VZCZCXRO4668
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0100/01 1620950
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 110950Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0649
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0635
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0700

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 HILLAH 000100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MADHI MILITIA ACTIVITY ON THE RISE IN BABIL PROVINCE 
 
REF: A) HILLAH 80, B) HILLAH 85, AND C) HILLAH 93 
 
HILLAH 00000100  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, DRC, REO Al Hillah, Department of 
State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is a Babil PRT cable. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2. (S) Throughout the second half of May and into early June, 
the Madhi Militia (MM and also commonly referred to as Jaysh al 
Mahdi or JAM) has increased its presence in Al-Hillah and Babil, 
engaging in overt attacks directed against Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF), civilians and Coalition Forces (CF).  In addition to 
kinetic attacks and placement of Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED), MM units appear more willing to engage in public 
intimidation, even in normally quiet Babil.  For example, the 
recent attacks against Al-Fayhaa newspaper and an America's 
Democracy Foundation (ADF, a USAID contractor organization) 
sponsored event appear to be coordinated and indicative of an 
upward spike in activity.  Moreover, the Regional Embassy Office 
(REO) continues to receive reports that the MM is fueling 
sectarian divides between Sunni and Shi'a tribes in the northern 
part of Babil Province.  Despite attempts by the Babil police 
forces to curb the rise of militia violence, local contacts 
report that the MM is augmenting its numbers and expanding its 
influence.  The reason for the rise in activities is clear, as 
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 
tightens its grip around provincial governing bodies, the MM and 
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS), seeks to prevent their own 
political marginalization.  The drawing-down of CF in the 
southern Babil may encourage the proliferation of MM activities. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
BACKGROUND: MADHI MILITIA ORGANIZATION IN BABIL 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C) The MM is an armed group, directed by Moqtada Al-Sadr, a 
radical anti-American Sh'ia Islamist spiritual leader from 
Najaf.  REO and PRT contacts describe most of the militia's 
members as young, poor, uneducated Shi'a males drawn to the 
organization for nationalistic and religious reasons.  The MM is 
present in almost all large towns in Babil.  Unlike SCIRI/Badr 
(septel) the MM does not have significant control of 
governmental institutions in Babil Province, nor sizeable 
influence over the provincial security forces. 
 
¶4. (S) PRT contacts have offered a general picture of MM 
structure and operations in Babil over the course of several 
recent meetings.  Different contacts have echoed a similar 
theme, arguing that MM represents a growing threat to the 
province as it expands organizational and technological 
abilities to conduct operations against ISF and the civilian 
population.  MM representatives have stated publicly that the 
organization is purely political and that members are no longer 
armed, contrary to U.S. military reports.  While this is 
definitely not the case, local contacts and CF, however, stress 
that the MM's organizational capabilities in Babil are less 
developed than those of the MM in Baghdad or other regions in 
South-Central. 
 
¶5. (S) REO and PRT contacts maintain that the MM in Babil is 
structured along the lines of a typical military organizational 
hierarchy, composed of platoon to battalion-sized units. 
According to Babil Police Chief General Qais Hamza Aboud 
Al-Momouri, a MM battalion normally consists of 800 individuals 
(COMMENT: It is likely that this number is exaggerated.  U.S. 
military reports indicate that a MM battalion is composed of a 
maximum of 150 individuals and that it is difficult for the 
leadership to deploy even a small fraction of this total number 
for operations.  END COMMENT).  Qais also detailed that the MM 
is presently manufacturing and deploying increasingly advanced 
technology such as Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) for use 
against ISF.  The U.S. military in northern Babil has reported 
the existence of MM special operations groups, including one 
unit known as "Sariah Al-Muqtar Al-Thakafi" (SMT).  SMT's 
primary task is to assassinate Sunnis in northern Babil in order 
to fuel sectarian conflicts.  Its secondary mission, is to 
attack U.S. military and Coalition targets, making it the only 
MM contingent authorized to conduct operations against CF in 
Babil. 
 
¶6. (S) While Moqtada Al-Sadr, according to the Babil Police 
Chief General Qais and the U.S. military, controls the overall 
operations of the MM in South-Central Iraq from Najaf, regional 
commanders responsible for individual provinces have assumed the 
 
HILLAH 00000100  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
authority to undertake independent actions.  According to one 
U.S. military report, the last time Al-Sadr issued a direct 
operational order to regional commanders was at the end of 
February 2006, when terrorists bombed two Shi'a mosques in 
Samarra.  Most MM attacks, according to Qais, are not linked to 
an overall MM strategy in South-Central, but tend to be directed 
against tactical targets of opportunity.  (COMMENT: The U.S. 
Army's Second Brigade Combat Team reports that MM has conducted 
retaliatory EFP strikes against CF in response to U.S. military 
operations.  END COMMENT).  Qais added that MM senior leadership 
has received extensive Iranian support, although the rank and 
file tend to be young, poor and unaware of the outside 
influence. 
 
¶7. (S) In Babil Province, according to U.S. military reports, 
the MM operates one main office located in Al-Hillah, and has 
branch offices in most major cities.  The MM has divided each 
branch office into four units, known as the political, 
educational, media, and social committees.  According to the 
U.S. military, the political committee is responsible for 
reporting information to the main office.  The social committee 
partakes in cleaning streets, directing traffic, selling 
propane, establishing guard schedules and announcing blood 
drives.  The media committee selects speakers and teachers for 
Friday prayers and monitors religious celebrations, while the 
education committee is responsible for religious instruction. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) According to sources on the Babil Provincial Council 
(PC), Al-Sadr had recently asked Sheikh Ibrahim Hamdi to assume 
the position of commander of all MM forces in Babil.  Hamdi 
declined the offer, stating that he had no desire to be 
responsible for bloodshed in Babil and Al-Hillah.  Turning to a 
second choice, the source contends, Sadr requested that Sheikh 
Muhannad from southern Babil to head the MM in the province. 
Muhannad, known for attacks against ISF according to the source, 
was reportedly selected by Sadr to specifically increase MM 
kinetic activities in the province.  Regardless of the current 
leadership, MM attacks in Babil are currently on the rise.  Six 
months ago it was almost unheard of that the MM would use 
intimidation tactics to publicly enforce their Shi'a Islamist 
vision in Babil, whereas today such activities are growing ever 
more commonplace. 
 
----------------------------- 
ATTACK ON AL-FAYHAA NEWSPAPER 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) On May 14, MM threatened Al-Fayhaa newspaper, a local 
independent publication in Al-Hillah, for reportedly publishing 
anti-Sadr articles.  Later the same day the MM assaulted the 
homes of two of the paper's editors with grenades.  Babil police 
confirmed that the MM targeted the newspaper because it was 
considering publication of a story detailing a supposed pact 
between the MM, Badr Corps and Da'wa Party to divide up Babil 
into distinct parts.  During a separate interview, Saad M. Anad 
(strictly protect), an Iraqi businessman and contact of REO 
staff, confirmed that Al-Fayhaa considered publishing this exact 
story.  Additionally, the newspaper previously reported that the 
MM severely beat and hospitalized a cell-phone shop owner for 
selling pornographic material. 
 
¶10. (S) After the May 14 attack on the two editors, Al-Fayhaa 
retracted the story about the MM attack upon the cell-phone shop 
owner and decline to publish the article about the alleged Shi'a 
Islamist pact to divide up Babil.  A May 17 article declared, "A 
peaceful solution has taken place and everybody is satisfied. 
Our newspaper would like to apologize for publishing false news. 
 That occurred because our sources were not accurate and had 
personal agendas."  After the retraction, Al-Fayhaa has started 
publishing pro-MM articles, including ubiquitously printing 
Al-Sadr's picture on almost every page. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MADHI CLOSURE OF A USAID SPONSORED EVENT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) On May 30, approximately sixteen armed MM members raided 
an America's Democracy Foundation (ADF) sponsored outdoor public 
event for students in downtown Al-Hillah, and subsequently 
closed the affair.  According to eyewitness accounts, the MM 
members entered the venue at approximately 10:30am and shut it 
down because it violated Al-Sadr's fatwa against playing 
non-religious music in public.  Witnesses also reported that the 
twenty-five Al-Hillah police who were responsible for guarding 
the location stood-down and allowed the MM entry onto the site. 
The witnesses, however, softened their statements by adding that 
the IPs refused to resist because of the high probability of 
inadvertently inflicting civilian casualties. 
 
¶12. (S) In a recent meeting, Colonel Mohammed Husseni Al-Jubori 
Abass, the Babil Police Chief's deputy, confirmed the eyewitness 
 
HILLAH 00000100  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
accounts.  Abass also added that the Babil Police Chief General 
Qais fired the commander of the unit responsible for security at 
the site, and had secured arrest warrants from the Al-Hillah 
judiciary for the MM members involved.  Colonel Abass claimed 
that at the time of the incident he and General Qais were 
meeting with U.S. military commanders and therefore were unable 
to direct the IPs to protect the event. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
THE MADHI MILITIA AND THE BABIL POLICE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (S) During a June 2 meeting, REO and PRT staff asked 
Al-Hillah Mayor Imad Lefta about his impression of the MM raid 
on the ADF celebration.  The Mayor stated that it was a scandal 
that the IPs under Qais failed to protect innocent Iraqi 
civilians.  He added that the IP failure was hardly surprising 
as most police in Al-Hillah are a "bunch of mercenaries who are 
terrified of the Sadrists."  Lefta specifically warned REO and 
PRT staff that while General Qais and the ISF of Babil fully 
desire to eliminate the MM threat, they possess neither the 
resources nor the manpower to accomplish this task.  The Mayor, 
also concerned with what he termed as the growing influence of 
the Badr Corps in the province (septel), stated that the good 
people of Al-Hillah are now living between two militias.  He 
stressed two points concerning this issue: One, that the recent 
wave of MM violence is intended to increase visibility of the 
organization in anticipation of upcoming provincial and local 
elections and two, the brewing tension between the MM and Badr 
Corps is artificially fuelled by the Iranians in order to weaken 
Iraq. 
 
¶14. (S/NF) Politically, some Sadrist members of the Babil 
Provincial Council have supported the besieged Babil Police 
Chief (reftel A, B and C) and have told REO and PRT contacts 
that the secular Shi'a General is the only individual with the 
capabilities to stabilize the Province and counter the SCIRI 
dominated PC.  Other reports indicate that MM-Babil police 
cooperation runs on a much deeper level.  A few U.S. military 
reports suggest that the militia provides the Babil Police, and 
specifically Al-Hillah SWAT with human intelligence, primarily 
directed at Sunnis concentrated in the northern part of the 
province.  One report even states that an unidentified Al-Hillah 
SWAT member attends MM meetings in Iskandariyah so that the two 
groups can coordinate actions. 
 
------------------------------------ 
CREATING SECTARIAN AND TRIBAL STRIFE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶15. (S) Documents captured by U.S. military units in northern 
Babil indicate that the MM plans to carry out covert attacks on 
Sunni population centers designed to sustain fighting between 
the Sunnis and CF.  One such MM document detailed information on 
how individual commanders could instigate tribal conflicts to 
fuel the already tense security situation.  During a May 27 
security briefing at the REO, Iraqi Second Brigade Commander 
Colonel Hatim Al-Husseiny detailed recent fighting between the 
Al-Gharran (Shi'a) and Al-Ubaid (Sunni) tribes on the 
Babil-Wasit provincial border.  According to Hatim, the Iraqi 
Army (IA), with the assistance of Babil IPs, had successfully 
intervened and ended the conflict. 
 
¶16. (S) Hatim further stated that during the operation, the IA 
killed twenty-one MM.  When REO staff asked how the IA killed MM 
during operations to end a tribal dispute, Hatim replied, "these 
conflicts occured since the fall of the old regime and the 
militias do get involved."  General Qais, more bluntly, related 
to REO and PRT staff that Iran supports all militias in order to 
"bleed Iraq dry" and that Iranian intelligence encourages MM 
leadership to instigate tribal conflicts.  Other reports 
indicate that Shi'a tribes contract JAM/MM for protection 
services against Sunni tribes. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶17. (S) By all accounts, MM activity is on the rise in Babil and 
designed to impose their own religious interpretations upon the 
province while at the same diminish SCIRI/Badr power.  The 
recent wave of attacks suggests a few key points.  First, the 
militia is becoming ever more organized and better able to carry 
out actions, even if such attacks are only against targets of 
opportunity.  Second, the Babil security forces are not able to 
neutralize or isolate this threat alone.  Finally, MM strategy 
in the province is relatively simple.  Local commanders engage 
targets to demonstrate their strength, whether it be against 
public events, independent media outlets or kinetic action 
against the provincial security forces.  This does not mean the 
MM intends to solve their political difficulties with SCIRI (or 
 
HILLAH 00000100  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
any other group) through force of arms.  Instead, these actions 
are meant to enforce a continued and overt presence that will 
have direct political benefits in the upcoming local and 
provincial elections. 
 
¶18. (U) This cable was cleared by the U.S. Army's Second Brigade 
Combat Team. 
MEURS