VZCZCXRO0316
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #1427/01 1661410
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151410Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5462
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA AND INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR SG
SUBJECT:  IS SENEGAL'S DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS AT RISK? 
 
REF: A)DAKAR 1149; B)DAKAR 1011; C)DAKAR 0817; 
D)DAKAR 0681; E)DAKAR 0565; F)05 DAKAR 1243 
 
CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER, FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (SBU)  There is deep-rooted Senegalese consensus in 
favor of freedom of expression, rule of law, respect of 
national institutions, conformity to parliamentary or 
executive rules or custom, civilian control of security 
forces, the desirability of dialog between authorities 
and opposition, and an expectation that leaders will 
respond to public needs.  The 2000 election proved the 
value of the democratic consensus, showing voters that 
failed leaders could be replaced by ballot without threat 
to public order. 
 
¶2.  (C)  President Wade, in disdaining the French- 
bequeathed bureaucratic system and reliance on inter- 
institutional arrangements for a more flexible and 
egocentric style, has called elements of the democratic 
consensus into question.  We are not by any means 
convinced he lacks commitment to democratic rule or free 
elections.  Still, we review below what constitutes 
Senegalese democracy, examine growing concerns that it 
could be at some risk, and explore ways the U.S. could 
help assure fair elections in 2007.  END SUMMARY 
 
AN IMPERFECT AFRICAN DEMOCRACY 
------------------------------ 
¶3.  (C)  Senegalese have never accepted an all-powerful 
and all-consuming "big man" as leader.  Founding 
President Leopold Senghor, as much French Catholic as he 
was African, combined his Independence movement with 
French colonial institutions to establish a severely- 
curtailed but effective democracy.  Citizens of 1960s and 
1970s Senegal could rally, speak out and criticize even 
the president, though their power to challenge the de 
facto single-party government was limited by Socialist 
control of the media; close links between state, 
religious leaders and traditional chiefs; and legal 
restrictions on the Left and other political parties. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In this real but limited democracy, the National 
Assembly was free to debate but expected to approve any 
bill Senghor sent it.  The single legal labor union was 
incorporated in the state.  Rules of law and 
institutional predictability were respected, though as 
time went on a measure of corruption was allowed to 
grease the wheels.  The army was well paid and under 
civilian control, though Senghor used it sometimes 
politically, as when he ordered enlistment of unruly 
Marxists.  Police and gendarmes were republican 
institutions, but Senghor also had young loyalist toughs 
whom he could use for rare instances when an arm had to 
be twisted. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Within the one-party democracy, factions or 
inchoate interest groups championed their region, 
ethnicity or religion and the energetic and to-politics- 
born Senghor networked closely with them all.  In 1974, 
he allowed Wade to lead the first loyal opposition, 
though he identified whenever Wade surpassed proper 
bounds and quickly acted by law or rougher methods to 
limit Wade's room to maneuver. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The underlying rules of one-party democracy 
remained intact even as Senghor's system declined in 
efficiency and decayed in public confidence under his 
more lethargic and less astute successor Abdou Diouf 
(1980-2000).  The rules reinforced the predictable 
performance of national institutions.  Combined with 
occasional electoral chicanery, they also permitted 
exercise of democratic rights while ultimately denying 
the opposition any real chance during either the campaign 
or the vote count. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Until 2000, Senegalese may have seen elections 
as a form of the idle conversation they love so much -- 
pleasant and often exhilarating but without consequences. 
Only in 2000 did they realize their vote let them hold 
leaders accountable and replace them.  It was a 
psychological boost, one we hear voters will not 
relinquish lightly. 
 
2000:  WADE'S COALITION EXPECTED TO PLAY BY THE RULES 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶8.  (C)  A deep, massive, widespread, decade-long 
revulsion against Socialist-led economic decline, 
 
DAKAR 00001427  002 OF 003 
 
 
combined with an unprecedented coalition of Wade's PDS 
plus the Left and a significant rebel Socialist faction, 
allowed Wade to hold the Socialists under 50 percent in 
the first-round 2000 presidential election.  This 
shattered the Socialist aura of invincibility and paved 
the way for a rout in the second round.  Once elected, 
Wade's allies expected Wade to enact new policies, but 
they also expected him to play by old rules. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Wade had other ideas.  His enforcer Idrissa Seck 
replaced Wade coalition allies with Socialist turncoats 
who from the moment of defection would owe their futures 
to Wade.  Seck overreached and was sidelined, but not 
before strengthening the already extensive powers of the 
presidency and removing from government those with 
political weight to influence Wade's decisions.  Wade's 
decisions since have often seemed whimsical, self-serving 
or even an outright challenge to the democratic 
consensus, as in his widely-resented late 2004 decision 
to allow Parliament to pass a bill pardoning political 
crimes. 
 
CLEVER, DASTARDLY OR DOWNRIGHT SUBVERSIVE? 
------------------------------------------ 
¶10.  (C)  Dakarois avidly consume news, and private radio 
has made political junkies of illiterates, isolated 
farmers and grassland herdsmen.  As far as we can tell, 
most agree Wade is manipulating the pre-campaign.  Some 
praise him as a canny politician committing allowable 
mischief, while others deplore alleged misuse of 
republican institutions and violation of the democratic 
consensus. 
 
¶11.  (C)  We have heard Senegalese deconstruct and re- 
imagine worst-case political analyses for hours.  Some 
popular assumptions are: 
 
--  there is deep rural disappointment with Wade; 
 
--  Wade may not be able to count on the youth or urban 
poor support he had in 2000; 
 
--  the Interior Ministry may be suppressing voter 
registration in rural areas where Wade is weak, and 
encouraging it in cities where he is strong; 
 
--  Wade prolonged MPs' mandates and coupled National 
Assembly and presidential elections so that his presumed 
coat-tails would help him win parliament.  (Almost surely 
true.  Critics charge prolongation of MP terms was not 
constitutional, but the law allowing it was passed in due 
form by Wade's parliamentary majority.) 
 
--  despite coupling of elections and allegedly biased 
registration, both opposition and PDS largely agree the 
PDS may/may lose parliamentary elections. (To compensate, 
Wade has indicated he may increase the overall number of 
MPs, and especially those chosen on the national list, 
which he can more easily influence); 
 
--  to avoid cohabitation with an opposition parliament 
or loss of the presidential election, many think Wade 
will postpone or cancel elections, unilaterally or in 
cahoots with the opposition (Ref A); 
 
--  ultimately, some fear Wade and his cronies -- if he 
actually holds free elections and loses them -- will use 
force, either friends in the police and gendarmerie or 
youthful thugs, to hold onto power (Ref D). 
 
U.S. LEVERAGE AND FREE ELECTIONS 
-------------------------------- 
¶12.  (C)  Nine months before elections, we agree Wade is 
hiding, obscuring or obfuscating his intentions, but that 
may fall, just barely, within the realm of acceptable 
albeit dirty-trick-flavored politics.  We are encouraged 
that media, labor unions, NGOs and some religious leaders 
have joined the opposition in insisting that coming 
elections be as free as in 2000.  This proves again how 
deeply the democratic consensus is entrenched.  Wade's 
less scrupulous hangers-on, including some in powerful 
ministries, may want to preserve privileges of power at 
all cost.  Wade, though, has spoken often, widely and 
persuasively of his commitment to democracy. 
 
¶13.  (S)  To help Wade act on his best instincts and 
ensure free, fair and transparent elections, we have 
identified ways in which the U.S. might best make its 
voice heard.  Each measure has advantages and 
disadvantages, which we have also tried to define: 
 
 
DAKAR 00001427  003 OF 003 
 
 
--  The most powerful leverage we have is Wade's deep 
appreciation of Senegal's ties to America, and above all 
his warm relationship with President Bush.  We would want 
to use such leverage only in an extreme situation, such 
as postponement or cancellation of elections.  In such 
case, a statement from President Bush (or Secretary Rice) 
encouraging Wade's commitment to hold free elections 
would intensify pressure on Wade to actually do so. 
There would be a negative side, though.  Wade would 
splash the U.S. message across the media, and this would 
be seen as an endorsement.  This in turn would provoke 
two criticisms: that the U.S. was naive about Wade's 
intentions; and that its intervention, no matter how 
well-meant, was reinforcing rather than correcting Wade's 
supposed manipulations. 
 
--  Wade expects signature of an MCA compact before the 
elections to show U.S. support for his economic programs, 
as Foreign Minister Gadio recently indicated to the 
Secretary.  Assuming technical progress permits signing 
 
SIPDIS 
of a compact before the elections, the signing ceremony 
could be used to stress the need for transparency.  Wade 
would also exploit such a statement, though, and critics 
will in any case denounce any signing ceremony that takes 
place during the campaign.  If greater pressure were 
required, scheduling could be subject to review of U.S. 
and other observers' evaluation of progress toward free 
elections. 
 
--  The forms of pressure which we would at present 
prefer include:  visits at the Assistant Secretary level 
(which again could be seen as U.S. favoritism to Wade); 
messages from the Assistant Secretary to Foreign Minister 
Gadio; an expanded series of speakers on democratic 
procedures and values; or aid to those with specific 
criteria for judging the electoral process' integrity 
(for example a manual for election observers being 
prepared by Law Professor Mamadou Kamara).  We could also 
help, through our Public Affairs Section, to provide 
greater visibility to civil society NGOs we are aiding to 
strengthen democracy and good governance. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Other ideas come to mind: 
 
--  We could announce that we would send election 
observers to Senegal, but that would be essentially 
meaningless, since any manipulation will come during the 
registration process or in parliamentary-approved changes 
to institutions such as an increase in the number of MPs. 
 
-- Any suggestion that we might reduce aid would have all 
the diplomatic delicacy of a sledgehammer with a double- 
long handle.  Doing so would put into question all that 
the donor community are achieving in reduction of poverty 
and the Casamance peace process, not to mention U.S.- 
Senegalese cooperation in peacekeeping. 
 
-- In past Senegalese elections, the National Democratic 
Institute has helped in the registration of voters.  Such 
a program would require approximately a nine-month lead- 
time, though, and there is currently no funding 
available. 
 
¶15.  (C)  The best tack to take for now, we believe, 
continues to be normal if intensified expression of 
interest in free elections, combined with continued close 
monitoring of election mechanisms and the campaign. 
 
Jacobs