VZCZCXRO1979
OO RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0313/01 1671927
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 161927Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2693
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0534
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0607
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0525
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0369
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0386
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0464
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0258
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2018

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DILI 000313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
PACOM FOR POLAD 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
USUN FOR GORDON OLSON AND RICHARD MCCURRY 
DEPT FOR IO, EAP/MTS, AND ISN/TRECN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/17/2016 
TAGS: KPKO PREL PGOV PHUM AU PO MY TT
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DILI VIEWS ON POST-UNOTIL MISSION 
 
REF: A) 05 DILI 168 B) 05 DILI 82 C) DILI 293 
 
DILI 00000313  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Curtis Ried, Political Officer, US Embassy Dili, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: This message discusses possible components of a 
follow-on United Nations mission in East Timor after the 
expiration of the anticipated two-month extension of the United 
Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL).  Whether or not the 
mission is conducted under Chapter VII authority and whether or 
not includes UN peacekeepers, among its most important tasks 
will to provide effective operational policing, as well as 
police training that integrates practical skills with human 
rights protection and appropriate levels of force.  The timely 
establishment of a robust police force will provide the security 
necessary for the UN to organize and administer national 
elections in co-operation with the appropriate Timorese 
institutions.  The mission should also include country-wide 
human rights monitoring; assistance to the judicial system that 
is different from and better than the assistance provided during 
UNOTIL; and thoughtful policy and technical guidance to help the 
GOET accomplish goals such as disarming the civilian population 
and restructuring the military. End Summary. 
 
Peacekeepers/Chapter VII 
--------------------------- 
 
      ¶2.  (U) Whether the next United Nations mission in East 
Timor should include "blue helmets" rather than simply extending 
a UN blessing to the coalition forces presently on the ground, 
and the related question whether the mission should be under 
Chapter VII authority, are matters on which the United States 
will be consulting closely with Australia and other countries 
whose forces are involved in the coalition presently on the 
ground in East Timor.  While these questions are of the highest 
importance, they may make more of a difference to the nations 
whose forces are involved than they do to the people of East 
Timor.  This message addresses the other possible components in 
a post-UNOTIL mission:  an international police force, election 
administration and/or assistance, and other elements designed to 
promote human rights, good governance, and the rule of law. 
 
International Police Force and Unified Training Program 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶3.      (SBU) The Australian-led Joint Task Force (JTF) has acted 
quickly to establish regular patrols and is responding far more 
quickly to acts of violence in Dili than was the case a week or 
two ago.  JTF officials have made it clear, however, that while 
the troops on the ground are filling the policing function as 
best they can, it is important that this function be assumed as 
soon as possible by an international police force.  The 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) (augmented by a small police 
contingent from New Zealand) and the Portuguese Republican 
National Guard (GNR) have been coordinating effectively at the 
operational level to begin providing policing services in their 
respective sectors.   The pending arrival of up to 250 Malaysian 
police officers will double the number of foreign police 
officers in Dili.  As these units become more familiar with 
conditions in Dili, and assuming they continue to co-ordinate 
effectively, they should be able to complete the task of 
restoring order within the capital. 
 
¶4.       Beyond the initial task of restoring a sense of security 
in Dili, international police forces will need to turn to the 
task of restructuring and retraining East Timor's national 
police service (PNTL).  AFP officials have indicated that, after 
a thorough vetting process, there are plans to integrate PNTL 
officers into AFP patrols and administrative structures. 
Pending the establishment of a UN successor mission it is 
important that one country, presumably Australia, take the lead 
 
DILI 00000313  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
in engaging with the PNTL.  During a visit today to PNTL 
Headquarters, EmbOffs learned that more than half of Dili 
District PNTL officers are reporting for work on a daily basis 
although they are not permitted to conduct police work or even 
to wear their uniforms outside the police compound.  Much of the 
former command structure appears to remain intact, police 
officers in all twelve districts other than Dili are carrying 
out their duties more or less normally, and PNTL officers in 
Dili are anxious to resume their responsibilities. 
 
¶5.      (SBU) The successor mission to UNOTIL should have two 
police components.  The first will be the operational force that 
should have executive authority over police operations 
throughout the country.  After years of ineffective policing, it 
is important that the units chosen to participate in this 
international police force be selected carefully, without the 
regional balancing and intra-UN logrolling that appears to have 
influenced the composition of previous UN police (UNPOL) forces 
in East Timor.  Each and every UNPOL contingent must come from 
an exemplary police force whose record in the home country is 
fully consistent with international standards regarding human 
rights protection and appropriate levels of force.  This is 
important not only to ensure that police operations are 
effective, but also to foster a sense of trust among the 
Timorese public for the international police force and for the 
retrained PNTL that will resume operations after the 
international force departs.  An emphasis on lightly-armed 
community policing should guide the operations of the 
international police force.  (Note:  Although some discussions 
of policing under a new UN mission have suggested a "rapid 
reaction force" as a separate element in such a mission, it 
would be better that rapid-reaction elements be integrated along 
with other elements in a single international force under a 
single command.) 
 
¶6.      (SBU) The second policing component in the next UN mission 
should be a robust and unified training program.  Retraining the 
PNTL will be one of the most important responsibilities of the 
successor mission and one that will need to be scrutinized 
closely by the diplomatic community.  In previous UN missions, 
the PNTL was trained by foreign police units from an array of 
countries with different standards of ethics and varying modes 
of operation and structures.  Moreover, some of these units had 
less-than-exemplary human rights records in their home 
countries.  See Refs A and B.  The new training program should 
be conducted by either by one country's police force or by a 
very small number of like-minded foreign police units to ensure 
continuity and in training.  As with the operational police 
contingents, it is vital that the international trainers come 
from police units whose doctrines and practices fully 
incorporate human rights protection and the use of no more than 
appropriate levels of force in all situations --- units who can 
deliver the training appropriate for a reconstituted East 
Timorese police force that would be lightly armed and engage 
primarily in community policing.  Past tendencies to promote the 
establishment of heavily armed specialized units must be 
actively resisted.  Although recent events do show that East 
Timor needs a highly-trained riot control unit and an effective 
and well-equipped border protection force, it is particularly 
important that these units be trained by international units 
with good records of not using excessive force.  See Refs A and 
¶B. 
 
¶7.      (S/NF) There have already been overtures from the GNR to 
begin training the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR).  The UIR, 
formerly known as the Special Police Unit (SPU), has been 
plagued by an institutional culture of machismo and related bad 
habits that some international and Timorese observers attribute 
in part to training the SPU received from GNR during previous UN 
missions.   See Ref A 
 
Election Administration and/or Assistance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
DILI 00000313  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Last year's local elections administered by the GOET 
with the assistance of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and bilateral donors were successful on the technical 
level, but there were credible accusations that GOET resources 
were used to assist candidates of the ruling Fretilin party and 
that GOET leaders may also have engaged in intimidation of 
non-Fretilin candidates and voters.  Barring a dramatic change 
in the political situation between now and early 2007, the 
national parliamentary and presidential elections will take 
place in an atmosphere of tension, of distrust, and quite 
possibly of fear.  Recent credible allegations of involvement by 
the Prime Minister in illegal activities to ensure his 
government and party remain in power, together with the 
Government's insistence that all election functions should be 
administered directly by the executive branch with a minimal 
role for the constitutionally mandated independent election 
commission, cast doubt on the current Government's willingness 
and ability to administer free and fair elections. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta's recent message to 
the UNSC addressed this problem by requesting that the national 
elections be not only "organized" but also "administered" 
directly by the UN mission.   Although there have been 
indications that Prime Minister Alkatiri does not concur with 
this position, it has the status of an official request to the 
UNSC by GOET.  The United States should move quickly to build 
UNSC consensus to comply with this request, which would greatly 
enhance the prospects for a free and fair election that has the 
confidence of the Timorese people.  International administration 
of the election should be carried out in close cooperation with 
the Timorese authorities --- and particularly with the 
independent election commission --- and should be done in a way 
that builds on the training received by national election 
officials during the local elections.  Special attention should 
be given to ensure that East Timor is left with capable and 
ethical electoral institutions, including the technical 
secretariat that handles the logistical aspects of elections as 
 
SIPDIS 
well as the independent election commission. 
 
Political Affairs, Human Rights, and Rule of Law 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶10. (SBU) UNOTIL has had difficulties in quickly accessing 
information about developments in the far-flung areas of the 
country, particularly alleged violations of human rights.  In a 
country where the news media often provides inaccurate 
information and telecommunications are unreliable, it is often 
difficult to debunk rumors without making time-consuming 
reconnaissance trips to remote areas.  In light of the upcoming 
elections and planned nationwide presence of UN election 
officials, Embassy would recommend that several political 
affairs and/or human rights unit offices be opened in strategic 
towns across the country.  Under the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the United Nations 
Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) mandates, similar 
offices provided a critical information resource for the UN, the 
diplomatic community, and GOET. 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) Both GOET and the leadership of UNOTIL believe it is 
important that a successor mission include assistance to the 
judicial system, including international judges, prosecutors, 
public defenders, and other judicial system personnel.  As with 
police training, it is important that international assistance 
to the judicial system be different from and better than the 
assistance that has been provided under UNOTIL and previous 
missions.  While it is true that East Timor's court system is 
fragile and inefficient, the UNOTIL- and UNDP-financed program 
designed to cure these problems has in fact made them far worse. 
 The centerpiece of this plan was mandatory classroom training 
for the Timorese judges and other judicial officers --- 
administered exclusively in the Portuguese language which at the 
time few of them understood ---  followed by a written 
 
DILI 00000313  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
examination.  In December 2004 the results of the examination 
were announced:  all 21 judges, including several who were by 
all accounts doing an excellent job, had failed.  These judges, 
along with almost all the Timorese prosecutors and public 
defenders, were then required to vacate their jobs and complete 
another 18 months of training.  About half of the judges have 
completed the training and will now be able to return to the 
bench as "probationary" judges.  During the absence of the 
Timorese judges from the bench, the caseload formerly handled by 
21 Timorese judges has been assigned to a much smaller number 
(ranging at various times from 2 to 5) of international judges, 
all from Portugal and other Lusophone countries.  Although Judge 
Ximenes (himself a Portuguese judge of Timorese extraction), 
Prime Minister Alkatiri, and some UN advisors have taken the 
position that the international judges have improved the quality 
and quantity of judicial decision making, the public perception 
is that the judicial system has slowed to a crawl and that most 
of the international judges have made no effort to understand 
the people whose cases they are deciding.  The recent return of 
the Timorese judges and other judicial officers, even as 
"probationers," see Ref C (Dili 293), should increase public 
confidence in the legal system.  International assistance to the 
judicial system should concentrate on helping the Timorese 
judges and other officers to do their jobs, not on convincing 
them that they lack the capacity to do so, and advisors to the 
judicial system under the new mission should not/not be limited 
to judges and other officials from Lusophone countries. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The relationship between the new mission and the 
international "commission of inquiry" into violence committed in 
East Timor since April 28, 2006, and the relationship of both 
these entities to possible follow-up mechanisms for truth and 
accountability for serious crimes committed in 1999, will be 
discussed in septel. 
 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) In light of the proliferation of weapons and increased 
recalcitrance of the various armed groups, including "civilians" 
(many of whom are ex-independence fighters who have been aligned 
with the armed forces (FDTL) during the recent conflict) or 
dissident members of the security forces, it appears 
increasingly unlikely that GOET will be able to manage the 
necessary disarmament program alone.  Although the international 
forces currently on the ground have recovered a number of 
weapons possessed by police officers and "civilians," these 
efforts have been confined primarily to Dili, and many weapons 
are believed to remain hidden in Dili and elsewhere.  The 
complete disarming of dissident and pro-government groups will 
be a long process.  A program to accomplish this should include 
not only disarmament but also mechanisms to ensure the members 
of these groups are effectively demobilized and reintegrated 
into civilian life. 
 
¶14. (C) During a meeting with EmbOffs today, Foreign/Defense 
Minister Ramos-Horta agreed that a disarmament, demobilization, 
and reinsertion (DDR) program would be a useful component of a 
follow-on mission.  He discussed the possibility of conducting 
exchanges whereby weapons could be traded for livestock, food, 
agricultural tools, etc.  The Foreign Minister indicated that a 
disarmament program was long overdue in East Timor as the 
population had never been effectively disarmed of old Falintil 
guerrilla weapons.  The Minister also highlighted the important 
point that, in order for the armed groups and individuals to be 
confident enough in their physical security to hand over their 
weapons, the international forces on the ground must be visibly 
present throughout the country and must work to establish a 
sense of community security. 
 
Military/Defense Advisors 
-------------------------- 
 
 
DILI 00000313  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶15. (C) There have been productive discussions between the 
President, Foreign/Defense Ministe Ramos-Horta, and FDTL 
commander General Taur Matan Ruak regarding a possible 
restructuring of FDTL.  During a meeting with EmbOffs, Defense 
Minister Ramos-Horta stated that he felt the size of the 
military should be reduced.  The Government has made important 
steps in this regard by recently adding line items to the budget 
that would provide housing and pensions for veterans.  As many 
FDTL soldiers are former guerrilla fighters who will soon reach 
retirement age, it is likely that a significant portion of the 
FDTL can be effectively demobilized through such programs. 
Although no decisions have been made, Ramos-Horta discussed a 
previous initiative that would enhance FDTL's capacity to serve 
as a maritime security force, perhaps give it some function with 
respect to land border security, and divide the remaining forces 
into two specially trained battalions, namely a peacekeeping 
battalion and an army corps of engineers.  Such an initiative 
would transform the current conventional infantry into 
specialized units that would perform productive work throughout 
the country and provide noncombatant assistance during crises 
such as natural disasters.  In light of these positive 
initiatives, Embassy would recommend the follow-on mission 
include a small unit of military/defense advisors.  As with the 
officers providing police training, particular care should be 
taken to select military/defense advisors with high ethical 
standards, commitment to human rights and to civilian control of 
the military, and experience in defense policy development. 
REES