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RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1953

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/4/2016 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV MOPS PHUM TT KDEM KPKO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH MINISTER RAMOS-HORTA 
 
REF: (A) DILI 228; (B) DILI 263; (C) DILI 275; (D) DILI 279; (E) DILI 281, (F) 
 
DILI 283; (G) DILI 287 
 
DILI 00000291  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1) (U) Ambassador Rees met twice on June 2 with Foreign Minister 
(and now Defense Minister) Jose Ramos-Horta: in a briefing with 
the diplomatic corps and in a subsequent private meeting.  In 
the meeting with the diplomatic corps Ramos-Horta said he had 
been resisted the appointment as Minister of Defense but had 
finally accepted after being urged to do so by armed forces 
(FDTL) commander General Taur Matan Ruak.  He emphasized recent 
improvements in the security situation in Dili and was 
optimistic about the prospects for further improvement. 
Ramos-Horta suggested that the next United Nations mission might 
be given a mandate to investigate the violent acts committed in 
East Timor since April 28, discussed the difficult task of 
collecting military and police weapons that had been distributed 
to select "civilians," indicated that his office was working 
with the Australian forces to facilitate these forces' ability 
to arrest and detain suspected perpetrators of violent crimes, 
and said he "hopes" the Portuguese security forces will work in 
an assigned sector as the other international forces do. 
Ramos-Horta also spoke candidly about what he regarded as the 
origins of the current problem: the United Nations tried 
unsuccessfully to build a state from scratch in two years, and 
after independence the Timorese government was arrogant and 
uninclusive.  He noted in particular that the Government had 
ignored and/or disrespected the traditional leadership structure 
(i.e. local and regional chiefs and "liurai") and the Catholic 
Church, which Ramos-Horta described as the two institutions that 
had held the Timorese people together. 
 
2) (S) Summary continued:  In his private meeting with 
Ambassador, Ramos-Horta was even more candid.  He discussed the 
need for further changes in East Timor's Government, which would 
almost certainly include the resignation or dismissal of Prime 
Minister Mari Alkatiri.  In Ramos-Horta's view, the only 
possible way to make Alkatiri's continuance in office acceptable 
to the public would be for Alkatiri to agree to head a 
"Government of National Unity" including key opposition leaders 
and in which the Prime Minister would share power with Ministers 
rather than exercising it unilaterally.  In the alternative, 
either the Fretilin Central Committee or the Parliament  --- 
including a number of Fretilin Members of Parliament whom he 
said were very unhappy with Alkatiri --- might vote for 
Alkatiri's removal, and if none of these things happened by the 
end of June then President Xanana Gusmao might have to use his 
constitutional power to dismiss the Prime Minister and appoint a 
caretaker government.  Ramos-Horta siad Gusmao had been ready to 
dismiss Alkatiri a week ago, but that he had persuaded the 
President not to dismiss the government in the midst of a 
crisis.  He noted that there were "very serious allegations" 
about Alkatiri's distribution of weapons to his supporters, and 
about his motivations for calling in the armed forces (FDTL) at 
several points during the last month.  Ramos-Horta added that 
once he assumed the Defense Ministry he would take orders from 
the President, not from the Prime Minister.  Finally, he 
suggested that the United Nations be given "100% control" of the 
2007 national elections in East Timor.  End Summary. 
 
3) (U) In a June 2 briefing for Ambassadors and other senior 
members of the Dili diplomatic corps, Foreign Minister 
Ramos-Horta discussed his impending assumption of the Minister 
of Defense position, which he will hold in addition to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs portfolio.  He began by saying he 
might not be an ideal Minister of Defense because he had argued 
throughout the 1990s that an independent East Timor should have 
no armed forces.  In his December 1996 acceptance of the Nobel 
Peace Prize he had suggested the "Costa Rica model" of a 
national police force but no army or other war-fighting entity. 
He said he had resisted accepting the Defense Ministry but had 
accepted after several calls from FDTL commander General Taur 
Matan Ruak, who said FDTL would be very happy if Ramos-Horta 
were Minister of Defense.  He said he had also been urged to 
accept by Prime Minister Alkatiri and Minister of State 
Administration Ana Pessoa. 
 
DILI 00000291  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
4) (U)  Ramos-Horta said FDTL members had been involved in some 
inappropriate acts of violence but that FDTL's "reputation had 
been blackened", in some ways unfairly.  He said some violent 
acts had been committed by FDTL members, but that others had 
been committed by non-FDTL members wearing FDTL uniforms. 
(Comment:  Although Ramos-Horta seemed to imply that these 
perpetrators may have been enemies of FDTL trying to make the 
armed forces look bad, all reports Embassy has received of 
non-FDTL members wearing FDTL uniforms appear to involve people 
who were given these uniforms and/or military weapons by senior 
FDTL officers or by persons acting in concert with them.  See 
Reftels.  End Comment.)  Ramos Horta added that "FDTL obeyed 
orders to be involved in putting down violence in the city" and 
that FDTL had subsequently obeyed the orders it was given to 
return to barracks. 
 
5) (U) Ramos-Horta indicated that soon after being sworn in as 
Minister of Defense he would visit the FDTL barracks at Baucau, 
Metinaro, and Hera.  He would then proceed to Gleno to visit 
with the ex-FDTL "petitioners," and to Maubisse to visit with 
dissident elements of FDTL under the command of Major Alfredo 
Reinado.  He hoped that in the next week there would be 
all-inclusive peace talks involving various elements of the 
Government, the petitioners, the dissident soldiers, the Church, 
and civil society. 
 
6) (U) Ramos-Horta was optimistic about the security situation 
in Dili, noting that "last night was the third straight night of 
almost no violence."  He said there had been "some burnings in 
Becora, but much less than previous days," and although there is 
"sporadic gunfire, there is no organized shooting."  He 
concluded that  "I think we see a trend."  He concluded that 
"the activities of the combined international forces, plus the 
messages of our President, are having some impact."  He added 
that "I've had 400 to 600 people camping on the grounds around 
my house, but last night there were only 100," although he noted 
that the Canossian Sisters and other church groups are still 
hosting many thousands of displaced persons. 
 
7) (U) Ramos-Horta suggested that the "next United Nations 
mission" might be given "a mandate to investigate post-April 28 
violence."   He also said that as soon as he takes over as 
defense minister he will initiate an immediate internal 
investigation to determine the location of all FDTL weapons, 
which would facilitate the recovery of any weapons distributed 
to non-FDTL members.  He noted that General Matan Ruak had 
written to the Prime Minister offering to compare lists of the 
weapons that had been given to FDTL with the weapons the FDTL 
still possesses. 
 
8) (U) Ramos-Horta said his international legal advisor is 
working with representatives of the Australian forces on 
procedures under which the international forces could arrest and 
detain suspected perpetrators of violent crimes.  He said that 
at present the forces are either not arresting those caught in 
the act of burning houses or committing other violence, or are 
arresting them and releasing them shortly thereafter.  He noted 
that the Timorese courts are working and that a number of 
Timorese judges would soon graduate from their training course 
and return to the bench. 
 
9) (U) Ramos-Horta told the diplomats that when the Portuguese 
paramilitary police (GNR) arrive, "I hope they will work in 
assigned sectors like the Australians, the Malaysians, and the 
New Zealand forces."  The Portuguese Ambassador, who was present 
at the meeting, immediately raised an unrelated question but did 
not address Ramos-Horta's suggestion that the Portuguese unit 
should operate only in an assigned sector. 
 
10) (U) Finally, Ramos-Horta spoke candidly about what he 
regarded as the causes of the current situation.  He said that 
East Timor should not be regarded as a "failed or failing 
state", noting that "only a few months ago we were seen as a 
shining example of democracy."  He said the next few days or 
weeks would be crucial in determining which of these paths East 
Timor would take.  Ramos-Horta suggested that two years of 
United Nations administration was "too soon to build a state. 
But if our government had been more inclusive, less arrogant, we 
 
DILI 00000291  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
could have avoided these problems.  In particular, the 
government had erred by not working together with the Catholic 
Church, "the only centuries-old institution in this country.  He 
noted that the Portuguese government had survived for 500 years 
in Timor with no army, "because they worked together with the 
Church and the traditional leaders (liurai).  But we thought it 
was politically correct to do away with the traditional leaders 
and to be extremely secular.  So we undermined the two 
institutions that held the country together.  But we are 
learning, and under Xanana's leadership we will succeed." 
 
11) (S) In a private meeting several hours later with 
Ambassador, Ramos-Horta said that further changes in the 
Government will be necessary beyond the replacement of the 
Ministers of Defense and Interior, in order to restore public 
confidence, peace, and stability.  He expects these changes to 
take place by the end of June at the latest. 
 
12) (S)  In Ramos-Horta's view, the only way the public will 
accept Alkatiri's continuance in office is if he agrees to head 
a "Government of National Unity" that includes key opposition 
leaders and discards some of the incompetent or corrupt Fretilin 
cabinet members.  Ramos-Horta has already urged this option, but 
Alkatiri has repeatedly turned it down.  If the Prime Minister 
keeps on refusing, then Ramos-Horta believes the Fretilin 
Central Committee might vote to recommend his resignation. 
Ramos-Horta has spoken with Francisco Branco, the leader of the 
Fretilin bench in Parliament, who was a prominent supporter of 
Alkatiri's as recently as the May 17-19 Fretilin Congress, but 
who is now angry and looking for an alternative.  Branco is 
trying to arrange a meeting of the party Central Committee, but 
Alkatiri may prevent this from happening.  Another possible 
course of action would be for Parliament to pass a vote of no 
confidence in the Prime Minister.  This would require that at 
least 15 to 20 of the 55 Fretilin Members of Parliament join 25 
to 30 of the 33 non-Fretilin members to support the motion of no 
confidence.  Ramos-Horta believes Branco and others would vote 
for such a motion.  He also believes it might be possible to 
persuade Francisco Lu'Olo Guterres, the President of Parliament 
and a strong Alkatiri ally, to distance himself from Alkatiri. 
 
13) (S) According to Ramos-Horta, if none of the above scenarios 
have happened by the end of June, he (Ramos-Horta) will resign 
from the Cabinet along with several other Ministers, and 
President Gusmao will invoke his constitutional power to dismiss 
the Prime Minister "when necessary to assure the regular 
functioning of the democratic institutions."  A caretake 
government would then be appointed, probably with Ramos-Horta as 
Prime Minister and Jose Lobato (a highly regarded former member 
of Parliament who is an Alkatiri ally and who now serves as 
Director of the Timor Sea Designated Authority, the joint East 
Timor-Australia offshore petroleum field management entity) as 
Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
14) (S) Ramos-Horta said the President was ready to dismiss 
Alkatiri last week, but that he had persuaded the President "not 
to dismiss the Government in the midst of the security crisis. 
I told Xanana, let's not take any imprudent actions.  We are 
closing in on him."  Nevertheless, he noted that the President 
is absolutely determined to dismiss Alkatiri, primarily because 
of evidence that has been presented to the President of 
Alkatiri's personal involvement in distributing weapons, 
including some that were allegedly to have been used to kill 
people.  See Ref G.  Ramos-Horta said he himself was not 
familiar with all of the evidence in the President's possession, 
but that he had heard "very serious allegations" against 
Alkatiri from a number of sources. 
 
15) (S) Ramos-Horta stated that as Minister of Defense he will 
take his instructions from President Gusmao, not from Alkatiri. 
He noted that he used to visit Alkatiri's house quite often but 
no longer does so.  Rather, "I spend half of every day in 
Xanana's office.  I work with the Government only on matters of 
mutual interest.  Otherwise I ignore them."   He added that 
Alkatiri is "so stubborn and arrogant he has alienated everyone. 
 Only the loyalists from Maputo stay with him." 
 
16) (SBU) Finally, Ramos-Horta reiterated an earlier suggestion 
that the United Nations should be given "100 per cent control" 
 
DILI 00000291  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
over the 2007 national elections in East Timor.  He said this 
would not only ensure that the elections were administered in a 
technically correct manner, but also that they would be regarded 
as fair by the Timorese people and the international community. 
 
17) (S) Comment:  Although Ramos-Horta is accurate in assessing 
Alkatiri's support among the general public as approaching zero, 
he and other observers (including Embassy Dili) have been wrong 
before in assuming that this unpopularity would cause Fretilin 
to dump Alkatiri.  The Prime Minister has proved himself adept 
at manipulating Fretilin party rules and procedures, and he and 
his allies recently reconstituted the Fretilin Central Committee 
to omit a number of anti-Alkatiri members.  Alkatiri's ally 
Lu'Olo could probably succeed in postponing the vote on a motion 
of no confidence in Parliament for at least long enough to apply 
the same kinds of pressures and inducements that resulted in 
Alkatiri's overwhelming victory in the Fretilin Congress. If the 
President is truly determined to dismiss the Prime Minister it 
is quite likely he will find it necessary to use his power under 
article 112 of the Constitution.  End Comment. 
REES