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RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2025

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DILI 000316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO, S/WCI 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/20/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV MOPS KPKO KCRM TT AS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GUSMAO SAYS HE WILL DISMISS PRIME MINISTER THIS 
WEEK 
 
REF: (A) DILI 239; (B) DILI 275; (C) DILI 287; (D) DILI 294; (E) DILI 303 
 
DILI 00000316  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
(1) (S/NF) Summary:  President Xanana Gusmao told Ambassador 
Rees this afternoon that he will request Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri's resignation tomorrow morning (June 20).  Gusmao will 
present Alkatiri with what he says is detailed evidence of 
Alkatiri's involvement in serious crimes including murder.  See 
Reftels C-E.  If, as the President expects, Alkatiri refuses to 
resign, he will call a Council of State meeting, probably on 
Wednesday (June 21).  He will then exercise his constitutional 
power to dismiss the Prime Minister.  President Gusmao will ask 
the ruling Fretilin party to recommend a new Prime Minister, but 
only after electing new party leadership at a party Congress 
that complies with the legal requirement that election of party 
leaders be by secret ballot.  President Gusmao says he has 
spoken with key Fretilin leaders who believe that once Alkatiri 
is dismissed as Prime Minister, Fretilin would comply with the 
President's request to hold a new Congress and would recommend 
an acceptable candidate for caretaker Prime Minister, probably 
Foreign/Defense Minister Jose Ramos-Horta.  The President would 
then call new parliamentary elections for October and request 
that the United Nations administer the elections.  President 
Gusmao says he will discuss this plan tomorrow morning with 
Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, the commander of East Timor's 
armed forces (FDTL), who he believes will endorse it, and that 
he has already discussed it several times with senior Australian 
Defense Force (ADF) officials, who did not object to it.  Gusmao 
said he also discussed his plan this weekend with Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is enthusiastic about it 
and will help explain it to other Asean leaders.  Despite the 
President's apparently firm decision to go forward immediately, 
and although his plan is fully consistent with East Timor's 
constitution, Embassy Dili believes he still might decide once 
again to delay its implementation.  This could depend on the 
reaction from Prime Minister Alkatiri and/or on the President's 
planned meetings tomorrow morning with General Matan Ruak, with 
the commander of the ADF-led Joint Task Force (JTF) in East 
Timor, and with the Australian Embassy.  On balance, however, 
the President's proposed course of action is a positive step --- 
and probably an essential one --- toward extricating East Timor 
from the pervasive distrust and fear that is at the heart of the 
ongoing political and security crisis. End Summary. 
 
(2) (S) Ambassador met this afternoon with President Gusmao to 
discuss reports that the President would act soon to dismiss 
Prime Minister Alkatiri.  The President had previously told 
Ambassador that he believes he has a moral and legal obligation 
to dismiss Alkatiri in accordance with article 112 of the 
Constitution, which provides inter alia that the President may 
dismiss the Prime Minister "when necessary to ensure the normal 
functioning of the democratic institutions."  Gusmao had 
indicated that he planned to invoke this power because the 
Government of East Timor (GOET) has been unable to perform many 
of its functions for almost two months, because the overwhelming 
majority of Timorese people believe Alkatiri's resignation or 
dismissal is an essential element in any plan to restore peace 
and stability, and because the strong evidence that Alkatiri 
armed and paid a group of ex-guerrillas to kill his opponents 
has made it impossible for Alkatiri to regain the trust of the 
people or of the President himself.  See Reftels C-E.  However, 
in previous conversations President Gusmao has said he wanted to 
wait until the international forces (JTF) had restored order and 
disarmed civilian armed groups.  There were also suggestions 
that the President might be waiting for an even broader 
consensus --- perhaps including FDTL leaders and/or Fretilin 
leaders --- before taking action.  As recently as last Wednesday 
the President's Chief of Staff, Agio Pereira, told Ambassador 
that "the President thinks it is important for the future of the 
country that everyone know Alkatiri fell on his own, rather than 
being pushed."  In today's meeting, however, the President said 
he had decided it was time to act. 
 
(3) (S) The President said that tomorrow morning he will send 
Alkatiri a videotape or DVD of tonight's program on the 
 
DILI 00000316  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
Australian television news program "Four Corners."  Gusmao said 
the program will reveal detailed information linking Alkatiri to 
a group of ex-guerrilla fighters that has claimed Alkatiri and 
former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato gave them money, 
automatic weapons, and other equipment and directed them to kill 
certain Alkatiri opponents including opposition politicians and 
some or all of the ex-FDTL "petitioners."  (Note:  The program 
did air tonight.  It contained more damning evidence against 
Lobato, who was the principal point of contact, than against 
Alkatiri, but it also supported the group's claim to have been 
in direct contact with Alkatiri.  For instance, the program 
showed a message from Alkatiri's cell phone asking "Where are 
you?"  sent in early June, a few days after the group reported 
they had cut off contact with Lobato.)  The President will also 
tell Alkatiri, either by letter or by phone, that although he 
does not wish to prejudge Alkatiri's guilt or innocence pending 
the outcome of judicial proceedings, there is enough evidence 
that "I can no longer have confidence in you."  He will 
therefore ask that Alkatiri immediately resign as Prime Minister. 
 
(4) (S)  If, as the President expects, Alkatiri refuses to 
resign, the President will call a Council of State meeting, 
probably for Wednesday (June 21).  Article 112 of the East 
Timorese Constitution requires the President to consult with the 
Council of State before exercising his authority to dismiss the 
Prime Minister.  See paragraph 13.  Although the President 
believes the members of the Council will be about evenly divided 
--- with Alkatiri himself and four or five close associates on 
one side and a coalition of Presidential allies, opposition 
representatives, and disaffected Fretilin members on the other 
--- he pointed out that the Constitution requires only that the 
President consult with the Council, not that a vote be taken or 
that the President follow the Council's advice. 
 
(5) (S)  After the Council meeting, probably on Wednesday 
afternoon or evening, the President will announce the dismissal 
of the Prime Minister in a televised address to the nation.  He 
will present in detail the evidence of Alkatiri's alleged crimes 
--- including not only the provision of arms and a "hit list" to 
the group featured on the Four Corners program, but also similar 
acts involving other armed groups whose members the President 
says have given him sworn statements and other evidence --- and 
will also set forth the constitutional justification for his 
dismissal of the Prime Minister.  See paragraph 13. 
 
(6) (S) The President said that in his public address to the 
nation he will reach out to members and leaders of the Fretilin 
Party, as he said he has already done privately.  He told 
Ambassador he believes Fretilin still has an important role to 
play in East Timor, "except for those guys who committed these 
crimes."  Contrary to some early reports on the President's 
probable course of action, he will not dissolve Parliament, 
which has a large (55 out of 88) Fretilin majority.  Rather, he 
will ask Fretilin to propose a new Prime Minister to replace 
Alkatiri as the head of an interim government until it is 
possible to organize national elections. First, however, he will 
request that Fretilin hold an "extraordinary Congress," 
preferably next week.  The purpose of this Congress will be to 
elect new leaders under procedures consistent with the Law on 
Political Parties, Law 3 of 2004, section 18(c), which requires 
that leaders of political parties be elected by secret ballot. 
The Fretilin Congress held in May, which resoundingly elected 
Alkatiri as Secretary-General of the party, did so only after 
the congress adopted a controversial rule requiring a show of 
hands for election of party officials.  Many observers believed 
that if the congress had followed the rules requiring a secret 
ballot, Alkatiri would have been defeated.  See Ref A. 
President Gusmao maintains that the election of Alkatiri and 
other party offices was therefore illegitimate.  He said he has 
discussed this with key Fretilin leaders and he believes that if 
Alkatiri were no longer Prime Minister the party would comply 
with the President's request to hold a new party congress, elect 
new leaders, and present an acceptable candidate for Prime 
 
DILI 00000316  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
Minister.  (The President added that "the Fretilin people have 
no doubt that Alkatiri is guilty.  Unlike us --- at first we 
could not believe he would do this.  But they knew it all 
along.") 
 
(7) (S) President Gusmao said he believed Foreign/Defense 
Minister Jose Ramos-Horta would emerge as the reconstituted 
Fretilin Party's choice for Prime Minister.  He said he believes 
Ramos-Horta is an inspirational leader but not a good manager, 
so he will quietly suggest that a Deputy Prime Minister be 
appointed, perhaps highly-regarded Minister of Health Rui de 
Araujo.  Asked whether he had considered simply asking the 
extremely popular Ramos-Horta to attempt to form a government 
--- a procedure that would require him either to get the support 
of Fretilin's parliamentary majority or to form a new 
parliamentary majority consisting of some Fretilin deputies (at 
least 12) and some deputies from opposition parties --- the 
President said  "I cannot," because he does not want to be seen 
as imposing a candidate on Fretilin or on Parliament. 
 
(8) (S) When asked what he would do if Fretilin refused to hold 
a new Congress, and/or simply presented Alkatiri or some close 
Alkatiri ally as the party's candidate for Prime Minister, the 
President said he would not accept such a candidate.  He pointed 
out that Article 106 of the Constitution empowers the majority 
party or majority coalition in parliament to nominate a Prime 
Minister, but gives the President the power to appoint.  Indeed, 
the article makes it clear that the President's appointment 
power is more than just a ministerial duty to appoint whomever 
the majority party prefers: it explicitly requires that he 
"consult with the political parties sitting in the National 
Parliament" before making an appointment, presumably in order to 
consider arguments that the majority party nominee is 
inappropriate and should not be appointed.  So until the 
majority party or coalition comes up with a candidate acceptable 
to the President there will be no Prime Minister.  The President 
said that he believed this prospect would cause Fretilin --- or 
at least what he believes to be the pragmatic majority on the 
party's "permanent political committee" --- to come up quickly 
with an acceptable candidate.  In the meantime, the President 
himself would continue to direct defense and security affairs 
(which, under the declaration previously approved by the Council 
of State, see Ref B, includes not only the military and the 
police but also other essential government functions such as 
electricity and humanitarian aid to internally displaced 
persons) working with members of the Alkatiri's current cabinet. 
 
(9) (S) The President said he will also request that Parliament 
pass an electoral law by the end of July.  He will work with 
Parliament to ensure that the law meets international standards 
for a free and fair election, and he will then call a 
parliamentary election for this October, rather than for early 
next year as Prime Minister Alkatiri had planned.  (Note: 
Article  86 of the Constitution give the President the power to 
"set dates for presidential and legislative elections in 
accordance with the Law.")  He will ask the United Nations to 
organize and administer the elections, not only so that they 
would be recognized as free and fair but also because the 
Timorese government lacks the technical capacity to hold a 
national election within the 90-day time frame he has in mind. 
 
(10) (S) Asked what would happen if Alkatiri refused to step 
down after the President dismissed him --- presumably claiming 
that the President's dismissal was a "coup d'etat" and calling 
upon FDTL to "defend the constitution and democracy" --- Gusmao 
said virtually nobody would support Alkatiri.  In particular, he 
said he had had several recent conversations with General Matan 
Ruak, who now feels betrayed and set up by Alkatiri.  He said 
Matan Ruak now understands that "Alkatiri ordered the [May 23] 
attack on Tasitolu [the FDTL headquarters] and let Matan Ruak 
think it was the police".  (The President also said this and 
other armed exercises ordered by Alkatiri during the week after 
the Fretilin Congress may have been partly an attempt to 
 
DILI 00000316  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
dissipate the public attention that was beginning to focus on 
the illegal procedures employed at the Congress.)  Gusmao will 
meet again with Matan Ruak tomorrow morning, give him a copy of 
the Four Corners program, and explain his plan for the dismissal 
of the Prime Minister and reconstitution of the Government.  He 
is confident Matan Ruak will support the plan. 
 
(11) (S/NF) The President said he had discussed briefly with ADF 
Brigadier General Mick Slater, the JTF commander, the possiblity 
of dismissing Alkatiri, and that he had had several recent 
meetings with other senior ADF officers to lay out his plan in 
detail.  These officers had raised no objections to the plan and 
seemed to understand and accept it.  Tomorrow morning the 
President will meet with General Slater to present the detailed 
plan including the timetable.  (Comment:  Although ADF sources 
have suggested at various times to Emboffs that replacing 
Alkatiri might be a step toward restoring stability in East 
Timor, Australia's Foreign Ministry may take a different view. 
A diplomatic source told Emboffs today that the Australian 
Foreign Ministry has asked its Charge d'Affaires in Dili to seek 
a meeting with the President for tomorrow, but has not yet told 
the Charge the content of what he is to say to the President. 
Embassy has also received a credible report (please strictly 
protect) that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
called the Australian Broadcasting Company and made an 
unsuccessful "demand to see the evidence" that would be 
presented on "Four Corners" program about Alkatiri and the armed 
group.  End Comment.) 
 
(12) (S/NF) President Gusmao said he had discussed the situation 
in detail during his June 17 meeting in Bali with Indonesian 
President Yudhoyono.  He said Yudhoyono was happy with his plan 
and had promised to explain it to the leaders of other Asean 
nations, noting that it would be necessary to use a slightly 
different explanation for each Asean government. 
 
(13) (SBU) Comment:  The President's proposed course of action 
appears to comply fully with East Timor's constitution.  Article 
112 of the Constitution ("Dismissal of the Government") sets 
forth seven types of situations in which the Prime Minister 
and/or his Government may be dismissed.  The first six cases are 
set forth in section 1 of Article 112 and are mandatory:  they 
"require" or "bring about" (implicam) the dismissal of the 
Government.  They include such cases as the beginning of a new 
legislative term; the resignation, death, or permanent 
disability of the Prime Minister; and a vote of no confidence by 
Parliament.  The second section is permissive:  it provides that 
the President "may" (pode) dismiss the Prime Minister only in 
certain specified situations: "in the cases set forth in the 
previous section [vote of no confidence, beginning of a new 
session, etc.] and when it is shown to be necessary to assure 
the regular functioning of the democratic institutions, after 
consultation with (ouvido, "having heard") the Council of 
State."  To the extent Prime Minister Alkatiri's "coup d'etat" 
talk has any substance, it might rest on a claim that the 
"functioning of the democratic institutions" language of section 
2 of article 112 merely places an additional limitation on the 
President's power, rather than setting forth an additional 
situation in which he may dismiss the Prime Minister.  But this 
interpretation would lead to absurd consequences.  The 
situations set forth in section 1 --- vote of no confidence, 
beginning of a new legislative term, etc. --- appear sufficient 
in and of themselves to justify the dismissal of a government, 
and have been so regarded in other countries with parliamentary 
systems.  Imposing an additional requirement that there be a 
political or constitutional crisis in order for a government to 
be dismissed in these situations would make no sense.  The most 
straightforward reading of the "functioning of the democratic 
insitutions" language is that it adds a seventh situation in 
which the President may dismiss the Prime Minister:  the six 
mandatory situations set forth in section one "and" when 
dismissal is necessary to preserve the functioning of the 
institutions of government.  Other steps the President proposes 
 
DILI 00000316  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
to take --- appointing a new Prime Minister only when an 
acceptable candidate is nominated by the majority party or 
coalition and only after consultation with the other parties in 
Parliament, and then setting a date for national elections --- 
are explicitly authorized by the Constitution.  See paragraphs 8 
and 9.  The Constitution does not explicitly provide for interim 
governance after the dismissal of a Prime Minister and pending 
the appointment of a new one, but the President's assumption of 
power over security and defense, in accordance with a 
"declaration of crisis" approved by the Council of State and 
agreed to by Prime Minister Alkatiri in accordance with 
provisions of law governing such declarations (see Ref B) 
appears to provide sufficient legal authority in the present 
situation. 
 
(14) (S/NF) Comment continued:  Notwithstanding the President's 
apparent determination to proceed quickly, it is quite possible 
that he could be persuaded that further delay is necessary or 
desirable.  If, for instance, Prime Minister Alkatiri were to 
promise to consider carefully the President's request to resign, 
but to ask for a few days in which to consider it, it is not out 
of the question that the President would agree.  If General 
Matan Ruak were to object to the President's plan --- and if the 
President were to conclude that Matan Ruak and/or any 
significant faction of FDTL might use force to defend the Prime 
Minister's right to remain in office, the President would 
probably decide to take more time in an effort to persuade the 
dissenters, rather than to rely on the international forces to 
put down a pro-Alkatiri "autogolpe".  Even more important, if 
either General Slater of the JTF or the Government of Australia 
through its Charge d'Affaires were to make a last-minute appeal 
for further delay --- perhaps citing the risk of destabilzing 
violence by small but heavily armed pro-Alkatiri elements --- 
the President would presumably comply with the request. 
 
(15) (S) Comment continued:  On balance, Embassy Dili believes 
the President's proposed course of action is far more likely to 
bring peace, stability, and even unity to East Timor than the 
alternative, which is to hope that the spectacularly unpopular 
and probably criminal incumbent administration can somehow 
recover its capacity to govern and that it will then hold free 
and fair elections in 2007.  Although the tens of thousands of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have been sleeping in 
churchyards for the last two months cite a variety of fears in 
explaining why they will not return to their homes, when asked 
what it would take to address these fears they invariably reply, 
"The government must change," or "Xanana must act," or simply 
"Down with Alkatiri."  Although it is difficult to gainsay the 
risk of further violence by some of the very armed groups that 
Alkatiri is now in trouble for arming in the first place, this 
seems an odd argument for leaving him in office.  Moreover, it 
seems wrong to assume that these groups will be less dangerous 
if they have a sitting Prime Minister on their side than if they 
do not.  Although little is known about these groups --- only 
three are known to exist, each consisting of 20 to 30 men, and 
two of these three groups have now switched sides and agreed to 
turn in their arms --- the original purposes of arming them were 
said to be to intimidate voters in the 2007 elections, to 
"eliminate" government critics, and perhaps to retain power by 
force in the event Fretilin were to lose.  Even if there are 
other such groups, a good argument can be made that they would 
be less dangerous on the outside than on the inside. 
 
(16) (C)  Commebnt continued:  Even more important, the 
President's plan is not just to dismiss a bad and unpopular 
government but to bring about a good and popular one.  Assuming 
Gusmao is right that Fretilin could be persuaded to choose 
Ramos-Horta as the caretaker Prime Minister, the Timorese people 
would for the first time in their history have a government 
controlled by someone of whom they strongly approve. A 
government led by Ramos-Horta, supported by President Gusmao 
himself, including moderate elements from the current government 
such as Minister Araujo, and working closely with the Catholic 
 
DILI 00000316  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
Church and other institutions of civil society to heal the 
wounds that have emerged during the last few months would not be 
the whole formula for putting East Timor back on the right 
track, but it would be a great start.  End comment. 
REES