 
checkpoints in two heavily Sadr districts were targeted by SAF. 
 
¶16. (C) For the moment, Iraqi Army units in the province 
(elements of the Eighth Army Division) are not as politicized. 
The screening process for recruits has been much more 
transparent and open to all applicants.  General Uthman Mohammad 
Farhood is a well-regarded independent.  Under his leadership, 
the IA is upgrading its intelligence gathering and ability to 
conduct operations in the province. 
 
Executive Dis-function: Governor Hamza Moves Closer to Sadr 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) On June 1, Qadisiyah Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza and 
OMS co-sponsored a "security conference" in Diwaniyah.  The 
Governor's own party, SCIRI, stayed away.  Other parties, NGOs, 
and civic associations joined OMS and the Governor in analyzing 
the upward trend in provincial violence.  Sadr spokesman Sheikh 
Al-Hasnawi charged that assassinations were being conducted by 
"death squads supported by coalition forces."  He stated that 
the provincial council should be "independent" instead of 
controlled by the Americans. 
 
¶18. (C) The increasingly high profile of Sadr political and 
terrorist activity in the Province seems to have pushed Governor 
Hamza into a difficult and restrictive accommodation with local 
Sadrists.  At every opportunity, he pushes for a ban on CF 
activity in Diwaniyah, announces that CF patrols are not 
welcome, and accuses the CF of exacerbating provincial tension. 
His attempts to delineate CF "no go" zones in Diwaniyah coincide 
with an increasingly bold Mahdi Militia tendency to challenge 
downtown CF patrols near Sadrist neighborhoods or mosques. 
COMMENT: In private, he is generally friendly and cooperative. 
Unlike other South Central provinces, the Governor or Provincial 
Council has not periodically instituted boycotts on contacts 
with the USG. END COMMENT 
 
¶19. (C) At this point, neither Hamza nor the Provincial Council 
can run on their accomplishments.  The Provincial Council has 
refused to make public its list of Iraqi government-funded 
projects, adding to suspicions that it may be "double dipping." 
Reportedly, the province rarely pays an advance to contractors 
or makes timely progress payments, leading many potential 
bidders to seek work on US-financed projects or take on projects 
in other provinces or Baghdad.  Qadisiyah voters do not see 
material improvements to their lives and do not believe that the 
provincial government serves them well.  The Governor is on the 
defensive and his public statements show him increasingly 
willing to lean on Sadr backing. 
 
Run-Up to Elections: SCIRI/Sadr Co-Existence, Fadilah Pushing, 
Moderates at the Back 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶20. (C) SCIRI may be growing more nervous about increasingly 
public Sadr political and social services activity, but the two 
parties enjoy a relatively harmonious sharing of power in the 
province.  There are no indications that SCIRI is tempted to use 
its control of Iraqi security assets to move against Sadrist 
militia, either those controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr or splinter 
groups operating autonomously.  SCIRI and Sadr cooperate in 
Provincial Council decision-making. 
 
¶21. (C) SCIRI, OMS, Fadilah, and Da'wa parties are gearing up 
for elections.  SCIRI and Sadr are reportedly canvassing 
potential candidates for their slates.  The SCIRI slate will 
reportedly hold some non-SCIRI loyalist candidates, but the 
make-up of the Sadr slate is still closely-held within OMS. 
 
¶22. (C) Moderates have not yet begun to hustle, even though many 
contacts optimistically believe that the poor performance of the 
religious parties in delivering public services opens an 
opportunity for moderates and non-sectarian parties to gain 
seats in the next election.  But, as one contact quipped, "How 
are we going to run without our own militia?" 
 
 
HILLAH 00000102  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶23. (C) During the run-up to elections, SCIRI and Sadrists will 
likely keep to parallel tracks.  They will cooperate in the 
Provincial Council and with us to bring public services on-line. 
 Both Sadr and SCIRI will likely augment their private social 
services.  Here, SCIRI will have the edge due to superior 
funding.  For example, SCIRI so far has provided by far the bulk 
of private assistance to displaced families arriving in the 
province. 
 
Will Elections Spur Terrorist Activity? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶24. (S) The Fadilah Party is seen as the richest political 
organization in Diwaniyah. COMMENT: Presumably due to their 
control of southern Iraq oil black market trafficking. END 
COMMENT  Party operatives have the best offices, drive new SUVs, 
and are reported to be in the process of standing-up their own 
local militia battalion (NOTE: not connected to the Sadrist 
"Fadilah" movement).  If OMS and SCIRI find themselves ramping 
up spending in response, this could indirectly become a driver 
for Iranian-financed attacks against Coalition Forces in the 
province.  Violent activity may also be spurred as Mahdi Militia 
finds competition for recruits from the Al-Sarkhi/Al-Hassani 
militia, a even more violent Shi'a splinter group. On June 12, 
unarmed members of the Al-Sarkhi group marched on the provincial 
government building in a rare public appearance. 
 
¶25. (S) Sadrists continue to target local residents who 
cooperate with Coalition Forces.  In the last few weeks, the 
Mahdi Militia has reportedly issued a four hundred name "Black 
List" of individuals working at Camp Echo or previously 
associated with the Coalition Forces.  Badr terrorist cells may 
undertake their own attacks, attributing them to Sadr when 
possible.  The return to Diwaniyah of Sheikh Ramsey, a local 
Sadr leader arrested last year and recently released from 
prison, is significant. He has already been seen in public and 
will likely energize Mahdi Militia activity. 
 
¶26. (S) Badr militia terrorist acts are harder to identify. 
While several recent assassinations in neighboring Wasit and 
Najaf provinces seem too sophisticated for Mahdi Militia (the 
use of silencers, for example), very little happening in 
Qadisiyah has an obvious Badr signature.  It may well be that 
Badr terrorist cells deliberately pass off their attacks as 
Sadrist by adopting Sadr-style tactics.  So far, despite 
occasional rumors, neither group seems to be targeting Sunnis 
outside of ex-Baathists. 
 
¶27. (S) In Qadisiyah, Sadrist attacks against Coalition Forces 
began to increase in April and peaked in mid-May at three times 
average levels.  An Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) attack 
on April 12 killed two CF personnel west of Diwaniyah in the 
first lethal attack in many months and a rare EFP attack south 
of Diwaniyah on Route Tampa killed one US soldier on June 9. 
Indirect fire (mortar and rocket) against Camp Echo is now 
occurring on a weekly basis.  Much of the increase is probably 
attributable to new-found Mahdi militia aggressiveness and 
determination to seize the initiative in and around Diwaniyah. 
 
Always Look to the Dark Side 
---------------------------- 
 
¶28. (C) On June 3, OMS held a graduation ceremony for local 
Sadrists completing training in the sciences, theology, and 
Islamic thought.  In public comments, Sheikh Haider Hussein 
Al-Ghara'wi stated, "This is a message to the dark forces that 
the Mahdi Army is not just an armed force, but soldiers working 
for justice and fairness."  On June 6, Mahdi Militia members 
reportedly took over a downtown Diwaniyah gas station, 
straightened out the lines of waiting cars, and kept 
distributing gas past the curfew. 
 
¶29. (S) Regardless of their civic public face, OMS and SCIRI 
continue to resort to intimidation and selective targeting of 
anyone offering resistance to their religious and political 
agendas.  While Sadr and SCIRI sharia courts are not as evident 
as in 2004 and 2005, Diwaniyah couples walking together are 
still dragged into mosques for "trials."  SCIRI is less menacing 
to the professional and moderate class in Qadisiyah than the 
lower class swaggering of Mahdi Militia, but some REO contacts 
are debating whether they can safely decline a SCIRI invitation 
to run on their ticket if asked.  Others speculate that SCIRI 
will seek to either suborn candidates or place their own 
loyalists on any slate proposed by a non-religious party.  Some 
reports suggest that Badr terrorist activities are not as 
evident because the Badr Organization simply asks local police 
to arrest targets on trumped-up charges.  Given the infiltration 
of Qadisiyah police by both Badr and Mahdi, even the strongest 
central government will find it difficult to ensure that other 
parties will find their voice in the campaigning to come. 
MEURS