VZCZCXYZ0016
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDK #1553/01 1811228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH CCY ADXEC2FBA MSI7427 612
R 301228Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5589

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 001553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (CHANGE DECLAS DATE) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, F, PRM/AFR, AF/EPS, DRL/PHO, 
INR/AA 
ALSO PASS TO AID FOR AFR/WA AND AA/AFR - LPIERSON 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/16 
TAGS: EAID ECON PGOV PINS SG
SUBJECT:  COUNTRY TEAM AID PROPOSALS FOR CASAMANCE 
 
REFS:  A)1 June 2006 Evaluation of the USAID Peace- 
 
Building Program in Casamance and Sub-Region; 
B)Dakar 1204 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JANICE L. JACOBS FOR REASONS 1.4 
(B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (C)  The Country Team met June 14 to discuss ways to 
move the Casamance peace process forward.  We raised two 
central questions.  First was whether the Senegalese 
Government and MFDC rebel movement have sufficient 
political will to resolve the conflict.  Second was 
whether USG money could make a significant positive 
difference.  We believe President Wade has a genuine 
desire and vision for peace.  His approach, though, has 
been incoherent, hampered by lack of know-how and hidden 
agendas among those responsible for executing his orders. 
 
¶2.  (C)  We also affirmed that U.S. pressure and 
financial aid has earned us a reputation as an engaged, 
neutral, knowledgeable and trustworthy intermediary. 
Based on this political capital, we concluded that 
strategic USG financial assistance could make a positive 
impact.  To support transformational diplomacy with 
implications for Senegal's reintegration, growth and sub- 
regional diplomacy, our recommendations for future aid 
include resources of USD 3.0 million/year from FY07 to 
FY09.  END SUMMARY 
 
APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED TO CORE OBJECTIVES 
 
------------------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C)  Progress in the Casamance peace process has been 
frustratingly slow, but three years of halting movement 
toward peace and return of some refugees have provided a 
basis to examine which assistance should be reinforced. 
We have been able to gauge:  1) the extent of GOS and 
MFDC engagement in the peace process; 2) that the Gambian 
and Bissau-Guinean governments are now willing to 
contribute to rather than hamper peace; 3) Casamancais 
acceptance of the U.S. as intermediary, and, 4) thanks to 
an internal AID evaluation (REF A), the relative efficacy 
with which different forms of assistance have contributed 
to the peace process. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Presidential and legislative elections are to be 
held in February 2007, and there are few signs the GOS 
will launch major initiatives in the Casamance until then. 
This period will provide an excellent opportunity to build 
on lessons learned, by fine tuning a practical approach to 
address key drivers of conflict and by mapping out a 
strategy to persuade the new government to make Casamance 
a priority.  Our overall objectives are to encourage GOS- 
MFDC dialog, build capacities for a transparent peace 
process, and intensify civil society's role in resolving 
the conflict at community and national levels. 
 
NO WAR/NO PEACE AS OF JUNE 2006 
------------------------------- 
¶5.  (C)  President Wade recently assigned Mbaye Jacques 
Diop of the Council of the Republic for Social and 
Economic Affairs, officially the number four person within 
the GOS, as Casamance advisor.  Still, many believe his 
predecessor, General Fall, retains dominant influence on 
Casamance issues.  Some suspect that for a number of 
reasons, including financial ones, Fall is hampering 
progress toward peace. 
 
¶6.  (C) Diop told the Ambassador May 31 the Casamance is 
"evolving."  He said an earlier meeting with DCM Jackson, 
AID/Senegal Director Carduner and a representative of 
PADCO, the USAID-financed consultants who offer training 
in interest-based negotiations to the GOS, MFDC and civil 
society, had been fruitful.  When asked if Guinea-Bissau 
armed forces' intervention to suppress MFDC recalcitrant 
Salif Sadio had been helpful, Diop replied it had, that 
Sadio was weakened and wanted to negotiate.  He said the 
GOS hopes for a second round of negotiations with the MFDC 
after the rainy season, in late September or October. 
Diop said the GOS had an action plan for Casamance 
reconstruction once peace talks succeed, and had set up 
agencies whose mission is economic revitalization. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Within the MFDC, there appears to be continued 
but creakingly slow progress toward unity, though some 
increasingly question the competence of aging MFDC 
political leader Abbe Diamacoune Senghor.   Sadio hard- 
liners and the pro-peace factions of the MFDC are 
intermittently talking and fighting, while the recent 
clashes left thousands more people displaced on both sides 
of the Guinea-Bissau and Gambian borders.  The 
International Committee of the Red Cross described the 
situation as "worrisome but not alarming." 
 
SHARPER STRATEGY: CHOOSING WHAT LEADS TO PEACE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶8.  (SBU)  Both our significant and our modest successes 
have provided valuable lessons in what contributes 
directly to peace.  Ref A indicates AID has gotten most 
bang for the buck with conflict resolution programs at the 
community level.  This has included reconstruction of 
housing and village infrastructure, and emphasized 
projects implemented by women's groups.  It indicates that 
rebuilding economic livelihoods, while "very relevant," 
was "too thinly spread and focused on micro-finance." 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ref A found that conflict resolution at the 
political level, due to personnel turnover in the GOS and 
rivalries among rebels, had to date had only moderate 
success.  Despite this, it concluded the U.S. should 
"emphasize more political and cross-border aspects of 
conflict dynamics." 
 
¶10.  (C)  A sharper U.S. strategy can counter Casamancais' 
growing perception, based on dramatically reduced funding, 
that the USG is pulling out.  We can capitalize on 
investments already made, focus limited funding on areas 
that show most promise, and build on the unique foundation 
the U.S. has established.  The World Bank, European Union 
and UNDP are ready with funds for humanitarian demining, 
economic development and disarmament, demobilization and 
reinsertion programs.  (The U.S. is also contributing to 
demining with FY06 and 07 funding.)  This offers excellent 
opportunity to maximize U.S. investment by coordinating 
with other donors.  A sustainable peace accord is 
prerequisite, though, and only the U.S. can play the 
pivotal role in the peace process. 
BUILDING A FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC PLAN 
---------------------------------- 
¶11.  (C)  A strategic and sustainable plan must retain 
macro and micro level activities and build links between 
the two.  The Casamance population, most internal MFDC 
factions and President Wade want peace, but they have been 
unable to move much beyond ceasefire. 
 
--  The first element of our plan would include policy 
dialog at the national level, centering on issues such as 
demining, setting a joint MFDC/GOS peace talk agenda, 
identifying key negotiating parties, and advocating an end 
to use of discretionary or "black" funding.  This could 
include, when needed, services of a special facilitator or 
mediator. 
 
--  Second, we will continue to provide technical aid to 
GOS and MFDC in conflict resolution and negotiations, and 
we would add communications and intra-party strategic 
planning.  To assure continuity, this would entail full 
time engagement of a mediator with Casamance expertise. 
 
--  Mediation and reconciliation by civil society is 
essential to establish peace.  Our third tack would be to 
assist civil society to apply pressure for reaching a 
peace accord, and to play an expanded and meaningful role 
in the peace process.  The U.S. will also contribute to 
building trust between the GOS, MFDC and civil society. 
 
--  Offering concrete dividends has proved an especially 
effective contribution to the peace process according to 
Ref A.  We should, as a fourth measure, help to build 
small community infrastructure such as wells, classrooms, 
health huts and houses.  To have an impact on peace, these 
projects require a minimum number of beneficiaries and 
must be designed with an integrated peace-building 
component anchored in community reconciliation.  Budgets 
for these projects are insufficient, even with small DOD, 
Self Help, and HRDF activities redesigned to support 
peacebuilding, since there are no AID funds available for 
a large-scale program.  Finally, we will continue to 
support DOS and DOD efforts in humanitarian demining. 
This will start with USD 92,000 in FY06 funds for mine 
risk education and victims' assistance, and lead 
eventually, once a peace agreement has been signed, to 
actual humanitarian demining activities in concert with 
the Senegalese National Demining Commission and our 
international partners. 
 
--  Fifth, to leverage public diplomacy and encourage the 
broader Senegalese public to support the peace process, we 
will enhance strategic public affairs coverage of our aid 
to civil society. 
 
SPECIFIC MEASURES 
----------------- 
¶12. (C)  Seven years of AID technical aid in the 
Casamance, heavy Embassy political engagement since at 
least 2003 and DOD interaction with the Senegalese 
military have made the U.S. one of only two external 
actors with extensive knowledge of the conflict's dynamics 
and the trust of both GOS and MFDC.  (The other is the 
International Red Cross.)  The Embassy will continue to 
actively encourage the peace process, while AID will set 
aside funding for possible engagement of a special 
mediator. 
 
¶13. (C)  Technical assistance to the peace process is a 
core element of our strategy, and will focus on building 
capacity to manage and participate in a peace process.  A 
key element of this is working with each side, and 
especially the MFDC, to clarify interests and positions. 
This will be achieved via training workshops, facilitated 
dialogs and other means of building relationships of 
trust.  An expert will be engaged to follow the conflict 
full-time and manage activities.  In FY06, AID has in 
place a program to help advance the peace program that is 
targeted at the first three areas outlined above.  This 
will build on a $700,000 project (conducted by PADCO) 
focusing solely on capacity building in negotiation and 
conflict resolution. 
 
¶14.  (C)  To encourage reconciliation, we will provide 
seed projects, which are sub-grants with integrated, 
stand-alone objectives.  They will include advocacy 
campaigns by local leaders and organizations to press the 
GOS and MFDC to work toward peace.  The seed projects may 
also encourage specific groups such as women, youth, 
locally elected officials or schools and students to 
continue building support for peace at community level. 
In addition, the Ambassador's Fund for Refugees and DHRF 
funding will support, among other projects, a community 
radio network reaching out to refugees.  ODC plans FY06 
school construction in the key town of Sindian. 
 
¶15.  (C)  There are insufficient funds to fully implement 
the Mission's integrated and comprehensive Casamance 
strategy.  The Country Team suggests a budget of USD 3.0 
million/year for FY07 - 09 to accomplish the five-pronged 
strategy outlined above. 
 
JACOBS